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“Since the UN system has proved, over a sixty-year period that it is essentially unreformable, 
we will end up with donors increasingly turning away, the organization sinking into oblivion, 
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about language that, in the end, does little to change reality” 


















The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  UNCTAD	  

















©	  Maren	  Maal	  
2013	  
The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  UNCTAD	  –	  A	  study	  of	  the	  dynamics	  in	  the	  North-­‐South	  Dialogue	  
Maren	  Maal	  
http://www.duo.uio.no/	  




In	  this	  thesis,	  UNCTAD	  (United	  Nations	  Conference	  of	  Trade	  and	  Development)	  is	  used	  as	  a	  
case	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  dynamics	   in	  the	  North-­‐South	  dialogue.	  UNCTAD	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  
the	   institutional	   arena	   where	   the	   South	   used	   Global	   Conference	   Diplomacy	   (GCD)	   to	  
challenge	  the	  status	  quo	   in	   the	  quest	   for	  a	  New	   International	  Economic	  Order	   (NIEO).	  The	  
quest	  of	  NIEO	  through	  UNCTAD	  failed	  conclusively	  when	  the	  outcome	  was	  compared	  to	  the	  
stated	   objectives	   of	   the	   grand	   coalition	   of	   the	   South.	   Consequently,	   UNCTAD	   as	   an	  
institutional	  arena	  and	  as	  a	  device	  for	  aggregating	  and	  articulating	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  South	  
experienced	  a	  Fall.	  	   	  
The	  main	   objective	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   understand	   UNCTAD’s	   development	   over	   time	   and	  
explain	  the	  drivers	  behind	  the	  ‘Rise’	  and	  ‘Fall’.	  The	  wider	  aim	  is	  to	   identify	  drivers	  that	  are	  
relevant	   to	   other	   GCD	   processes	   where	   the	   North-­‐South	   cleavage	   appears.	   Preliminary	  
interviews	  in	  Geneva	  and	  four	  months	  of	  participative	  observation	  in	  UNCTAD	  negotiations	  
in	  2011	  served	  as	  a	  point	  of	  departure.	  I	  constructed	  a	  theoretical	  model	  that	  includes	  four	  
selected	   independent	   variables:	   Consensual	   Knowledge,	   Problem	  Malignancy,	   Institutional	  
Capacity	  and	  Power.	  The	  model	  also	  includes	  three	  specified	  criteria	  to	  evaluate	  UNCTAD’s	  
performance	  as	  an	  intergovernmental	  forum	  over	  time.	  In	  order	  to	  obtain	  information	  about	  
these	  issues,	  21	  semi-­‐structured	  elite	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  19	  respondents	  who	  
were	   diplomats,	   UNCTAD	   staff	   and	   experts	   in	   Norway	   and	   Geneva.	   It	   became	   clear	   that	  
UNCTAD	   had	   experienced	   a	   rise	   and	   fall	   and	   was	   influenced	   by	   “the	   vicious	   cycle	   of	  
deprioritization”,	  ”radicalization	  of	  the	  UN	  agenda	  and	  coalitions”,	  “agenda	  sprawling”,	  “law	  
of	  the	   least	  ambitious	  program”	  and	  finally	  the	  “the	  contamination	  scare”.	   It	  became	  clear	  
from	  my	  analysis	  that	  the	  independent	  variables	  correlated,	  and	  subsequently	  three	  general	  
findings	   from	   the	   analysis	   were	   examined:	   (i)	   In	   the	   GCD	   processes	   the	   leader	   and	   the	  
secretariat	  play	  a	   fundamental	  and	  pivotal	  role	   in	  creating	  consensual	  knowledge	  between	  
the	  North	  and	  South;	  (ii)	  The	  GCD	  process	  is	  sensitive	  towards	  the	  ‘amplifying	  effect	  of	  the	  
level	  of	  participation’	  in	  a	  competitive	  institutional	  landscape;	  (iii)	  The	  GCD	  process	  becomes	  
harder	  when	   there	   is	   asymmetry	   in	   the	  power	  distribution	   in	   the	  negotiations	   in	  UNCTAD	  
(the	  decision	  game),	  coupled	  with	  asymmetric	  power	  distribution	  in	  the	  world	  as	  such	  (basic	  
game)	  and	  when	  these	  two	  games	  are	  incongruent.	  	  
I	  hope	  to	  make	  a	  small	  contribution	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  dynamics	  
in	   the	   North-­‐South	   Dialogue	   and	   shed	   light	   on	   factors	   that	   increase	   the	   vulnerability	   for	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“The	  North-­‐South	  division	  simplified	  the	  negotiations.	  The	  coalition	  structure	  had	  a	  facilitating	  
function	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  rise.	  In	  later	  years	  this	  coalition	  structure	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  main	  causes	  
leading	  to	  global	  conference	  diplomacy	  gridlocks.	  The	  map	  and	  terrain	  has	  been	  separated“	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Expert	  Lunde)	  	  
The	   United	   Nations	   Conference	   of	   Trade	   and	   Development	   (UNCTAD)	   was	   formed	   as	   an	  
institutional	   device	   to	   aggregate	   and	   articulate	   the	   developing	   countries’	   demands	   for	   a	  
changed	  economic	  system	  (Walters	  1972).	  UNCTAD’s	  main	  function	  has	  been	  “to	  provide	  a	  
forum	  for	  questioning	  the	  basic	  assumptions	  underlying	  the	  present	  world	  economic	  order”	  
(Gosovic	   1968:77).	   The	   controversial	   North-­‐South	   encounters	   in	   UNCTAD	  were	   important	  
international	  incidents	  on	  the	  multilateral	  arena	  in	  the	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s.	  It	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  
social,	  economic	  and	  political	  emancipation	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  third	  world	  nations	  which	  
was	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  challenges	  to	  the	  contemporary	  international	  
system	  (ibid).	  
Stephen	   Krasner	   (1981:120)	   argued	   that	   in	   the	   1970’s	   there	   had	   never	   before	   been	   “[…]	  
states	  with	  such	  wildly	  variant	  national	  power	  resources	  coexisting	  as	  formal	  equals”	  on	  the	  
international	  arena.	   It	  was	  believed	  to	  be	  possible	  for	  different	  countries	  to	  sit	   together	   in	  
UNCTAD	  and	   through	  Global	  Conference	  Diplomacy	   (GCD)	  negotiate	  new	  rules	   that	  would	  
reshape	   financial	   and	   trade	   relations	   in	   a	   fairer	   and	   more	   balanced	   manner	   (UNCTAD	  
2004:xi).	  However,	   this	  rather	   idealistic	  approach	  had	  a	  tendency	  to	  overlook	  the	  fact	  that	  
power	   remained	   the	   core	   reality	   of	   international	   relations	   (ibid).	   Thus,	   UNCTAD	   as	   an	  
institutional	  device	  and	  GCD	  as	  a	  weapon	  against	  the	  West	  failed	  to	  reshape	  the	  economic	  
system.	  	  
It	  has	  been	  quiet	  for	  30	  years	  and	  most	  people	  have	  forgotten	  about	  UNCTAD’s	  heydays.	  Yet,	  
UNCTAD	  lives	  on	  and	  global	  negotiations	  are	  still	  taking	  place	  between	  the	  North	  and	  South	  
in	  UNCTAD’s	  headquarters	  in	  Geneva	  and	  in	  the	  quadrennial	  conferences.	  	  
Many	  books	  and	  articles	  have	  described	  and	  analyzed	  what	  happened	  during	  the	  first	  15-­‐20	  
years	   of	   UNCTAD’s	   existence.	   In	   the	   last	   decades	   much	   less	   attention	   has	   been	   paid	   to	  
UNCTAD.	   How	   can	   one	   understand	   the	   dynamics	   in	   the	   North-­‐	   South	   dialogue	   that	   took	  
place	  in	  UNCTAD	  in	  the	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s,	  and	  what	  is	  UNCTAD’s	  role	  today?	  Are	  there	  any	  
2 
 
lessons	   learnt	   from	   the	   intense	   negotiations	   that	   may	   shed	   light	   in	   the	   North-­‐South	  
stalemate	  we	  are	  witnessing	  at	  the	  UN	  arena	  today?	  
It	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   UNCTAD	   with	   its	   highly	   ambitious	   plans	   for	   reshaping	   the	   world	  
economic	  order	  is	  a	  rather	  unique	  organization.	  There	  are,	  nevertheless,	  several	  features	  of	  
the	   negotiation	   processes	   that	   took	   place	   in	   UNCTAD	   that	  may	   be	   relevant	   for	   other	   UN	  
forums.	   By	   understanding	   what	   happened	   with	   UNCTAD,	   one	   can	   with	   a	   theoretical	  
framework	  capture	  important	  elements	  of	  GCD.	  Several	  respondents	  argued	  that	  UNCTAD	  is	  
an	  image	  of	  the	  broader	  UN	  system.	  
A	   central	   assumption	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   that	   an	   investigation	   confined	   to	   the	   North-­‐	   South	  
negotiations	   in	  UNCTAD	  may	  provide	  an	  explanation	  and	  be	  relevant	   to	  other	   institutional	  
UN-­‐contexts	   where	   the	   North-­‐South	   cleavage	   appears.	   This	   assumption	   echoes	   Williams	  
(1991:2-­‐3)	  who	  studied	  the	  coalition	  of	  G77	  in	  UNCTAD1.	  
1.1 Purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  
In	  this	  thesis	  a	  main	  objective	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  group	  dynamics	  in	  the	  negotiations	  that	  
took	  place	   in	  UNCTAD	  by	  utilizing	  different	   theories	  and	  concepts	   from	  political	   science.	  A	  
wider	   aim	   is	   to	   draw	   lessons	   learnt	   from	   UNCTAD’s	   North-­‐South	   negotiations	   that	   are	  
relevant	  for	  other	  UN	  organizations	  that	  are	  experiencing	  the	  same	  block	  negotiations.	  The	  
research	  questions	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  
(Main	   Research	   Question)	   How	   can	   one	   understand	   UNCTAD’s	   development	   over	   time,	  
more	  precisely	  the	  ‘Rise’	  and	  ‘Fall’	  of	  UNCTAD?	  	  
(Secondary	   Research	   Question)	   What	   does	   the	   analysis	   of	   UNCTAD	   tell	   us	   about	   the	  
prospects	   of	   success	   and	   failure	   in	   Global	   Conference	   Diplomacy	   (GCD)	   in	   other	   UN	  
organizations?	  
In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  main	  research	  question	  the	  thesis	  will	  examine	  UNCTAD’s	  historical	  
development	  as	  a	  case.	  Based	  on	  secondary	  and	  primary	  literature	  one	  can	  roughly	  outline	  
                                                
1	  Williams	  (1991:2-­‐3)	  argued	  that	  "Although	  the	  empirical	  data	  is	  drawn	  solely	  from	  the	  UNCTAD	  context,	  the	  
conclusions	  can	  be	  generalized	  to	  cover	  the	  G77	  in	  other	  organizational	  contexts".	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two	   time	   periods	   conveying	   “The	   Rise	   of	   UNCTAD”	   (1964-­‐mid	   1980’s)	   and	   “The	   fall	   of	  
UNCTAD”	   (mid	   1980’s-­‐2013).	   It	   is	   not	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis	   to	   examine	   the	  
organization	   of	   UNCTAD	   as	   a	  whole,	   therefore	   UNCTAD’s	   function	   as	   a	   forum	   will	   be	   the	  
focus.	   In	   order	   to	   assess	   UNCTAD’s	   level	   of	   success	   and	   failure	   as	   an	   intergovernmental	  
forum	   one	   needs	   a	   standard	   to	   measure	   it	   against.	   Thus,	   selected	   elements	   from	   the	  
theoretical	  framework	  from	  Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  (1999)	  that	  has	  roots	  in	  institutional	  theory	  
will	  be	  used	  in	  my	  interview	  guide.	   I	  have	  selected	  criteria	  and	  adopted	  this	  framework,	   in	  
consultation	  with	  one	  of	  the	  co-­‐authors,	  Leiv	  Lunde,	  to	  suit	  UNCTAD’s	  function	  of	  being	  an	  
intergovernmental	   forum.	   These	   criteria	   are	   (1)	   Agenda	   setting	   (2)	   promote	   common	  
understanding	  and	  (3)	  give	  policy	  advice	  concerning	  implementation.	  The	  three	  criteria	  serve	  
as	  dimensions	  (or	  scores)	  on	  my	  dependent	  variable,	  UNCTAD	  (Y)	  and	  are	  used	  to	  answer	  the	  
question	   “whether	   there	   has	   been	   a	   rise	   and	   fall	   of	   UNCTAD”.	   The	   different	   scores	   on	  
UNCTAD	  (Y)	  will	  not	  be	  quantified	  as	  entirely	  positive	  or	  negative.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  capture	  and	  understand	  the	  drivers	  behind	  the	  development	  of	  UNCTAD	  I	  have	  
gathered	  primary	  data	  based	  on	  a	   theoretical	  model	  of	   inquiry	   that	  was	   created	  after	   the	  
literature	  review.	  Thus,	  the	  selected	  variables	  that	  affect	  my	  dependent	  variable	  UNCTAD	  (Y)	  
are	   consensual	   knowledge	   (X₁),	   problem	   malignancy	   (X₂),	   institutional	   capacity	   (X₃)	   and	  
power	  (X₄).	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  secondary	  research	  question	  secondary	  literature	  as	  well	  
as	  empirical	  information	  was	  used.	  
1.2 The	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis	  
In	  any	  thesis,	   it	   is	   important	  to	   limit	  the	  subject	  so	  that	   it	  becomes	  manageable	  within	  the	  
frame	  of	  a	  Master’s	  thesis.	  Due	  to	  the	  space	  limitations	  there	  were	  several	  interesting	  issues	  
that	  could	  not	  be	  addressed	  in	  my	  Research	  Questions.	  Some	  may	  argue	  that	  one	  needs	  to	  
delve	   into	   Raul	   Prebisch’s	   theories2.	   His	   theories	   have	   greatly	   affected	   UNCTAD	   and	   the	  
ideology	   of	   G77,	   but	   will	   not	   be	   discussed	   in	   detail	   due	   to	   the	   disciplinary	   focus	   on	   the	  
aspects	  that	  deal	  with	  political	  science.	  This	  also	  explains	  why	  I	  chose	  not	  to	  delve	  into	  the	  
                                                
2	  Raul	  Prebisch	  was	  an	  academic	  from	  the	  Latin	  American	  School	  who	  was	  the	  first	  Secretary	  General	  of	  UNCTAD.	  He	  had	  
several	  influential	  theories	  that	  shaped	  UNCTAD	  and	  G77.	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substantial	   trade	   and	   development	   topics	   discussed	   at	   the	   thirteen	   high	   level	   UNCTAD	  
conferences,	  but	  rather	  focus	  on	  the	  overall	  picture	  and	  the	  coalition	  dynamic.	  
Regarding	  the	  secondary	  research	  question;	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  presume	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  
to	  generalize	  all	  my	  findings	  in	  to	  all	  GCD	  processes.	  However,	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  
focus	  on	  certain	  elements	  that	  may	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  negotiation	  dynamics	  and	  speculate	  on	  
the	   potential	   of	   generalization	   to	   other	   GCD	   processes	   that	   experience	   the	   same	   block	  
negotiations.	  	  	  
UNCTAD	  is	  a	  huge	  organization	  performing	  different	  tasks,	  functions	  and	  projects.	  Evaluating	  
UNCTAD	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  a	  time	  consuming	  task.	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  will	  restrict	  itself	  to	  only	  
evaluating	  UNCTAD	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  one	  of	  its	  functions,	  namely	  being	  an	  intergovernmental	  
forum.	  	  
1.2.1 Operationalization	  of	  the	  Dependent	  variable	  
This	  thesis	  uses	  UNCTAD	  as	  a	  case	  and	  outlines	  roughly	  two	  time	  periods	  conveying	  a	  change	  
in	  the	  dependent	  variable,	   i.e.	   the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  UNCTAD.	   It	  must	  be	  underlined	  that	  this	  
thesis	   examines	   “observed	   change”	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  historical	   anecdotes,	   information	   from	  
key	  respondents,	  evaluations	  conducted	  and	  other	  relevant	  primary	  and	  secondary	  material.	  
Observed	   change	   may	   not	   capture	   underlying	   variables	   that	   may	   affect	   my	   dependent	  
variable	  (confounding	  variables,	  Skog	  2004:259).	  Thus,	  one	  needs	  to	  critically	  think	  how	  and	  
in	   what	   way	   the	   causal	   relationship	   ties	   my	   independent	   variables	   with	   my	   dependent	  
variable	  and	  attempt	  to	  capture	  the	  relevant	  variables	  to	  avoid	  omitted	  variable	  bias	  (Skog	  
2004:214).	  	  	  	  
Many	  organizations	  are	  evaluated	  in	  an	  unfair	  manner	  as	  a	  generalized	  framework	  is	  used	  to	  
cover	  all	  organizations	  -­‐	  both	  action	  and	  politically	  based	  organizations.	  However,	  there	  are	  
differences	   in	   organizations	   based	   on	   their	  mandates	   and	  what	   they	   are	   supposed	   to	   do.	  
Thus,	   a	   challenge	   for	  my	   thesis	   is	   to	   evaluate	   and	   give	   scores	   on	  my	   dependent	   variable,	  




1.2.2 	  Clarification	  of	  concepts	  
There	  are	   several	   central	  words	   in	  my	   thesis	   that	  must	  be	   concretized	  and	  defined.	  South	  
refers	  to	  the	  developing	  countries,	  i.e.	  the	  coalition	  group	  of	  77	  (G77).	  According	  to	  Williams	  
(1991:28)	   a	   developing	   country	   is	   defined	   as	   “one	   which	   considers	   itself	   as	   such	   and	   is	  
generally	  included	  in	  this	  category	  by	  international	  economic	  organizations”.	  In	  other	  words,	  
there	   is	   “an	   element	   of	   self-­‐selection	   and	   independent	   validation	   for	   this	   status”	   (ibid).	  
Within	  the	  G77	  there	  are	  many	  countries	  that	  are	  Less	  Developed	  Countries	   (LDC).	  The	  UN	  
uses	  a	   list	  of	  criteria	  that	  are	  specific	  to	  LDC	  (UN	  Development	  Policy	  and	  Analysis	  Division	  
20113).	  There	  are	  also	  countries	  in	  the	  G77	  that	  are	  Middle	  Income	  Countries	  (MIC).	  Today,	  
the	  group	  calls	  itself	  G77	  and	  China,	  however	  in	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  whole	  group	  as	  
G77.	  	  	  
I	  have	  used	  the	  term	  West.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War	  the	  G77	  targeted	  the	  West,	  or	  the	  countries	  
in	   the	   Organization	   for	   Economic	   Co-­‐operation	   and	   Development	   of	   the	   Organization	  
(OECD).	   Thus	   the	   authors	  writing	   about	   UNCTAD	   during	   the	   Cold	  War	  would	   refer	   to	   the	  
West,	  but	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  the	  authors	  would	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  group	  as	  the	  North.	  	  
UNCTAD	  uses	  Global	  Conference	  Diplomacy	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  reach	  goals.	  By	  using	  GCD	  it	  implies	  
that	  there	  is	  (a)	  Universal	  participation	  of	  countries.	  That	  a	  given	  conference	  or	  organization	  
has	   (b)	   a	   specific	   function	   or	   a	   restricted	   focus.	   The	   idea	   of	  GCD	   also	   implies	   that	   (c)	   the	  
institutional	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  are	  agreed	  upon	  by	  the	  actors	  involved.	  One	  example	  can	  be	  
the	  idea	  of	  reaching	  consensus.	  In	  the	  conference	  there	  are	  (d)	  certain	  formal	  and	  informal	  
group	   coalitions/alliances.	   Finally,	   that	   the	   conference	   or	   organization	   has	   a	   (e)	   lighter	  
organizational	  set	  up	  (Rittberger	  1983:169-­‐172).	  UNCTAD’s	  process	  exhibits	  all	  these	  traits.	  	  
GCD	  involves	  negotiations	  between	  countries.	  Negotiations	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  "the	  sum	  total	  
of	  talks	  and	  contacts	  intended	  to	  solve	  conflicts	  or	  to	  work	  towards	  the	  common	  objective	  of	  
a	   conference"	   (Kaufmann	   (1968)	   cited	   in	   Williams	   1991:64).	   A	   diplomatic	   deadlock	   or	  
gridlock	  is	  defined	  as	  “a	  period	  during	  a	  negotiation	  when	  parties	  stand	  firm	  on	  inconsistent	  
positions”	  (Odell	  2009:274).	  
                                                
3	  Further	  information	  on	  the	  criteria	  see:	  	  http://www.un.org/esa/analysis/devplan/profile/criteria.html	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1.3 	  Methodological	  approach	  
In	   order	   to	   answer	  my	   research	   questions	   and	   find	   relevant	   theoretical	   variables	   I	   had	   to	  
delve	   into	   the	   primary	   and	   secondary	   literature	   on	   UNCTAD.	   This	   was	   necessary	   to	  
understand	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  study	  and	  the	  historical	  context	  that	  UNCTAD	  was	  a	  part	  of.	  
The	   literature	   on	   UNCTAD,	   New	   International	   Economic	   Order	   (NIEO),	   and	   North-­‐South	  
relations	  was	  vast.	  	  
Several	  months	  were	  used	  to	  obtain	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  existing	  academic	  work	  on	  this	  topic.	  
This	  was	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  the	  process	  as	  I	  chose	  some	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  that	  were	  
used	  by	  previous	  authors	  within	  this	  field.	   It	  was	  a	  demanding	  process	  as	  I	  had	  to	  critically	  
assess	   the	   articles	   that	   were	   often	   highly	   ideological.	   The	  main	   literary	   work	   and	   classics	  
within	   this	   field	   were	   read,	   afterwards	   I	   followed	   Aberbach	   and	   Rockman’s	   (2002:673)	  
maxim	   “purpose,	   purpose,	   purpose”	   and	   delved	   strategically	   into	   other	   articles	   that	  were	  
referenced	  in	  the	  main	  literary	  work.	  
Most	  of	  the	  secondary	   literature	  covering	  UNCTAD	  was	  from	  the	  1960’s	  to	  early	  1990’s.	   In	  
order	   to	   fill	   the	   empirical	   gap,	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  were	   conducted	   in	  Geneva	   and	  
Oslo.	  In	  2011	  I	  had	  four	  months	  of	  participative	  observations	  as	  an	  intern	  for	  the	  Permanent	  
Mission	   of	   Norway	   covering	   the	   UNCTAD	   negotiations	   in	   Geneva.	   I	   met	   delegates	   and	  
members	   of	   the	   UNCTAD’s	   secretariat	   whom	   I	   believed	   could	   be	   potentially	   useful	  
respondents.	  Three	  preliminary	  interviews	  were	  conducted.	  After	  my	  experience	  in	  2011	  the	  
snowballing	   technique	  was	  used	   to	   get	   in	   touch	  with	   relevant	  people	   in	  Norway	  who	  had	  
participated	   in	   the	   negotiations	   in	   UNCTAD.	   Semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   in	   2012	   and	   2013	  
were	  conducted	   in	  Oslo	  and	  Geneva.	  The	  reason	  why	   I	  chose	   in	  chapter	  4	  to	  focus	  and	  go	  
into	  details	  of	  the	  research	  process	  is	  because	  the	  process	  of	  gathering	  data	  has	  had	  a	  large	  
impact	  on	  and	  shaped	   this	   thesis.	   For	  example,	   the	  analysis	   includes	  many	  direct	   citations	  
from	  the	   respondents	   from	  various	  groups.	  This	  may	  seem	   like	   repetition	  and	  dwelling	  on	  
the	  same	  topic,	  but	  it	  is	  done	  because	  it	  conveys	  how	  the	  respondents	  perceive	  UNCTAD	  and	  
the	  multilateral	  system	  differently.	  Having	  dissimilar,	  and	  sometimes	  opposing	  perceptions,	  
has	  a	  great	  impact	  on	  the	  North-­‐South	  dialogue.	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1.4 Theoretical	  departure	  point	  	  
My	   research	   questions	   and	   theoretical	   variables	   are	   anchored	   in	   the	   field	   of	   study.	   The	  
theoretical	   framework	   in	   this	   thesis	   will	   draw	   heavily	   on	   GCD	   literature,	   especially	   Arild	  
Underdal’s	  academic	  work	  (1980,	  2002,	  2012)	  concerning	  global	  negotiation	  processes.	  GCD	  
literature	  by	  Volker	  Rittberger	  (1983)	  and	  Lisa	  H.	  Gelman	  (2000)	  will	  also	  be	  presented.	  The	  
thesis	   will	   also	   refer	   to	   the	   classic	   literature	   including	   Joseph	   Nye	   in	   Robert	  W.	   Cox	   and	  
Harold	  Jacobsen’s	  book	  (1973),	  Robert	  W.	  Cox	  (1994)	  and	  Krasner	  (1981).	  	  
The	   abovementioned	   theoretical	   work	   is	   of	   a	   general	   nature	   and	   is	   a	   part	   of	   a	   broader	  
discourse	   on	   GCD	   and	   negotiation	   literature.	   Another	   book	   which	   will	   be	   used	   in	   the	  
theoretical	   framework	   is	   Helge	   Ole	   Bergesen	   and	   Leiv	   Lunde’s	   book	   titled	   “Dinosaurs	   or	  
Dynamos-­‐	   The	   United	   Nations	   and	   The	   World	   Bank	   at	   the	   Turn	   of	   the	   Century”	   (1999).	  
Bergesen	  and	   Lunde	   focused	  on	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  UN-­‐system	   in	   global	   governance.	  
The	   authors	   have	   used	   institutional	   theory	   based	   on	   Nils	   Brunsson’s	   book	   called	   the	  
“Organization	  of	  hypocrisy”	  (Brunsson	  1989).	  	  
Articles	   and	   papers	   on	   UNCTAD	   describe	   the	   negotiations,	   but	   without	   any	   theoretical	  
framework	  (Meisaari-­‐Polsa	  1987:17).	  Many	  of	  these	  articles	  are	  normative	  and	  ideologically	  
colored.	  The	  academics	  were	  influenced	  by	  the	  ideological	  trends	  at	  the	  time.	  One	  can	  argue	  
that	   the	   contrasting	   interpretations	   by	   scholars	   and	  practitioners	   can	   be	   explained	  by	   the	  
strong	  polarization	  between	  the	  pro-­‐NIEO/UNCTAD	  groups	  versus	  the	  critics.	  	  
	   However,	  some	  of	  the	  academic	  literature	  from	  the	  1990’s	  was	  useful	  and	  included	  in	  
my	  empirical	   background	  as	  well	   as	   in	   the	  analysis;	  Williams	   (1991	  and	  1994)	   and	  Righter	  
(1995).	  Williams	  wrote	   specifically	   about	   the	   G77	   in	   UNCTAD	   (1991),	   as	   well	   as	   the	   third	  
world	  coalition	  in	  different	  economic	  institutions	  (1994).	  Righter’s	  (1995)	  book	  “Utopia	  lost”	  
is	  ideologically	  colored	  and	  is	  clearly	  with	  the	  con-­‐NIEO/UNCTAD	  group.	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  
perspective	  as	  many	  of	  my	  respondents	  today	  echoed	  some	  of	  her	  interpretations.	  	  
Joseph	  Nye	  conducted	  fieldwork	  in	  Geneva	  on	  negotiations	  in	  UNCTAD	  already	  in	  1969.	  The	  
thorough	  article	  that	  utilizes	  a	  multifaceted	  theoretical	  framework	  was	  published	  in	  Cox	  and	  
Jacobsen	   “The	   anatomy	  of	   influence”.	  Nye	   (1973:370)	   ended	  his	   analysis	   of	  UNCTAD	  with	  
this	  statement:	  	  “Whether	  Prebisch	  strategy	  (of	  using	  UNCTAD	  as	  a	  pressure	  group)	  will	  pay	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off	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   proving	   UNCTAD	   to	   be	   one	   of	   those	   rare	   organizations	   that	   has	  
contributed	  to	  re-­‐creating	  its	  own	  environment,	  will	  be	  one	  of	  the	  intriguing	  questions	  of	  the	  
next	  decade”.	  Nye’s	  article	  was	  an	  important	  source	  of	  background	  information.	  
Robert	   s.	   Walters	   (1971)	   was	   another	   scholar	   who	   studied	   UNCTAD	   during	   its	   early	  
establishment.	   He	   criticized	   scholars	   and	   practitioners’	   narrow	   focus	   on	   results	   and	   goal	  
achievement	  only	  in	  international	  organizations.	  Walters	  examined	  UNCTAD	  with	  a	  different	  
perspective	   and	   viewed	   UNCTAD	   as	   an	   organization	   that	   aided	   the	   LDC	   to	   articulate,	  
aggregate	  and	  communicate	  their	  preferences	  and	  demands	  in	  the	  international	  context.	  	  
Robin	  L.	  Rothstein	   (1984)	  also	  discussed	  some	  of	   the	   ‘lessons	   learnt’	   from	  the	  8	  year	   long	  
commodity	   negotiations	   in	   UNCTAD.	   Important	   elements	   identified	   by	   Rothstein	   during	  
these	  negotiations	  will	  be	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  These	  elements	  include	  the	  politicization	  of	  the	  
negotiation	   process	   and	   the	   importance	   of	   establishing	   consensual	   knowledge	   in	   North-­‐
South	  negotiations.	  Consensual	  knowledge	  is	  one	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  (X1).	  
Branislav	  Gosovic	  (1968)	  wrote	  about	  the	  North-­‐South	  encounter	  in	  UNCTAD	  already	  in	  1968	  
and	   covered	  UNCTAD	   I	   (Geneva	   1964)	   and	  UNCTAD	   II	   (New	  Delhi	   1968).	   In	   1971	  Gosovic	  
published	   the	  book	  “UNCTAD:	  Conflict	  and	  Compromise”.	  He	  argues	   that	   the	  high	  aims	  of	  
the	  developing	  countries	  to	  press	  for	  change	  is	  “hindered	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  face	  a	  group	  
of	  countries	  with	  superior	  economic	  power	  who	  molded	  the	  present	  international	  economic	  
system	   and	   find	   it	   highly	   advantageous	   to	   preserve	   status	   quo	   […]	   the	   international	  
community	   which	   should	   have	   come	   to	   their	   assistance	   is	   basically	   selfish	   and	   lacking	   in	  
solidarity”	   (Gosovic	   1971:IX).	   Gosovic’s	   opening	   statements	   in	   his	   book	   illustrate	   the	  
politicized	   tension	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   UNCTAD.	   Gosovic	   clearly	   belongs	   in	   the	   pro-­‐NIEO/pro-­‐
UNCTAD	  group.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Many	  articles	  have	  been	  published	  that	  have	  dealt	  with	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  commodity	  
negotiations	   in	   purely	   economic	   terms,	   some	   have	   combined	   approaches4.	   Nevertheless,	  
due	   to	   the	   focus	  on	  my	   thesis,	   I	  will	   not	  delve	   into	   the	   technical	   and	  economic	   substance	  
discussed	  in	  UNCTAD,	  but	  only	  focus	  on	  political	  science	  aspects	  of	  the	  negotiations.	  	  	  	  
                                                
4	  Rangarajan	  (1978:	  19)	  focused	  on	  the	  “symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  the	  international	  economic	  system	  
and	  international	  political	  system”.	  He	  analyzes	  commodity	  conflict	  and	  his	  approach	  is	  to	  perceive	  national	  
interest	  among	  governments	  as	  “part	  economic	  and	  part	  political”	  (Rangarajan	  1978:18).	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1.5 Relevance	  and	  importance	  of	  research	  questions	  	  
A	   senior	   diplomat	   who	   had	   worked	   with	   UNCTAD	   informed	   me	   that	   “institutions	   in	  
themselves	  are	  not	  important,	  it	  is	  the	  global	  problems	  and	  issues	  that	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  solve	  
that	   are	   important.	   Because	   these	   issues	   have	   been	   taken	   over	   by	   other	   institutions,	  
understanding	   UNCTAD	   in	   itself	   is	   not	   useful”.	   Even	   though	   there	   is	   some	   truth	   in	   this	  
perspective,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  reflect	  on	  negotiations	  in	  the	  past	  in	  order	  
to	  draw	  some	  lessons	  learnt	  that	  may	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  negotiations	  at	  present	  and	  in	  the	  
future.	   Variables	   in	   one	   negotiation	   process	   can	   be	   argued	   to	   be	   relevant	   to	   other	  
negotiation	  processes	  that	  take	  place	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  UN	  system.	  	  	  
It	   is	   not	   new	   or	   controversial	   that	  UN	   organizations	   have	   been	   ineffective	   and	   that	   there	  
exist	   diplomatic	   gridlocks.	   The	   former	   Norwegian	   Minister	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs,	   Jonas	   Gahr	  
Støre	   (2012a),	   claims	   that	   the	   results	   from	   the	   ever	   increasing	   amount	   of	   top	   diplomatic	  
meetings	  and	  high	   level	   conferences	  are	  meager.	   Støre	  argues	   that	  global	  governance	  has	  
entered	   the	   “age	   of	   summit-­‐mania”	   (Støre	   2012b).	   	   Summit	   mania	   has	   had	   us	   ‘working	  
harder,	   but	   not	   smarter’	   in	   global	   politics	   (ibid).	   The	   global	   summits	   are	   highly	   time	  
consuming	   and	   expensive.	   Another	   problem	   with	   summit-­‐mania	   is	   that	   “the	   process	  
becomes	  the	  end,	  and	  mere	  participation	  becomes	  a	  substitute	  for	  real	  problem	  solving	  and	  
better	  global	  governance”	  (ibid).	  One	  pertinent	  question	  is	  whether	  our	  diplomatic	  toolbox	  
that	   contains	   GCD	   as	   its	  main	   tool	   is	   capable	   of	   dealing	  with	   the	   new	   complex	   reality	   of	  
collective	  problems.	  	  
1.6 Plan	  for	  the	  thesis	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  organized	  as	  follows:	  	  
In	   chapter	   2	   I	   will	   give	   a	   short	   outline	   of	   the	   events	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	  
UNCTAD.	  	  
Chapter	  3	   concerns	   the	   theoretical	   framework	  and	   is	   divided	   into	   three	  parts.	   Section	  3.1	  
will	  present	  the	  institutional	  criteria	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  evaluate	  UNCTAD.	  Section	  3.2	  will	  
briefly	  discuss	  the	  theories	  related	  to	  GCD	  and	  international	  negotiations.	  In	  section	  3.3	  the	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explanatory	   variables	   will	   be	   introduced.	   Reflections	   concerning	   choice	   of	   independent	  
variables	  will	  be	  included,	  as	  well	  tentative	  conclusions	  based	  on	  the	  secondary	  and	  primary	  
literature	  review	  on	  the	  independent	  variables’	  effect	  on	  UNCTAD.	  	  
Chapter	   4	   includes	   methodological	   reflections	   concerning	   my	   research	   process	   which	  
consists	  of	  4	  stages,	  including	  preliminary	  research	  and	  participative	  observation	  in	  UNCTAD,	  
literature	  review,	  semi-­‐structured	  elite	   interviews	  in	  Oslo	  and	  Geneva,	  and	  a	  final	  round	  of	  
expert-­‐interviews.	  Reliability	  and	  validity	  of	  my	  research	  design	  will	  be	  addressed	  in	  section	  
4.3.	  
Chapter	  5	  deals	  with	   the	  main	  Research	  Question	  and	  attempts	   to	  capture	  whether	   there	  
has	  been	  a	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  UNCTAD.	  The	  chapter	  first	  addresses	  the	  secondary	  and	  primary	  
literature	  and	  explores	  the	  different	  phases	  of	  UNCTAD,	  namely	  phases	  relating	  to	  the	  rise;	  
phase	  (1)	  The	  creation	  of	  UNCTAD,	  phase	  (2)	  The	  period	  of	  systemic	  turbulence	  (1970’s)	  and	  
phases	  related	  to	  the	  fall;	  phase	  (3)	  the	  second	  Cold	  War	  and	  global	  recession	  (the	  1980’s),	  
phase	  (4)	  Global	  uncertainty	  (the	  period	  from	  the	  mid	  1980’s	  to	  the	  mid	  1990’s)	  and	  phase	  
(5)	  After	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s.	  Afterwards	  information	  from	  the	  elite	  interviews	  will	  be	  assessed,	  
based	  on	  the	  institutional	  criteria.	  	  
Chapter	  6	  explains	  the	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  UNCTAD	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  independent	  variables.	  It	  
also	   compares	   the	   tentative	   conclusions	   based	   on	   secondary	   literature	  with	  my	   empirical	  
findings.	  Three	  main	  observations	  are	  presented	  in	  the	  summary	  (section	  6.1.5).	  
Chapter	  7	   relates	  to	  the	  secondary	  Research	  Question:	  What	  does	  the	  analysis	  of	  UNCTAD	  
tell	  us	  about	   the	  prospects	  of	   success	  and	   failure	   in	  Global	  Conference	  Diplomacy	   (GCD)	   in	  
other	   UN	   organizations?	   This	   section	   will	   speculate	   and	   reflect	   on	   the	   potential	   for	  
generalizations	  of	   the	  main	  observations	  and	  whether	  UNCTAD’s	  development	   could	  have	  
elapsed	  differently.	  Thus,	  a	  best	  case	  and	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  of	  GCD	  in	  relation	  to	  UNCTAD	  
will	  be	  presented.	  	  
Chapter	   8	   will	   look	   towards	   the	   future	   and	   speculate	   as	   to	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   place	   for	  
UNCTAD	  in	  the	  ‘Beyond	  Aid	  Era’	  based	  on	  expert	  interviews.	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2 Empirical	  background	  
More	  than	  180	  global	  conferences	  have	  taken	  place	  since	  the	  establishment	  of	   the	  United	  
Nations.	   In	   the	   1970’s	   several	   global	   conferences	   were	   ‘follow	   up	   conferences’	   reviewing	  
past	  achievements	   (Gelman	  2000:2).	  The	  topics	  of	   these	  global	  conferences	  varied	  greatly;	  
the	  environment,	  the	  position	  of	  women,	  world	  trade,	  non-­‐proliferation	  and	  disarmament.	  
The	  global	  conferences	  cannot	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  free-­‐standing	  events,	  they	  are	  continuing	  
processes.	   Today	   many	   of	   the	   high	   level	   processes	   are	   connected	   to	   the	   UN	   General	  
Assembly	  (UNGA).	  Many	  of	  the	  conferences	  have	  a	  broad	  focus,	  for	  example	  the	  Millennium	  
Development	  Goals	  summit	  in	  2015.	  
UNCTAD	   is	   one	  of	   the	   conferences	   that	  have	  become	  an	   institutionalized	   conference.	   The	  
first	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  (UNCTAD)	  was	  held	  in	  Geneva	  in	  
1964.	   “Given	   the	  magnitude	  of	   the	  problems	   at	   stake	   and	   the	  need	   to	   address	   them,	   the	  
conference	  was	   institutionalized	   to	  meet	   every	   four	   years,	  with	   intergovernmental	   bodies	  
meeting	  between	  sessions	  and	  a	  permanent	  secretariat	  providing	  the	  necessary	  substantive	  
and	  logistical	  support”	  (UNCTAD	  2012).	  UNCTAD	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  meant	  to	  be	  an	  arena	  
where	   government	   representatives	   meet,	   exchange	   experiences	   and	   opinions	   concerning	  
trade	   and	   development	   related	   issues,	   which	   is	   supported	   by	   discussions	   with	   experts.	  
Today,	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  UNCTAD	  conferences	  is	  consensus	  building.	  The	  high	  level	  conferences	  
are	   the	   highest	   decision-­‐making	   bodies	   in	  UNCTAD	  and	  GCD	   is	   vital	   in	   this	   context	  where	  
member	   states	   discuss	   policy	   options	   and	   formulate	   global	   policy	   responses	   (ibid).	   The	  
quadrennial	  conferences	  also	  set	  the	  organization’s	  mandate	  and	  establish	  priorities	   (ibid).	  
UNCTAD	  has	  organized	  13	  quadrennial	  conferences.	  The	  last	  meeting	  was	  UNCTAD	  XIII	  that	  
was	  held	  in	  Doha	  in	  2012.	  
This	   chapter	   will	   give	   some	   background	   information	   on	   the	   events	   that	   led	   up	   to	   the	  





2.1  Events leading up to the creation of  UNCTAD  
“The	  pattern	  of	  interactions	  in	  the	  past	  and	  the	  particular	  processes	  of	  transformation	  
experienced	  serve	  to	  structure	  the	  existing	  set	  of	  relations	  in	  the	  present”	  (Williams	  1991:3).	  
When	   studying	   the	   history	   of	   international	   organizations	   one	   can	   see	   how	   there	   is	   an	  
interplay	   between	   the	   organizations	   and	   the	   international	   context.	   Institutions	   are	   often	  
marked	  by	  the	  context	  leading	  up	  to	  their	  creation.	  The	  brief	  historical	  background	  provided	  
in	  this	  section	  serves	  to	  highlight	  UNCTAD’s	  historical	  roots.	  These	  factors	  have	  had	  a	  great	  
impact	  for	  the	  direction	  UNCTAD	  took.	  	  This	  issue	  will	  be	  further	  explored	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
2.1.1 Decolonization	  
“To	  one	  who	  studies	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  common	  man,	  UNCTAD	  marks	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
colonial	  age”	  	   (Nagenda	  Singh	  (1969)	  cited	  in	  Aschim	  1995:9)	  
Decolonization	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   the	   undoing	   of	   colonialism.	   Following	  World	  War	   2	   the	  
process	   of	   decolonization	   increased	   the	   representation	   of	   LDC	   in	   the	   UN	   (Williams	  
1994:181).	   In	   1960,	   when	   17	   African	   states	   and	   Cyprus	   entered	   the	   UN,	   that	   meant	   the	  
developing	  countries	  had	  a	  decisive	  majority	  (UNCTAD	  2006:3).	  “Almost	  overnight,	  the	  world	  
was	  composed	  not	  only	  of	  many	  more	  states,	  but	  of	  new	  kinds	  of	  states”	  (Righter	  1995:99).	  
The	   revolution	   of	   independence	   gave	   voice	   to	   countries	   that	   had	   a	   lower	   level	   of	  
development	   than	   the	   existing	   developing	   countries	   (i.e.	   countries	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	  
Asia).	   The	   New	   African	   states	   perceived	   ‘lack	   of	   economic	   growth’	   as	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
important	   problems	   facing	   their	   development.	   The	   demands	   for	   a	   reform	   in	   the	  
international	  trade	  system	  were	  therefore	  “infused	  with	  new	  intensity”	  (Williams	  1994:181).	  
Another	   significant	   result	   of	   the	   process	   of	   decolonization	   was	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Non-­‐
Alignment	   Movement	   (NAM)	   (ibid).	   The	   roots	   of	   NAM	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   the	   Afro-­‐Asian	  
People’s	   conference	   in	   Bandung,	   Indonesia	   in	   1955	   (ibid).	   The	   Bandung	   conference	  
articulated	   goals	   for	   a	   cross	   regional	   coalition	   concerning	   economic	   development	   and	  
decolonization	  (Williams	  1994:182).	  NAM	  was	  officially	  created	  in	  Belgrade	  (1961)	  as	  a	  broad	  
alignment	  with	  delegations	   from	  Africa,	  Asia,	  and	  Latin	  America.	  NAM	  excluded	  China	  and	  
Pakistan	  to	  “forge	  a	  unity	  away	  from	  the	  cold	  war	  blocks”	  (ibid).	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Through	   the	   process	   of	   coalition	   building,	   the	   third	   world	   countries	   became	   increasingly	  
aware	   of	   “common	  problems	   arising	   from	   the	   underdeveloped	   nature	   of	   their	   economies	  
and	  their	  peripheral	   location	   in	  the	  global	  economy”	  (Williams	  1991:17).	  This	  commonality	  
of	  non-­‐alignment	  and	  shared	  problems	  increased	  and	  accentuated	  their	  self-­‐identification	  as	  
the	   ‘Third	   World’	   (ibid).	   	   The	   third	   world	   countries	   also	   became	   aware	   that	   in	   order	   to	  
change	   the	   current	   system	   “concerted	  pressure”	   against	   the	  West	  was	   needed	   (ibid).	   The	  
third	   world	   countries	   had	   internal	   cleavages	   relating	   to	   different	   political	   loyalties	   and	  
interests.	   However,	   the	   international	   climate	   was	   affected	   by	   a	   polarization	   between	   the	  
West	   and	   the	   Communist	   states.	   The	   polarized	   international	   context	   therefore	   had	   the	  
effect	  of	  balancing	  and	  uniting	  the	  third	  world	  countries	  (ibid).	  
2.1.2 The	  Havana	  conference	  (1947-­‐1948)	  
“The	  Havana	  charter	  for	  an	  International	  Trade	  Organization	  […]	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
deliberations	  of	  a	  preparatory	  committee	  and	  the	  UN	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Employment,	  held	  at	  
Havana,	  Cuba	  from	  21st	  of	  November	  1947-­‐	  24th	  of	  March	  1948	  and	  attended	  by	  fifty-­‐three	  states”	  
(Williams	  1991:20).	  	  
The	   Havana	   conference	   has	   often	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   first	   North-­‐South	   negotiation	  
(Aschim	   1995:12).	   However,	   according	   to	   Aschim	   (ibid)	   this	   aspect	   should	   not	   be	  
exaggerated.	   The	   core	   issues	   of	   the	   Havana	   conference	   were	   related	   to	   western	   issues,	  
especially	  the	  issues	  that	  were	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  US	  and	  the	  British	  Commonwealth	  (ibid).	  
The	   vertical	   ties	   between	   countries	   in	   the	   North	   and	   countries	   in	   the	   South	   were	   much	  
stronger	  than	  the	  horizontal	  ties	  between	  the	  countries	  in	  the	  South	  (Aschim	  1995:13).	  The	  
LDC	   as	   ‘one	   coalition’	  was	   a	   concept	   that	  would	   not	   play	   a	   decisive	   role	   until	   the	   1960’s	  
(ibid).	  Williams	   (1991:21),	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   argued	   that	   during	   the	  Havana	  negotiations	  
one	   could	   clearly	   identify	   the	   LDC	   as	   a	   specific	   interest	   group	   that	   had	   different	   views	  
compared	  to	  the	  developed	  countries.	  Williams	  argued	  that	  the	  developing	  countries	  played	  
an	   active	   role	   in	   the	   negotiations	   on	   reforming	   the	   trading	   system.	   The	   LDC	   put	   forward	  
arguments	   and	   proposals	   for	   specialized	   treatment	  within	   the	   new	   institutions	   (ibid).	   This	  
included	  a	  proposal	  of	  the	  relaxation	  of	  trade	  rules	  that	  would	  enable	  LDC	  governments	  to	  
use	   protectionist	   measures	   to	   aid	   their	   infant	   industries	   and	   therefore	   promote	  
industrialization	   and	   development	   (ibid).	   The	   LDC	   managed	   to	   secure	   the	   inclusion	   of	   8	  
points	  in	  the	  Havana	  Charter.	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The	   initial	   Havana	   charter	   drafted	   by	   the	  US	   and	  Great	   Britain	   had	   been	   greatly	  modified	  
(Aschim	   1995:12).	   In	   the	  US	   congress	   there	  was	   strong	   opposition	   to	   give	   away	   authority	  
over	  world	  trade	  to	  an	  international	  organization	  that	  the	  US	  had	  little	  control	  over.	   In	  the	  
end,	   US	   President	   Truman	   decided	   in	   1950	   not	   to	   submit	   the	   charter	   for	   congressional	  
ratification,	  thus	  signaling	  the	  end	  of	  the	  International	  Trade	  Organization	  (ITO)	  (ibid).	  Thus,	  
the	   Havana	   charter	   was	   never	   ratified	   and	   ITO	   “died	   an	   abortive	   death”	   (ibid).	   Williams	  
argued	  that	  the	  demise	  of	   ITO	   left	  an	   institutional	  vacuum	  in	  world	  trade.	  This	  was	  one	  of	  
the	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  third	  world	  coalition	  (Williams	  1994:183).	  	  	  
An	  interim	  arrangement,	  Generalized	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  Trade	  (GATT),	  was	  signed	  in	  
1947	  to	  establish	  some	  ground	  rules	  in	  world	  trade	  (UNCTAD	  2006:4).	  However,	  GATT	  failed	  
to	   “incorporate	   provisions	   dealing	   with	   commodity	   agreements,	   restrictive	   business	  
practices,	  foreign	  investment	  and	  preferential	  trading	  systems	  for	  the	  developing	  countries”	  
(ibid).	  GATT	  also	  used	  the	  institutional	  principle	  of	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  (MFN).	  MFN	  implies	  
that	   countries	   that	   are	   the	   most	   affected	   by	   the	   proposals	   have	   more	   to	   say	   in	   the	  
negotiations.	  Developing	  countries	  had	  therefore	  a	  diminished	  impact	  in	  the	  negotiations	  as	  
the	  representatives	  from	  the	  OECD	  countries	  accounted	  for	   larger	  market	  shares	  and	  were	  
therefore	  the	  most	  influential	  participants	  in	  the	  trade	  negotiations	  (ibid).	  MFN	  implied	  non-­‐
discriminatory	   multilateralism	   that	   treats	   all	   countries	   equal	   regardless	   of	   their	   stage	   of	  
development	  (UNCTAD	  2006:12).	  
Hence,	  the	  developing	  countries	  stood	  on	  the	  sideline	  and	  had	  little	  influence	  on	  the	  trade	  
negotiations.	   The	   trade	   negotiations,	   however,	   played	   a	   great	   role	   in	   affecting	   the	   third	  
world	   countries’	   economic	   situation.	   E.	   Spero	   (cited	   in	   Aschim	   1995:15)	   outlined	   three	  
strategies	   for	  how	  the	  developing	  countries	  could	  approach	  this	  situation:	   (1)	  adapt	  to	  the	  
system	  and	  play	  by	  its	  rules,	  (2)	  isolate	  yourself	  from	  the	  system,	  (3)	  attempt	  to	  change	  the	  
system.	  The	  western	  countries	  hoped	  that	  the	  developing	  countries	  would	  choose	  the	  first	  
strategy	  of	   adapting.	  However,	   the	  developing	   countries	   chose	   strategy	  3.	   The	   strategy	  of	  





2.1.3 The	  creation	  of	  UNCTAD	  and	  its	  context	  	  
For	  many	  of	  the	  new	  states	  entering	  the	  UN,	  economic	  independence	  was	  just	  as	  important	  
as	   political	   independence	   (Aschim	   1995:16).	   Unfortunately,	   many	   of	   the	   tools	   the	   South	  
wished	  to	  use	  to	  gain	  its	  economic	  independence	  were	  opposed	  by	  existing	  institutions	  and	  
rules	  (ibid).	  After	   intense	  debates	   in	  1962	  in	  the	  UNGA	  and	  in	  the	  UN	  Economic	  and	  Social	  
Council	   (ECOSOC),	  the	  UNGA	  decided	  to	  convene	  a	  conference	  on	  trade	  and	  development.	  
The	   result	   was	   a	   “triumph	   for	   Third	   World	   pressure	   over	   Western	   opposition”	   (Williams	  
1994:183).	  Williams	  (1994:183)	  argues	  that	  Western	  states	  gave	  up	  their	  opposition	  because	  
of	   two	   factors:	   (1)	   The	  US	  and	   its	   allies	  perceived	   that	   the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	   interested	   in	  
creating	  a	  conference,	  thus	  the	  US	  could	  “not	  afford	  to	  let	  the	  developing	  countries	  and	  the	  
communist	   block	   form	   an	   organization	  without	   them”.	   (2)	   The	   growing	   third	  world	   had	   a	  
winning	  majority	   in	   the	  UN.	   This	   left	   the	  US	   and	   its	   allies	  with	  no	   choice.	   In	   other	  words,	  
“UNCTAD	   was	   created	   by	   the	   developing	   countries	   with	   the	   grudging	   acceptance	   of	   the	  






3 Theory	  	  
This	   chapter	   has	   two	   objectives.	   The	   chapter	   will	   first	   explain	   and	   present	   the	   specified	  
criteria	  that	  will	  be	  utilized	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  a	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  UNCTAD.	  
The	   choice	   of	   criteria	   was	   based	   on	   a	   thorough	   review	   of	   the	   secondary	   and	   primary	  
literature	   in	   this	   field.	   Secondly,	   this	   chapter	   will	   identify	   possible	   drivers	   that	   may	   have	  
either	  positive	  or	  negative	  effect	  on	  the	  development	  of	  UNCTAD.	  	  
3.1 Criteria	  for	  assessing	  UNCTAD	  
There	   are	   several	   ways	   to	   evaluate	   an	   organization.	   Different	   frameworks	   have	   been	  
developed	   in	   order	   for	   donor	   agencies	   to	   map	   the	   effectiveness	   and	   performance	   of	  
Intergovernmental	  Organizations	   (IGOs).	  One	   framework	   is	   the	   “Multilateral	  Organizations	  
Performance	   Assessment	   Network”	   (MOPAN)	   that	   conducts	   annual	   surveys	   based	   on	   the	  
member	   countries’	   delegations’	   perceptions	   of	   the	   organization	   (CIDA	   2009).	   The	   UK’s	  
agency	   DFID	   (Department	   For	   International	   Aid)	   has	   developed	   its	   own	   approach,	  
Multilateral	  Aid	  Review	  (MAR)	  (DFID	  2012).	  
There	  were	  many	  relevant	  criteria	  when	  choosing	  a	   theoretical	   framework	   for	  my	  thesis.	   I	  
have	   chosen	   a	   framework	   that	   is	   meant	   to	   be	   especially	   suited	   to	   evaluate	   UNCTAD.	  	  
Elements	   from	   institutional	   theory	  have	  been	  chosen	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  standard	  on	  which	  one	  
can	  compare	  UNCTAD’s	   level	  of	  success/failure	  as	  an	  intergovernmental	  forum.	  A	  common	  
and	  traditional	  view	  of	  what	  organizations	  are	  supposed	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  be	  successful	  is	  to	  
produce	   “collective	   and	   coordinated	   action”	   (Brunsson	   2006:2).	   Brunsson	   introduces	   two	  
ideal	  types	  of	  organizations,	  the	  “action	  organization”	  and	  the	  “political	  organization”.	  “The	  
political	   organization	   raison	   d’etre	   and	   the	   basis	   for	   its	   legitimacy	   lie	   in	   its	   ability	   not	   to	  
produce	   actions,	   but	   to	   reflect	   inconsistencies	   in	   the	   environment”	   (Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	  
1999:1-­‐3).	  UNCTAD	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  political	  organization	  (ibid).	  Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  (ibid)	  
argue	  that	  Brunsson’s	  general	  framework	  can	  be	  used	  on	  IGOs.	  UNCTAD	  would	  be	  classified	  
as	   a	   political	   organization	   where	   “the	   typical	   output	   from	   a	   political	   organization	   is	   talk,	  
decisions	  and	  only	  occasionally	  tangible	  results”	  (ibid).	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UNCTAD’s	   main	   functions	   have	   changed	   over	   time,	   but	   are	   today	   based	   on	   three	   pillars	  
stated	  in	  the	  Accra	  Accord:	  (a)	  A	  forum	  for	  intergovernmental	  deliberations	  and	  consensus-­‐
building;	  (b)	  A	  think	  tank	  for	  research	  and	  analysis	  on	  key	  and	  emerging	  development	  issues;	  
(c)	   A	   demand-­‐driven	   provider	   of	   tailored	   technical	   assistance	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   needs	   of	  
developing	   countries	   and	   countries	   with	   economies	   in	   transition	   in	   implementing	  
development	  strategies	  (Ortiz	  2012).	  	  
This	   thesis	   will	   only	   focus	   on	   the	   first	   pillar	   of	   UNCTAD,	   i.e.	   being	   an	   intergovernmental	  
forum.	   UNCTAD	   has	   functioned	   as	   a	   forum	   for	   the	   North	   and	   the	   South	   since	   its	  
establishment.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  forum	  has	  changed	  over	  time;	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  will	  be	  
further	  discussed	  in	  the	  analysis.	  However,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  UNCTAD	  has	  always	  been	  a	  
political	  and	  not	  an	  operative	  organization.	   In	  order	   to	  assess	   to	  what	  extent	  UNCTAD	  has	  
succeeded	  one	  needs	  to	  look	  at	  the	  different	  functions	  a	  political	  organization	  is	  supposed	  to	  
have.	  This	   thesis	  has	  chosen	   three	  criteria	   from	  Bergesen	  and	  Lunde’s	   framework	   that	  are	  
the	  most	   relevant	   variables	   for	  UNCTAD	  as	   a	   forum.	   The	   three	   criteria	   include	   (1)	   agenda	  
setting	  (2)	  promoting	  a	  common	  understanding	  (3)	  giving	  policy	  advice.	  Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  
(1999:4)	  also	  mentioned	  standard	  setting	  and	  monitoring.	  After	  a	  consultation	  with	  one	  of	  
the	   authors,	   Leiv	   Lunde,	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   standard	   setting	   and	  monitoring	  were	  more	  
related	  to	  organizations	  that	  attempted	  to	  set	  norms	  concerning	  human	  rights	  and	  climate	  
and	  were	  therefore	  not	  relevant	  for	  UNCTAD.	  Hence,	  these	  functions	  are	  not	  included	  in	  my	  
analysis.	   Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	   also	   mentioned	   the	   functions	   of	   financing	   and	   managing	  
operations.	  These	  functions	  are	  specific	  to	  an	  action	  organization	  that	  is	  operative	  in	  nature,	  
which	  is	  very	  different	  compared	  to	  UNCTAD.	  	  
Before	   assessing	  UNCTAD	   as	   an	   intergovernmental	   forum,	   the	   institutional	   criteria	  will	   be	  
presented	  in	  more	  detail.	  
3.1.1 Agenda	  setting	  
Agenda	  setting	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “a	  process	  by	  which	  demands	  by	  various	  actors	  at	  different	  
levels	   are	   translated	   into	   items	   vying	   for	   the	   attention	  of	   policymaking	   organs”	   (Bergesen	  
and	   Lunde	   1999:4).	   Often	   one	   can	   have	   an	   “organizational	   salesperson”	   for	   a	   certain	  
ideological	  perspective	  that	  the	  IGO	  is	  trying	  to	  invoke	  on	  policymaking	  agencies.	  UNCTAD’s	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first	  SG,	  Raul	  Prebisch,	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  a	  “salesperson”	  representing	  a	  new,	  innovative	  
ideology	   (Cox	   1994:102).	   Agenda	   setting	   includes	   the	   discussion	   and	   bargaining	   between	  
competing	  perceptions	  of	  the	  issues.	  In	  other	  words,	  “formulating	  an	  agenda	  is	  a	  question	  of	  
which	  items	  to	  include	  (and	  to	  exclude),	  how	  they	  are	  to	  be	  presented	  and	  where	  to	  handle	  
them”	  (Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  1999:5).	  	  
Thus,	  the	  task	  of	  a	  political	  organization	  is	  “primarily	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  formal	  forum	  where	  the	  
tug-­‐of-­‐war	   over	   agenda	   setting	   takes	   place”	   (ibid).	  However,	   the	   IGO	   secretariat	  may	   also	  
have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  influence	  both	  the	  selection	  and	  framing	  of	  issues.	  Examples	  where	  
this	  is	  relevant	  are	  when	  “the	  UN	  decides	  to	  convene	  a	  world	  conference	  on	  a	  set	  of	  issues	  
that	  has	  no	  clearly	  defined	  place	  on	  the	  international	  agenda”	  (ibid).	  
Agenda	  setting	   is	  also	  mentioned	   in	  the	  GCD	  literature.	  One	  has	  often	  considered	  that	  the	  
use	   of	   GCD	   is	   effective	   in	   “setting	   political	   agendas	   and	   focusing	   governments	   and	  
stakeholders’	  attention	  worldwide”	  (Underdal	  2012:6).	  	  
The	  GCD	  process	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  different	  phases	  (Rittberger	  1983:174-­‐181).	  One	  could	  
therefore	  argue	  that	  the	  function	  of	  agenda	  setting	  often	  happens	  in	  stage	  (1)	  in	  Rittberger’s	  
general	  GCD	  procedure.	  When	  initiating	  a	  conference	  project	  the	  organization’s	  secretariat	  
facilitates	   exploratory	   talk	  with	   governments.	   This	   is	   to	   determine	  whether	   there	   exists	   a	  
widely	   shared	   view	   that	   there	   should	   be	   diplomatic	   efforts	   to	   address	   this	   topic.	   These	  
exploratory	  talks	  trigger	  the	  national	  government	  to	  find	  one	  united	  national	  position	  on	  a	  
certain	  topic.	  This	  includes	  gathering	  the	  relevant	  stakeholders	  from	  the	  civil	  society,	  private	  
sector	  and	  relevant	  units	  from	  different	  state	  departments.	  This	  exercise	  in	  itself	  is	  useful	  as	  
one	  becomes	  aware	  of	  the	  topic	  and	  it	  sets	  the	  agenda	  (ibid).	  There	  is	  also	  a	  necessary	  step	  
before	   one	   can	   negotiate	   solutions.	   One	   example	   was	   UNCTAD	   I	   in	   1964	   where	   the	  
Norwegian	   position	   paper	   on	   questions	   relating	   to	   the	   shipping	   industry	   was	   highly	  
influenced	   by	   a	   strong	   lobby	   in	   Norway	   during	   the	   first	   stage	   in	   the	   GCD	   process.	   The	  
Norwegian	  Shipowners’	  Association	  (Norsk	  Rederiforbund)	  was	  an	  affected	  actor	  and	  had	  a	  




3.1.2 Promoting	  understanding	  
The	  secretariat	  and	  leader	   in	  political	  organizations	  are	  supposed	  to	  organize	  and	  facilitate	  
discussions	  where	   the	   nature	   and	   scope	   of	   a	   certain	   problem	  needs	   to	   be	   ‘solved’.	   There	  
needs	   to	   be	   agreement	   regarding	   the	   cause	   and	   effect	   relationships	   in	   the	   problems	  
addressed.	  Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  (1999:6)	  argue	  that	  “contending	  perceptions	  for	  framing	  the	  
issues	  thrives	  under	  such	  circumstances”	  and	  that	  “various	  actors	  may	  hold	  conflicting	  views,	  
sometimes	  reinforced	  by	  real	  scientific	  uncertainty”	  (ibid).	  
There	   are	   barriers	   to	   pursuing	   a	   joint	   understanding.	   The	   barriers	   can	   be	   “concrete	   and	  
material”.	   A	   material	   barrier	   may	   be	   in	   purely	   economic	   terms	   where	   a	   certain	  
understanding	  of	  a	  problem	  will	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  winners	  and	  losers.	  However,	  the	  barriers	  
will	  also	  be	  related	  to	  values	  and	  ideological	  cleavages.	  Thus,	  in	  this	  stage	  the	  organization	  is	  
supposed	  to	  play	  a	  role	  as	  a	  forum	  for	  discussion	  and	  the	  secretariat	  and	  leader	  are	  meant	  to	  
supply	  factual	  foundation	  for	  the	  debate	  (ibid:5-­‐7).	  
The	   tool	   of	   GCD	   has	   often	   proved	   effective	   in	   “providing	   an	   institutional	   framework	   for	  
building	  consensual	   scientific-­‐based	  knowledge”	  and	   to	  provide	  “arenas	   for	   learning	  about	  
effective	  policies	  and	  good	  practices”	  (Underdal	  2012:6).	  	  
The	  function	  of	  ‘promoting	  a	  common	  understanding’	  relates	  to	  stage	  (2)	  in	  the	  GCD	  process	  
(Rittberger	  1983:174-­‐181).	  It	  is	  in	  this	  process	  that	  the	  organization’s	  secretariat	  may	  play	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  conducting	  analytical	  groundwork	  that	  is	  distributed	  in	  good	  time	  so	  that	  
each	   country	   can	   form	  pre-­‐negotiation	  postures	  based	  on	   the	   same	  base	  of	   informational	  
material.	   Consequently,	   one	   has	   therefore	   a	   common	   foundation	   of	   knowledge	   that	   the	  
positions	  may	  be	  built	  upon.	  	  
Promoting	  a	  common	  understanding	   is	  a	   function	   that	  also	   is	  exercised	   in	   stage	   (3)	  of	   the	  
GCD	  process,	  which	  entails	  the	  actual	  conference.	  During	  the	  negotiations	  one	  has	  to	  be	  able	  





3.1.3 Policy	  advice	  
“[…]	   governments	   can	   reach	   agreement	   not	   only	   on	   appropriate	   standards	   in	   legal	   terms,	  
but	  also	  guidelines	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  by	  the	  states	  and	  other	  stakeholders”	  
(Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	   1999:8).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   IGO	   can	   and	   should	   “translate	   the	  
normative	   principles	   into	   action	   at	   the	   nation	   level”	   (ibid).	   In	   order	   to	   propose	  
recommendations	   for	   government	   policy	   the	   IGO	   needs	   to	   possess	   expertise	   and	   have	  
sufficient	  legitimacy	  (ibid).	  This	  happens	  in	  stage	  (4)	  of	  the	  GCD	  process,	  the	  implementation	  
of	  conference	  outcome(s)	  including	  review	  and	  appraisal	  (Rittberger	  1983:	  174-­‐181).	  	  	  	  
These	   specified	   criteria	   may	   explain	   why	   an	   intergovernmental	   forum,	   like	   UNCTAD,	   can	  
achieve	   success	   and	   failure.	   However,	   the	   more	   general	   question	   is	   to	   understand	   and	  
capture	   the	   drivers	   that	  may	   determine	   success	   and	   failure	   in	   GCD.	   The	   next	   section	  will	  
shed	  light	  on	  some	  of	  these	  drivers.	  	  	  
3.2 Theories	  relating	  to	  International	  Negotiations	  
Conference	  diplomacy	  is	  not	  a	  new	  phenomenon	  (Gelman	  2000:1).	  The	  Peace	  of	  Westphalia	  
in	  1648	  was	  an	  example	  of	  “international”	  conference	  diplomacy,	  followed	  by	  the	  Congress	  
of	  Vienna	  in	  1815,	  which	  opened	  ‘the	  age	  of	  consultation’	  between	  countries	  (ibid).	  In	  other	  
words,	  countries	  would	  consult	  each	  other	  when	  facing	  collective	  problems	  and	  attempt	  to	  
reach	  an	  agreement.	  However,	  these	  conferences	  had	  a	  limited	  and	  specific	  mandate	  that	  is	  
very	   different	   from	   many	   of	   the	   conferences	   we	   are	   witnessing	   today.	   The	   conferences	  
today	  often	   “lack	   clear	  mandates	   and	   transparent	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  necessary	   to	  
effectively	  address	  the	  issues	  they	  are	  designed	  to	  resolve”	  (Støre	  2012a).	  Until	  the	  middle	  
of	   the	   late	   19th	   century	   conference	   diplomacy	   became	   standardized,	   set	   precedents	   and	  
“created	   many	   procedural	   innovations	   still	   found	   in	   global	   conference	   diplomacy	   today”	  
(Gelman	  2000:1).	  
Even	  though	  GCD	  is	  a	  widespread	  diplomatic	  tool,	  little	  research	  has	  been	  done	  on	  this	  topic	  
(ibid).	   In	   international	   negotiations	   there	   are	   different	   variables	   that	   capture	   the	   group	  




There	  have	  been	  scholars,	   like	  Gelman	   (2000),	  who	  have	  examined	   the	   role	  of	   conference	  
diplomacy	  by	  using	  the	  main	  IR	  schools,	  Neo-­‐Realism,	  Neo-­‐Liberalism	  and	  Constructivism.	  In	  
this	  thesis	  it	  seems	  more	  fruitful	  to	  use	  theoretical	  tools	  that	  are	  closer	  and	  more	  specialized	  
on	  the	  topic	  that	  I	  want	  to	  examine.	  	  
3.3 Operationalization	  of	  independent	  variables	  
This	  thesis	  had	  to	  restrict	  itself	  to	  four	  independent	  variables	  chosen	  from	  literature	  dealing	  
with	  global	  conference	  diplomacy	  and	  more	  generally	  international	  negotiations.	  Power	  is	  an	  
essential	  variable	  in	  negotiations	  because	  it	  permeates	  all	  steps	  of	  the	  negotiation	  process,	  
thus	   it	   had	   to	   be	   included.	   Problem	   malignancy	   is	   another	   concept	   which	   brings	   “value	  
added”	   in	   the	   analysis.	   The	   concept	   manages	   to	   capture	   the	   link	   between	   specific	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  problem	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  actors	  that	  are	  attempting	  to	  solve	  it.	  
Institutional	  capacity,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  puts	  focus	  on	  the	  more	  formalized	  rules	  within	  the	  
institution	  that	  shape	  the	  space	  in	  which	  negotiations	  take	  place.	  These	  formalized	  rules	  may	  
also	   lead	   to	   specific	  diplomatic	   strategies	  or	   influence	   the	  dynamic	   in	   the	  negotiations.	  All	  
the	  above	  mentioned	  variables	   (problem	  malignancy,	   institutional	  capacity	  and	  power)	  are	  
based	   on	   Underdal’s	   core	   model	   that	   explores	   “why	   some	   efforts	   at	   developing	   and	  
implementing	  joint	  solutions	  to	  international	  problems	  succeed	  while	  others	  fail”	  (Underdal	  
2002:37).	  One	  can	  argue	  that	  Underdal’s	  core	  model	  is	  based	  on	  soft	  rationalism.	  	  
The	  variable	  of	  consensual	  knowledge	   is	  taken	  from	  Rothstein	  (1984).	  Rothstein	  introduced	  
and	  explored	  this	  variable	  when	  analyzing	  the	  UNCTAD	  commodity	  negotiations	  from	  1974-­‐
1979.	  This	  period	   included	  two	  conferences:	  UNCTAD	  IV	  1976	   in	  Nairobi	  and	  UNCTAD	  V	   in	  
1979,	  Manila.	  According	  to	  Rothstein,	  lack	  of	  consensual	  knowledge	  is	  a	  key	  variable	  in	  the	  
understanding	  of	  why	  the	  commodity	  negotiations	  in	  UNCTAD	  failed.	  
All	   these	  variables	  emphasize	  different	  parts	  of	   the	   reality.	  Using	  all	   four	  variables	  will	   aid	  
the	   thesis	   in	   capturing	   and	   understanding	   the	   most	   decisive	   drivers	   that	   influenced	   the	  
dynamic	   in	   the	   North-­‐South	   negotiations	   in	   UNCTAD.	   For	   each	   independent	   variable	   a	  
tentative	  conclusion	  based	  on	  the	  secondary	  literature	  review	  will	  be	  presented.	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3.3.1 Consensual	  knowledge	  X₁	  
Rothstein	   (1984:736)	   uses	   Ernst	   Haas’	   definition	   of	   consensual	   knowledge.	   Consensual	  
knowledge	  is	  defined	  as	  “a	  body	  of	  beliefs	  about	  cause-­‐effect	  and	  ends-­‐means	  relationships	  
among	  variables	  (activities,	  aspirations,	  values	  and	  demands)	  that	  is	  widely	  accepted	  by	  the	  
relevant	  actors,	   irrespective	  of	   the	  absolute	  or	   final	   ‘truth’	  of	   these	  beliefs”	   (ibid).	   Thus	   in	  
global	   negotiations	   one	   needs	   to	   have	   a	   set	   of	   beliefs	   that	   the	  most	   relevant	   actors	   can	  
agree	  upon.	  In	  UNCTAD	  the	  relevant	  actors	  would	  be	  the	  coalition	  of	  G77	  and	  the	  B-­‐group	  
(developed	  countries).	  	  
Rothstein	  argues	  that	  even	  though	  the	  explanatory	  variable	  of	  “consensual	  knowledge”	  is	  in	  
most	   cases	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   weak,	   it	   still	   can	   have	   influence	   in	   a	   setting	   where	   “force	   is	  
inappropriate,	   power	   is	   fragmented	   and	   uncertainty	   is	   great”	   (Rothstein	   1984:761).	  
Rothstein	   (1984)	   argues	   that	   this	   description	   fits	   well	   in	   to	   the	   context	   of	   commodity	  
negotiations	   in	   UNCTAD.	   Thus,	   power	   and	   self-­‐interest	   that	   are	   often	   seen	   as	   dominant	  
factors	  in	  world	  politics	  must	  be	  reinterpreted	  in	  this	  setting.	  	  
The	   organization’s	   secretariat	   may	   play	   an	   important	   role	   with	   regard	   to	   supplying	  
information	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  but	  the	  member	  countries	  involved	  must	  also	  be	  willing	  to	  
learn	  and	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  information	  provided.	  Rothstein	  (1984:736)	  defines	  learning	  
as	  “the	  ability	  and	  willingness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  relevant	  actors	  to	   incorporate	  consensual	  
knowledge	   into	   the	  definition	  of	   interests	   that	  motivate	   international	   behavior”.	  As	  noted	  
earlier	   there	   are	   barriers	   to	   learning.	   Rothstein	   (1984:737)	   argues	   that	   in	   large	   coalitions	  
with	   great	   diversity	   in	   interests	   and	   perspectives,	   there	   is	   limited	   capacity	   to	   create	   real	  
consensus,	   which	   makes	   it	   harder	   to	   be	   influenced	   by	   the	   new	   information	   provided.	   In	  
other	   words,	   “the	   capacity	   to	   build	   genuine	   consensus	   (that	   is,	   something	   more	   than	  
rhetorical	  support	  for	  grand	  principles)	  is	  limited”	  (ibid).	  Thus,	  consensus	  in	  G77	  is	  “likely	  to	  
be	   established	   around	   a	   few	   abstract	   symbols	   that	   become	   institutionalized	   and	   hence	  
resistant	  to	  change	  or	  compromise”	  (ibid).	  	  
In	   the	   secondary	   literature	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   disagreement	   about	   the	   role	   of	   consensual	  
knowledge	   in	  the	  negotiations	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  rise	   (Rothstein	  1984	  versus	  Righter	  1995).	  
Rothstein	   (1984)	  argues	   that	   the	   reason	  why	   the	  negotiations	  during	  UNCTAD’s	   rise	   failed	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was	   because	   of	   lack	   of	   consensual	   knowledge.	   Some	   of	   the	   factors	   creating	   difficulties	   in	  
providing	   a	   foundation	   of	   consensual	   knowledge	  were	   (1)	   structural	   conditions	   related	   to	  
the	  GCD	   process	   (structure	   of	   the	   bargaining	   process;	   the	   group	   structure	   and	   the	   actors	  
involved),	  (2)	  complex	  problems	  and	  uncertainty	  of	  knowledge	  which	  became	  politicized	  and	  
backstopped	  with	  in-­‐house	  research.	  Therefore	  in	  a	  setting	  with	  uncertainty	  and	  fragmented	  
power,	   consensual	   knowledge	   plays	   a	   major	   role	   in	   explaining	   the	   failure	   of	   achieving	  
consensus	  and	  concrete	  results.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Righter	  (1995)	  argues	  that	  the	  posture	  
of	  confrontation	  was	  more	  important	  for	  the	  G77	  than	  any	  concrete	  gains	  that	  might	  accrue	  
from	   compromise	   or	   agreement.	   Thus,	   a	   lack	   of	   consensual	   knowledge	   is,	   according	   to	  
Righter,	  not	  a	  decisive	  factor	   in	  explaining	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  negotiations	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  
rise.	  	  
The	   tentative	   conclusion	   based	   on	   secondary	   literature	   is	   that	   a	   lack	   of	   consensual	  
knowledge	  was	  one	  of	  many	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  negotiations	  of	  UNCTAD.	  How	  
important	  consensual	  knowledge	  was	  in	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  UNCTAD	  is	  difficult	  to	  determine	  
as	  the	  secondary	  literature	  has	  conflicting	  views.	  
3.3.2 Problem	  Malignancy	  X₂	  
There	  is	  no	  question	  that	  some	  problems	  are	  harder	  to	  solve	  than	  others.	  UNCTAD	  has,	  since	  
its	   establishment,	   attempted	   to	   solve	   global	   questions	   relating	   to	   structure	   of	   the	  
international	  economic	  order.	  Many	  respondents	  argued	  that	   in	  the	  1980’s	  negotiations	   in	  
UNCTAD	   became	  more	   “inward-­‐looking”	   and	   focused	   only	   on	  UNCTAD’s	   own	  mandate.	   A	  
variable	   that	   focused	  on	   the	  character	  of	   the	  problem	  that	  UNCTAD	   is	   trying	   to	   solve	  was	  
needed.	  	  
According	   to	  Underdal	   (2002:17-­‐19)	  problem	  malignancy	   (X₂)	   is	   a	   “function	  of	   incongruity,	  
asymmetry,	  and	  cumulative	  cleavages”.	  Incongruity	  refers	  to	  problems	  where	  “cost-­‐benefit	  
calculus	   of	   individual	   actors	   is	   systematically	   biased	   in	   favor	   of	   either	   the	   costs	   or	   the	  
benefits	   of	   a	   particular	   course	  of	   action”	   (ibid).	   Incongruity	   can	  be	   caused	  by	   competition	  
and	  externalities	   (ibid).	  Asymmetry	  refers	   to	   the	  actors’	  values	  which	  are	  “incompatible	  or	  
their	   interests	   are	   negatively	   correlated”	   (ibid).	   Finally,	   cumulative	   cleavages	   are	   often	   an	  
additional	   source	   of	   complications.	   Cumulative	   cleavages	   are	   defined	   as	   “to	   the	   extent	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parties	  find	  themselves	  in	  the	  same	  situation	  on	  all	  dimensions	  or	  issues,	  so	  that	  those	  who	  
stand	  to	  win	  (or	  lose)	  on	  one	  dimension	  also	  comes	  out	  as	  winners	  (or	  losers)	  on	  the	  other	  
dimensions	   as	   well”	   (Underdal	   2002:20).	   Thus,	   these	   three	   elements	   are	   determining	   the	  
malignancy	  of	  the	  problem	  that	  the	  organization	  is	  trying	  to	  solve.	  	  
According	   to	  Young’s	   institutional	  diagnostic	   tool	  one	  would	  assume	   that	   the	   character	  of	  
the	   problem	   that	   UNCTAD	   is	   trying	   to	   solve	   is	   not	   one	   of	   coordination,	   but	   collaboration	  
(Young	   2006:122).	   Another	   aspect	   is	   that	   the	   problems	   UNCTAD	   is	   trying	   to	   solve	   are	  
problems	   that	   will	   affect	   other	   institutional	   settings.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   UNCTAD’s	   mandate	  
concerning	  trade	  overlaps	  with	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO).	  	  
The	   implication	   of	   this	   is	   that	   the	   problem	   solving	   capacity,	   i.e.	   the	   capacity	   for	   an	  
organization	  to	  do	  something,	  will	  have	  to	  be	  matched	  with	  the	  notions	  of	  problem	  type	  and	  
task	  (Underdal	  2002:15).	  	  
A	  tentative	  conclusion	  based	  on	  the	  secondary	  literature	  review	  is	  that	  problem	  malignancy	  
has	  been	  a	   consistent	   feature	  of	  UNCTAD’s	   rise	  and	   fall.	   Yet,	   the	  malignancy	  has	   changed	  
character	  during	  its	  rise	  and	  fall.	  During	  its	  rise	  the	  malignancy	  was	  related	  to	  the	  trade	  and	  
development	   issues	   negotiated,	  while	   during	   UNCTAD’s	   fall	   it	   seemed	   like	   the	  malignancy	  
was	  concerning	  disagreement	  about	  UNCTAD’s	  mandate.	  
3.3.3 Institutional	  Capacity	  X₃	  
An	  organization’s	  institutional	  capacity	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  “the	  institutional	  setting	  (i.e.	  the	  
rules	  of	  the	  game),	  the	  distribution	  of	  power	  among	  the	  actors	  involved,	  the	  skill	  and	  energy	  
available	   for	   the	   political	   engineering	   of	   cooperative	   solutions”	   (Underdal	   2002:23).	  
Institutional	   settings	   refer	   to	   institutions	   as	   arenas	   and	   as	   actors.	   Most	   UN-­‐arenas	   share	  
similar	  traits	  in	  relation	  to	  rule	  of	  access,	  decision	  rules	  and	  rules	  of	  procedure.	  
This	   thesis	  will	  mostly	   focus	   on	  UNCTAD	   as	   an	   arena	   and	   therefore	   focus	   on	   the	   decision	  
rule,	   as	   it	   is	   the	   most	   important	   determinant	   of	   institutional	   capacity	   to	   aggregate	   actor	  
preferences	   into	   collective	   decisions	   (Underdal	   2002:25).	   Decision	   rules	   are	   meant	   to	  
“stipulate	  conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  valid	  collective	  decisions	  or	  social	  
choices	   relating	   to	   issues	   falling	   within	   the	   competence	   of	   specific	   institutional	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arrangements”	   (Breitmeier	   et	   al	   2006:1145).	   In	  most	  UN	  organizations	   the	   decision	   rule	   is	  
consensus.	  Consensus	   is	   the	  most	  demanding	  decision	  rule	   there	   is	  after	  unanimity,	  which	  
often	  can	  lead	  to	  the	   law	  of	  the	  least	  ambitious	  program	   (Underdal	  2002:25,	  see	  Underdal	  
1980).	  	  
However,	  the	  decision	  rule	  is	  only	  one	  procedural	  element	  in	  the	  broader	  GCD	  process.	  The	  
GCD	   process	   in	   UNCTAD	   is	   similar	   to	   other	   global	   conferences	   and	   organizations.	   As	  
mentioned	   earlier	   the	   GCD	   process	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   different	   phases	   (Rittberger	  
1983:174-­‐181).	   Stage	   (1)	   is	   the	   initiation	   of	   a	   conference	   project.	   Stage	   (2)	   involves	   the	  
preparatory	  work	  for	  holding	  the	  conference.	  Stage	  (3)	  is	  the	  actual	  conference;	  conference	  
negotiations	   for	   decision-­‐making.	   This	   stage	   consists	   of	   intense	   negotiations	   between	  
coalitions	  of	  countries	  that	  have	  instructions	  from	  their	  capitals.	  States	  are	  the	  main	  players,	  
but	  the	  secretariat	  and	  sometimes	  NGOs	  can	  act	  as	  brokers	  and	  go	  between	  the	  coalitions	  to	  
find	   possibilities	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   compromises.	   Stage	   (4)	   is	   the	   implementation	   of	  
conference	  outcome(s)	  including	  review	  and	  appraisal	  (ibid).	  
These	  elements	  are	  general	  to	  most	  global	  conferences.	  When	  delving	  deeper	  into	  the	  actual	  
conference	   (step	   3),	   the	   negotiation	   process	   in	   UNCTAD	   is	   characterized	   by	   a	   negotiation	  
group	   structure,	  which	   is	   based	  on	   formal	   and	   informal	   features.	   The	   group	   structure	  has	  
changed	  after	  the	  Cold	  War.	  The	  main	  negotiation	  groups	  are	  therefore	  the	  G77	  and	  the	  B-­‐
group,	  which	   is	  divided	   into	  the	  EU-­‐group	  and	  the	   JUSSCANNZ	  group.	  Normally	  one	  would	  
have	  one	  group	  coordinator	  that	  will	  lead	  each	  negotiation	  group.	  This	  person	  will	  have	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  convening	  small	  meetings	  before	  all	  the	  groups	  meet	  in	  the	  negotiations.	  In	  
these	  meetings	  a	  common	  position	  within	  the	  coalitions	  will	  be	  hammered	  out.	  After	  this,	  in	  
the	   actual	   negotiation,	   the	   coalitions	  will	   negotiate	   the	  wording	   in	   the	  working	  document	  
line-­‐by-­‐line.	   The	  working	   document	   is	   projected	   on	   a	   big	   screen	   in	   the	   negotiation	   room.	  
Sometimes	  it	  can	  end	  up	  with	  working	  documents	  where	  the	  negotiations	  are	  on	  a	  word-­‐by-­‐
word	  level.	  This	  can	  be	  a	  rather	  time	  consuming	  and	  exhaustive	  exercise.	  However,	  often	  the	  
process	  in	  itself	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  as	  it	  raises	  awareness	  and	  thus	  increases	  
competence	  in	  the	  specific	  issues	  that	  are	  dealt	  with.	  	  
                                                
5	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  concerning	  decision	  rules,	  regime	  effectiveness	  and	  current	  practice	  see	  Breitmeier	  
et	  al.	  2006.	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I	  have	  now	  focused	  on	  the	   formal	  procedural	  elements	  of	  GCD.	  However,	   there	   is	  another	  
more	  fluid	  element	  within	  the	   institutional	  framework	  of	  GCD	  that	   influences	  the	  behavior	  
of	   the	  actors,	   the	  outcome	  and	  process.	  For	  example,	  one	   respondent	  argued	   that	  “When	  
you	  are	  negotiating	  in	  a	  global	  climate	  where	  there	  is	  already	  a	  certain	  disappointment	  and	  
uncertainty	   over	   the	   lack	   of	   advances	   you	   can	   see	   how	   the	   tensions	   are	   being	  magnified”	  
(UNCTAD	  staff,	  former	  lead	  negotiator	  of	  G77,	  Respondent	  I).	  Thus	  one	  must	  have	  in	  mind	  
that	   the	  general	  atmosphere	  at	   these	  conferences	  has	  a	  major	   influence	  and	  has	  changed	  
over	   the	   years.	   In	   UNCTAD’s	   rise,	   the	   global	   conferences	   began	   with	   a	   clean	   slate;	   there	  
were	   no	   disappointments	   just	   a	   strong	   belief	   in	   GCD.	   When	   few	   concrete	   results	   were	  
achieved,	  the	  general	  atmosphere	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  sentiment	  of	  disappointment	  in	  the	  
GCD	  method.	  
GCD	  and	  the	  development	  of	  an	  organization	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  evolutionary	  process.	   In	  
the	  words	  of	  Cox	  and	  Jacobsen	  (1973:7)	  “Since	  established,	  organizations	  take	  on	  a	  life	  of	  
their	   own	   and	   develop	   their	   own	   inner	   dynamics".	   Conferences	   and	   organizations	   are	  
formed	   by	   a	   sequence	   of	   connected	   events;	   it	   is	   not	   something	   that	   is	   controllable	   by	   a	  
leader.	  SG	  Raul	  Prebisch	  wanted	  to	  use	  UNCTAD	  as	  an	  instrument	  to	  promote	  the	  interests	  
of	   G77.	   However,	   when	   he	   realized	   that	   UNCTAD	   had	   only	   become	   a	   “forum”	   and	   not	   a	  
powerful	  instrument,	  he	  stepped	  down	  as	  a	  SG	  for	  UNCTAD	  (Love	  2001:13).	  Maybe	  he	  noted	  
how	  institutions	  do	  not	  follow	  an	  intended	  course	  of	  action.	  Path	  dependency	  is	  a	  concept	  
that	  may	  explain	  why	  some	  organizations	  develop	  the	  way	  they	  do	  (Christensen	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
Path	  dependency	  underlines	  the	  importance	  of	  historical	  roots.	  	  
A	  tentative	  conclusion	  based	  on	  the	  literature	  review	  is	  that	  UNCTAD’s	  Achilles	  heel	  has	  been	  
the	  biased	  secretariat.	  During	  its	  rise	  UNCTAD	  had	  a	  strong	  secretariat	  that	  functioned	  as	  an	  
actor	  (i.e.	  a	  pressure	  group	  of	  the	  G77)	  that	  fuelled	  the	  political	  energy	  behind	  the	  rise.	  The	  
decision	  rule	  of	  majority	  voting	  favored	  the	  G77.	  However,	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  fall	  the	  role	  of	  





3.3.4 Power	  	  X₄	  
Power	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  various	  ways.	  Gilpin	  (1981)	  describes	  the	  concept	  of	  power	  as	  “one	  
of	  the	  most	  troublesome	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  relations”	  (cited	  in	  Baldwin	  2002).	  Bell	  
et	  al	  (1969)	  argue	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  power	  to	  the	  political	  scientist	  “is	  vague	  and	  ultimately	  
tautological,	  and	   its	  use	   in	  political	  analysis	  poses	  epistemological	  difficulties	  of	  definitions	  
and	   operationalization”	   (cited	   in	   Zartman	   and	   Rubin	   2002:6).	   Nevertheless,	   when	   delving	  
into	  the	  inner	  dynamics	  of	  global	  negotiations	  the	  concept	  of	  power	  must	  be	  included.	  	  
There	   are	   two	   different	   schools	   of	   thought	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   connection	   of	   power	   in	  
international	  negotiations	   (Zartman	  and	  Rubin	  2002:4).	  One	  school	  of	   thought	  argues	  “the	  
very	   act	   of	   negotiating	   has	   the	   real	   effect	   of	   leveling	   the	   playing	   field,	   producing	   at	   least	  
rough	   symmetry”	   (ibid).	   This	   means	   that	   the	   initial	   power	   differences	   between	   countries	  
dissolve	   as	   one	   “needs	   the	   other’s	   assent	   and	   is	   blocked	   by	   the	   other’s	   veto”	   (ibid).	  
Consequently,	  negotiations	  reconcile	  and	  mediate	  a	  prior	  power	  distribution.	  The	  dominant	  
school	   of	   thought	   argues	   that	   differences	   in	   power	   do	  make	   a	   difference	   in	   negotiations.	  
Powerful	  parties	  can	  obtain	  the	  results	  to	  their	  liking	  by	  controlling	  the	  negotiation	  process.	  
Thus,	  “negotiations	  only	  confirm	  a	  given	  power	  distribution”	  (ibid).	   In	  order	  to	  capture	  the	  
prior	  power	  distribution	   this	   thesis	  will	  differentiate	  between	   (1)	  power	   in	   the	  basic	  game	  
(i.e.	  power	   in	   the	  system	  of	  activities)	  and	   (2)	  power	  within	   the	  organization’s	  negotiation	  
arena,	  decision	  game	   (numerical	  power/winning	  coalition).	  This	   is	  an	   important	  distinction	  
as	  UNCTAD’s	  purpose	  and	  goal	  was	  to	   let	  the	  poor,	  yet	  numerous	  developing	  countries	  be	  
successful	   in	   “mobilizing	   the	   majorities	   required	   to	   win	   contested	   decisions”	   in	   the	   UN	  
organizations	   (Keohane	  and	  Underdal	  2011:55).	  However,	  even	  though	  G77	  had	  a	  winning	  
coalition	  in	  different	  UN	  organizations	  it	  was	  much	  weaker	  when	  it	  came	  to	  “power	  in	  basic	  
games	  of	  international	  trade	  and	  finance”	  (ibid).	  	  
This	   thesis	  will	  employ	  multiple	  conceptions	  of	  power	  to	  capture	  different	   forms	  of	  power	  
prevalent	   in	   GCD	   process	   (Barnett	   and	   Duvall	   2005:39).	   Power	   will	   be	   examined	   with	  
theoretical	   tools	   that	   stem	   from	   two	   grand	   theories,	   namely	   Realism	   and	   Constructivism.	  
This	  is	  a	  fruitful	  departing	  point	  to	  understand	  how	  power	  works	  and	  to	  capture	  the	  rise	  and	  
fall	  of	  UNCTAD.	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Coleman’s	  narrow	  definition	  of	  power	  as	  “control	  over	  important	  events”	  (cited	  in	  Underdal	  
2002:29)	   can	   be	   argued	   to	   be	   a	   realist	   conception	   of	   power	   (this	   is	   termed	   ‘compulsory	  
power’	  by	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall	  2005:40).	  According	  to	  Underdal	  (2002),	  one	  may	  distinguish	  
two	  faces	  of	  power,	  i.e.	  (1)	  Control	  over	  events	  that	  are	  important	  to	  oneself;	  this	  provides	  
autonomy	  for	   the	  actor.	   (2)	  Control	  over	  events	   that	  may	  be	   important	   to	  others;	   this	  can	  
provide	   an	   actor	   the	   power	   to	   impose	   its	  will	   on	   the	   others.	   The	   combination	  of	   the	   two	  
faces	  of	  power	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  “hegemony”	  (Underdal	  2002).	  Power	  can	  be	  a	  variable	  to	  
“bypass	   or	   break	   aggregation	  deadlock”	   (ibid).	   Coleman’s	   definition	   is	   included	   to	   capture	  
power	   in	   the	   basic	   game	   and	   how	   this	   may	   influence	   the	   other	   variables	   (for	   example	  
institutional	  capacity).	  	  	  	  	  
This	   thesis	  will	   also	   draw	  on	   findings	   from	  Krasner	   (1981),	  who	   is	   characterized	   as	   a	   neo-­‐
realist.	  He	  used	   the	  concept	  of	  meta-­‐political	  power	   in	  his	  article	   to	   capture	  how	   the	  G77	  
attempted	   through	   the	   demands	   of	   NIEO	   to	   ‘alter	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   game’	   to	   suit	   their	  
interests.	  Krasner	  underlines	  that	  the	  G77	  was	  guided	  by	  interest	  and	  this	  caused	  the	  rise	  of	  
the	  remarkable	  protest-­‐organization	  UNCTAD.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  one	  needs	  an	  additional	  theoretical	  tool	  to	  capture	  that	  there	  
was	  something	  more	  than	  just	  interests	  that	  shaped	  the	  G77’s	  unity	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  UNCTAD.	  
Barnett	  and	  Duvall	   (2005)	   introduces	   four	  conceptualizations	  of	  power	   that	  are	  “meant	   to	  
provide	  a	  distinct	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  in	  what	  respects	  are	  actors	  able	  to	  determine	  their	  
own	  fate,	  and	  how	  is	  that	  ability	   limited	  or	  enhanced	  through	  social	  relations	  with	  others”	  
(Barnett	  and	  Duvall	  2005:43).	  This	   is	  a	   recent	  and	  ambitious	  article	  attempting	  to	  create	  a	  
conceptual	   framework	   that	   includes	  concepts	  of	  power	   from	  different	  grand	   theories.	  The	  
four	   conceptualizations	   are:	   (1)	   Compulsory	   power	   (realist	   perception	   of	   power),	   (2)	  
Institutional	   power	   (‘the	   control	   actors	   exercise	   indirectly	   over	   others	   through	   diffuse	  
relations	  of	  interactions’),	  (3)	  structural	  power	  (in	  line	  with	  Marxism	  and	  Critical	  theory;	  the	  
constitution	  of	  subjects’	  capacities	   in	  direct	  structural	   relations	   to	  one	  another)	  and	   finally	  
(4)	  productive	  power	  which	   is	   defined	  as	   “the	   socially	   diffuse	  production	  of	   subjectivity	   in	  
systems	   of	   meaning	   and	   significance”	   (ibid).	   All	   these	   conceptualizations	   may	   have	   been	  
relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  For	  example,	   institutional	  power	   illustrates	  how	  the	  powerful	  actors	  
manage	  to	  shape	  institutions	  and	  the	  decision	  procedures	  (which	  was	  the	  case	  in	  UNCTAD).	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It	  was	  through	  the	  idea	  of	  Structural	  power	  that	  Prebisch	  was	  able	  to	  explain	  and	  frame	  the	  
NIEO	  agenda	  and	  ideological	  belief	  system	  the	  G77	  was	  built	  upon.	  	  
However,	   this	   thesis	   will	   only	   focus	   on	   one	   of	   the	   Barnett	   and	   Duvall’s	   concepts,	   namely	  
productive	   power.	  After	   the	   secondary	   literature	   review	   I	   believe	   this	   is	   the	   concept	   from	  
Barnett	   and	   Duvall	   that	   may	   capture	   the	   rise	   and	   fall	   of	   UNCTAD.	   Barnett	   and	   Duvall	  
(2005:39)	  argue	  that	  “power	  is	  the	  production,	  in	  and	  through	  social	  relations,	  of	  effects	  that	  
shape	  the	  capacities	  of	  actors	   to	  determine	  their	  own	  circumstances	  and	   fate”.	  Productive	  
power	   concerns	  how	  one	  views	  and	  perceives	  one’s	  own	   ‘self’	   and	   ‘identity’	   in	   relation	   to	  
others	  within	   a	   “system	  of	   significance	  and	  meaning”.	   The	   identity	  of	   an	  actor	   is	   not	  only	  
shaped	  by	  the	  “other”,	  but	  also	  by	  what	  one	  ‘might	  have	  become’	  in	  the	  social	  world.	  This	  
perception	   is	   formed	   by	   the	   existing	   social	   and	   historical	   understandings,	   meanings	   and	  
norms	  that	  influence	  an	  actor’s	  choice	  of	  action	  (ibid:	  56).	  Productive	  power	  underlines	  the	  
complexity	   in	   international	  negotiations,	   the	  unintentionally	  of	   actions	   that	   are	   shaped	  by	  
how	  other	  actors	  perceive	   this	  action.	  This	   conception	  also	  explains	  how	   there	   is	  not	  only	  
one	  outcome.	  
The	  main	  players	  in	  the	  UNCTAD	  negotiations	  are	  nation	  states	  that	  have	  aligned	  themselves	  
in	   coalitions	  with	  other	  nation	   states.	   Yet,	   it	  must	  be	   recognized	   that	   there	  are	   important	  
actors	   on	   each	   level	   of	   the	   negotiation	   process.	   The	   nation	   state	  may	   have	   contradictory	  
motivations	  and	   interests	  based	  on	   lobby	  groups	  within	   the	  state	   (cf.	   the	  Norwegian	  Ship-­‐
owners’	  Association	  which	   influenced	   the	  Norwegian	  position	  paper	   in	   the	  negotiations	   in	  
UNCTAD	  I).	  Fractions	  and	  contradictory	  motivations	  are	  certainly	  the	  case	  within	  coalitions	  
that	  contain	  countries	  that	  are	  heterogeneous	  and	  have	  different	  interests.	  	  
A	  tentative	  conclusion	  based	  on	  secondary	  literature	  is	  that	  one	  must	  focus	  on	  power	  in	  the	  
basic	   game	   and	   how	   it	   relates	   to	   the	   power	   in	   a	   decision	   game.	   During	   the	   rise	   actors	  
believed	   that	   one	   could	   change	   features	   in	   the	   basic	   game	   through	   the	   decision	   game.	   I	  
believe	   productive	   power	   can	   explain	   this	   strong	   belief	   in	   the	   GCD	   process.	   Later,	   one	  
observed	  how	  this	  did	  not	  work	  in	  practice,	  which	  again	  showed	  the	  relevance	  and	  strength	  




“Social	  Science	  at	  its	  best	  is	  a	  creative	  process	  of	  insight	  and	  discovery	  taking	  place	  within	  a	  
well-­‐established	  structure	  of	  scientific	  inquiry”	  (King,	  Keohane	  and	  Verba	  1994:12)	  
In	  the	  following	  section	  the	  research	  process	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  be	  presented.	  The	  reasons	  for	  
the	  choice	  of	  the	  research	  design	  will	  also	  be	  outlined.	  My	  research	  methods	  included	  semi-­‐
structured	  elite	  interviews,	  participative	  observation	  and	  a	  review	  of	  secondary	  and	  primary	  
literature.	   It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  research	  design	  and	  research	  methods	  that	  have	  been	  
chosen	  are	  the	  most	  appropriate	  tools	  to	  address	  the	  questions	  raised	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  
The	   main	   focus	   in	   this	   chapter	   will	   be	   on	   the	   research	   methods	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   main	  
Research	   Question:	   How	   can	   one	   understand	   UNCTAD’s	   development	   over	   time,	   more	  
precisely	  the	  ‘Rise’	  and	  ‘Fall’	  of	  UNCTAD?	  Section	  4.3	  will	  address	  challenges	  related	  to	  the	  
secondary	  Research	  Question: What	  does	  the	  analysis	  of	  UNCTAD	  tell	  us	  about	  the	  prospects	  
of	  success	  and	  failure	  in	  Global	  Conference	  Diplomacy	  (GCD)	  in	  other	  UN	  organizations?	  	  
4.1 The	  importance	  of	  the	  research	  method	  
The	  scientific	  method	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  all	  scientific	  work.	  In	  my	  research	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  
adopt	   the	   criteria	   developed	   by	   Keohane,	   Verba	   and	   King	   (from	   now	   on	   KKV)	   that	  
characterize	   ‘Good’	   scientific	   research6.	   This	   thesis	   has	   made	   inferences	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
empirical	  information	  collected	  and	  has	  attempted	  to	  “infer	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  data	  to	  
something	   broader	   that	   is	   not	   directly	   observed”	   (KKV	   1994:8).	   Throughout	   the	   research	  
process	  the	  thesis	  has	  attempted	  to	  be	  explicit	  concerning	  the	  methodological	  procedure	  so	  
that	  the	  limitations	  and	  possible	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  research	  process	  can	  be	  understood	  by	  
others.	  Throughout	  the	  process	  I	  have	  also	  been	  aware	  that	  “uncertainty	  is	  a	  central	  aspect	  
of	  all	  research	  and	  all	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world”	  (KKV	  1994:9).	  This	  has	  been	  very	  relevant	  
as	  the	  different	  actors	  interviewed	  have	  different	  views	  or	  narratives	  of	  the	  world.	  This	  does	  
not	  mean	  that	  some	  of	   the	  perceptions	  are	  wrong,	  but	   that	   that	  actors	   tend	  to	  see	  “what	  
they	  want	  to	  see”	  through	  their	  ideological	  point	  of	  view.	  Finally,	  the	  thesis	  has	  attempted	  to	  
                                                
6	  The	  four	  characteristics	  for	  good	  research	  are	  (1)	  The	  goal	  is	  inference	  (2)	  the	  procedures	  are	  public	  (3)	  
conclusions	  are	  uncertain	  and	  (4)	  the	  content	  is	  the	  method	  (KKV	  1994:7-­‐9)	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arrive	  at	   “inferences	   that	  are	  consistent	  with	   rules	  of	   science”	  with	   the	   information	  at	  my	  
disposal	  (KKV	  1994:9).	  The	  scientific	  method	  is	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  determining	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  
thesis	   findings,	   results	   and	   conclusions.	   Thus,	   as	   a	   ‘critical	   social	   scientist’	   one	   needs	   to	  
critically	  assess	  one’s	  own	  research	  design	  (KKV	  1994:32).	  
4.2 The	  research	  process	  
The	   thesis	   analyzed	   the	   empirical	   findings	   through	   a	   chosen	   theoretical	   framework.	   The	  
research	   process	  was	   divided	   into	   four	   stages	   (see	   figure	   2).	   By	   organizing	   this	   chapter	   in	  
accordance	  with	  the	  stages	  in	  the	  research	  process	  it	  becomes	  more	  transparent	  and	  easier	  
to	  follow.	  	  
Figure	  1:	  The	  Research	  Process	  
Stage	  1:	  Preliminary	  interviews	  and	  participative	  observation	  (Geneva	  2011)	  
The	  reason	  why	  I	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  UNCTAD	  was	  because	  of	  my	  experience	  as	  an	  intern	  at	  
the	  Permanent	  Mission	  of	  Norway	  to	  the	  UN	  in	  Geneva	  (from	  January	  to	  July	  2011).	  UNCTAD	  
was	  one	  of	  many	  organizations	   that	   I	   had	   to	  participate	   in	   covering.	  My	   supervisor	   at	   the	  
Mission	  suggested	  to	  me	  in	  March	  2011	  that	  I	  should	  write	  about	  UNCTAD	  for	  my	  Master’s	  
thesis.	  Thus,	  I	  had	  four	  months	  at	  the	  Mission	  during	  which	  time	  I	  knew	  I	  was	  going	  to	  write	  
about	  UNCTAD	  
During	  my	   stay,	   preliminary	   research	   was	   conducted	   (see	   stage	   1	   in	   the	   diagram).	   Three	  
initial	   interviews	  were	  executed	  and	  four	  months	  were	  used	  to	  first-­‐hand	  study	  the	  formal	  
proceedings	   in	   UNCTAD,	   as	   well	   as	   catch	   the	   ‘informal	   talk’	   among	   the	   diplomats.	   I	   had	  
access	  to	  documents	  concerning	  UNCTAD	  at	  the	  Norwegian	  delegation.	  Through	  a	  mapping	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exercise,	   diplomats	   who	   had	   covered	   UNCTAD	   were	   identified	   and	   were	   contacted	   for	  
interviews;	   later	   they	   would	   give	   me	   new	   names	   and	   people	   to	   interview,	   i.e.	   the	  
snowballing	   method.	   This	   approach	   was	   in	   line	   with	   Tansey	   (2007)7.	   This	   is	   termed	  
“purposive	   sampling”	  where	   the	  “researcher	   samples	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  wanting	   to	   interview	  
people	   who	   are	   relevant	   for	   the	   research	   questions”	   (Bryman	   2004:334).	   This	   is	   a	   non-­‐
random	   sample,	   which	  may	   have	   led	   to	   a	   skewed	   sample	   of	   respondents.	   However,	   this	  
thesis	  managed	  to	  get	  respondents	  from	  the	  main	  groups	  in	  UNCTAD	  (see	  figure	  3).	  	  
KKV	   (1994:15)	  outlines	   two	   criteria	  which	  a	   scientific	   research	  question	   should	   satisfy:	  
(1)	  “a	  research	  project	  should	  pose	  a	  question	  that	  is	  “important”	  in	  the	  real	  world”	  and	  
(2)	   “A	   research	  project	   should	  make	  a	   specific	   contribution	   to	  an	   identifiable	   scholarly	  
literature	  by	  increasing	  our	  collective	  ability	  to	  construct	  verified	  scientific	  explanations	  
of	   some	   aspect	   of	   the	   world”	   (ibid).	   I	   constructed	   a	   research	   question	   that	   attempts	   to	  
scientifically	  explain	   the	  challenges	  UNCTAD	   is	   facing.	  This	   topic	  concerns	  many	  people,	  as	  
global	   conference	  diplomacy	   is	   our	  main	   tool	   in	   addressing	   global	   problems.	   The	   research	  
question	   contributes	   to	   the	   GCD	   scholarly	   literature	   by	   using	   well-­‐known	   theoretical	  
variables	  on	  a	  case,	  UNCTAD,	  which	  has	  not	  been	  properly	  examined	  for	  the	  last	  20-­‐30	  years.	  
Thus,	  I	  believe	  my	  research	  questions	  satisfy	  KKV’s	  criteria	  for	  a	  good	  research	  question.	  
My	  preliminary	  research	  in	  stage	  1	  served	  as	  a	  good	  empirical	  foundation	  on	  which	  I	  could	  
build	  my	  further	  research	  process.	  
Stage	  2:	  Literature	  review	  and	  interviews	  (Oslo	  2012)	  
The	   second	   stage	   consisted	   of	   a	   thorough	   review	   of	   secondary	   and	   primary	   literature,	  
choosing	   my	   research	   design	   and	   conducting	   elite-­‐interviews.	   A	   research	   design	   can	   be	  
defined	   as	   “a	   plan	   that	   shows,	   through	   a	   discussion	   of	   our	   model	   and	   data,	   how	   we	  
expect	  to	  use	  evidence	  to	  make	  inferences”	  (KKV	  1994:118,	  see	  Yin	  2009:19).	  This	  thesis	  
had	   a	   qualitative,	   intensive	   research	   design	   (Hellevik	   2002:	   95-­‐96).	   The	   research	   design	  
focuses	   on	   the	   depth	   of	   the	   information	   provided	   by	   each	   respondent	   and	   enables	   the	  
researcher	  to	  use	  the	  detailed	  knowledge	  to	  view	  the	  respondent	  	  
                                                
7	  Tansey	  (2007:	  14-­‐15)	  argued	  that	  the	  most	  decisive	  step	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  most	  relevant	  actors	  and	  not	  
necessarily	  have	  the	  largest	  selection	  of	  respondents.	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in	  a	  broader	  context	  (Hellevik	  2002:95-­‐96).	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  relevant	  theoretical	  variables,	  this	  
thesis	   deducts	   expectations	   of	   how	   my	   explanatory	   factors	   may	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   my	  
dependent	  variable8.	  This	  thesis	  used	  UNCTAD	  as	  a	  case	  study	  and	  conducted	  a	  “detailed	  
examination	   of	   an	   aspect	   of	   a	   historical	   episode	   to	   develop	   or	   test	   historical	  
explanations	   that	  may	  be	  generalizable	   to	  other	  events”	   (George	  and	  Bennett	  2005:5).	  
In	   section	   7.0	   the	   lessons	   learnt	   in	   UNCTAD	   will	   be	   generalized	   to	   other	   similar	   UN-­‐
organization.	  According	  to	  Lund	  (2002:108)	  case	  studies	  usually	  scores	  high	  on	   internal	  
validity.	  Lund	  (ibid)	  defines	  internal	  validity	  as	  whether	  one	  can	  identify	  a	  justifiable	  and	  
tenable	  inference	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  variables	  and	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  
causal	  relationship.	  	  
A	  criticism	  which	  is	  often	  voiced	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  case-­‐study	  approach	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  
representativeness	   (Gerring	   2007).	   Some	   would	   argue	   that	   since	   the	   case	   was	   not	  
“randomly	  picked”	  and	  not	  “representative”	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  UN	  organizations,	  one	  cannot	  
generalize	  to	  a	  broader	  universe.	  Yin	  (2009)	  resolves	  this	  issue	  by	  stating	  that	  one	  should	  
see	  case	  studies	  as	  a	  source	  of	  ‘analytical	  generalizations’	  rather	  than	  more	  quantitative	  
‘statistical’	   generalizations.	   This	   type	  of	   analytical	   generalization	   implies	  one	   can	  draw	  
inferences	   to	  a	  broader	  universe	  of	   theoretical	  and	  conceptually	  defined	  cases. GCD	   in	  
UNCTAD,	  in	  this	  sense,	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  set	  of	  general	  characteristics	  that	  may	  
be	  generalized	  to	  other	  similar	  organizations	  that	  use	  the	  same	  approach.	  Yet	  there	  are	  
also	   specific	   characteristics	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   institutional	   context	  of	  UNCTAD	   in	  which	  
GCD	   takes	   place	   that	   define	   the	   scope	   for	   analytical	   generalization.	   Section	   7.0	   will	  
reflect	   on	   the	   potential	   of	   analytical	   generalizations,	  which	   could	   be	   taken	   forward	   in	  
further	  research	  on	  the	  prospects	  of	  using	  GCD	  to	  solve	  collective	  problems.	  
This	  thesis	  will	  not	  be	  able	  refute	  the	  theoretical	  perspectives	  presented	  in	  section	  3.0,	  
yet	  the	  analysis	  may	  serve	  to	  strengthen	  or	  weaken	  some	  of	  the	  theoretical	  perspectives	  
presented.	   Thus	   it	   may	   serve	   to	   “refine	   and	   nuance	   our	   understanding”	   of	   the	  
theoretical	  perspectives	  (George	  and	  Bennett	  2005:115).	  	  
The	  positive	  aspects	  of	  using	  a	  case	  study	  is	  because	  it	  is	  a	  versatile	  research	  design	  with	  
                                                
8	  This	  approach	  is	  called	  a	  deductive	  theoretical	  approach	  (Hellevik	  2002:74)	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which	   one	   can	   easily	   include	   other	   types	   of	   methods	   (Gerring	   2005:33).	   It	   will	   also	  
enable	   me	   to	   achieve	   a	   good	   understanding	   of	   actors’	   intentions,	   motivations	   and	  
interpretation	  that	  lie	  behind	  their	  choice	  of	  action.	  	  
Literature	  review	  
During	  stage	  2	  a	  thorough	  review	  of	  the	   information	  that	  had	  been	  written	  on	  UNCTAD	  as	  
well	  as	  theoretical	  papers	  on	  negotiations	  and	  global	  conference	  diplomacy	  was	  conducted.	  
My	  supervisor,	  Professor	  Arild	  Underdal,	  who	  was	  contacted	  in	  2011,	  had	  provided	  me	  with	  
relevant	  theoretical	  papers.	  When	  I	  had	  managed	  to	  find	  the	  most	  important	  and	  referenced	  
literature	  in	  the	  field	  on	  UNCTAD,	  ranging	  from	  the	  old	  classics	  (Cox	  and	  Jackobsen	  1973)	  to	  
‘newer’	   books	   (Williams	  1991	  and	  1994,	  Bergesen	  and	   Lunde	  2000),	   a	  more	  narrow	   focus	  
was	  applied.	  It	  also	  became	  clear	  that	  little	  research	  had	  been	  done	  on	  UNCTAD	  for	  the	  past	  
few	  years.	   I	   therefore	  wanted	   to	   fill	   this	   knowledge	  gap	  on	  UNCTAD	  by	  gathering	  primary	  
data.	   Perspectives	   from	   UNCTAD’s	   own	   production	   of	   information	   were	   used.	   Thus,	   the	  
different	  phases	  of	  UNCTAD	  were	  provided	  from	  UNCTAD’s	  own	  history	  document	  “A	  brief	  
history	   of	   UNCTAD”.	   Throughout	   the	   literature	   study	   I	   attempted	   to	   critically	   analyze	   the	  
documents	   and	   theories,	   as	   most	   documents	   “have	   an	   intended	   purpose”	   and	   are	   not	  
“neutral”	  (Cox	  2010,	  George	  and	  Bennett	  2005:199).	  In	  order	  to	  secure	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  
literature	   review,	   data	   triangulation	   as	   well	   as	   cross-­‐referencing	   was	   applied.	   Reliability	  
concerns	  the	  accuracy	  and	  thoroughness	  in	  which	  the	  data	  are	  collected	  (Hellevik	  2002).	  
Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  and	  constructing	  interview	  guides	  
The	  interviews	  conducted	  were	  semi-­‐structured.	  Bryman	  (2004:321)	  defines	  semi-­‐structured	  
interviews	  as	  a	  flexible	  process	  where	  the	  researcher	  follows	  an	  interview	  guide,	  but	  can	  ask	  
follow-­‐up	  questions	  and	  pursue	  topics	  that	  may	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  the	  respondents.	  
The	   respondents	   “have	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   leeway	   in	   how	   to	   reply”	   (ibid).	  When	   creating	   the	  
interview	   guide	   a	   couple	   of	   months	   were	   used	   to	   read	   and	   obtain	   knowledge	   on	   global	  
conference	  diplomacy	  before	  elements	  were	  plotted	   into	   the	   interview	  guide.	   For	  each	  of	  
my	  interview	  objects	  I	  attempted	  to	  find	  plausible	  ways	  of	  understanding	  the	  questions	  and	  
how	   they	  would	  be	  answered.	  Pilot	   interviews	  were	  conducted	  on	  persons	  who	  knew	   the	  
topic	   in	   order	   to	   see	   how	  much	   time	  was	   spent	   and	  whether	   any	   of	   the	   questions	  were	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unclear.	  When	  conducting	  elite	  interviews	  in	  Oslo	  I	  was	  concerned	  that	  the	  interview	  objects	  
had	  forgotten	  the	  UNCTAD	  negotiations.	  This	  challenge	  was	  overcome	  by	  sending	  some	  of	  
my	   questions	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   interview,	   so	   that	   the	   respondent	   could	   get	   time	   to	  
remember	  details	  before	  the	  interview.	  	  
Conducting	  elite	  interviews	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  quite	  demanding	  as	  the	  respondents	  often	  
can	   take	   charge	   and	   try	   to	   define	   the	   situation.	   The	   interviews	   were	   in	   that	   sense	  
asymmetric	  in	  nature	  as	  the	  respondents	  were	  highly	  knowledgeable	  on	  the	  topic.	  Therefore	  
a	  flexible	  research	  strategy	  with	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  seemed	  appropriate.	  	  
The	   interview	   guide	   was	   cumulative	   in	   nature.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   more	   information	  
obtained	   on	   a	   certain	   topic,	   the	   easier	   it	   was	   to	   reduce	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   questions.	   The	  
interview	  guide	  in	  stage	  2	  incorporated	  the	  insights	  gained	  earlier	  from	  the	  respondents	  in	  
Norway.	  This	  helped	  me	  understand	  and	  frame	  the	  questions	  better	  in	  stage	  3	  in	  Geneva.	  
The	  choice	  of	  elite	  interviews	  and	  information	  concerning	  the	  respondents	  
The	  reason	  why	  elite	  interviews	  were	  chosen	  was	  because	  (1)	  the	  UN	  diplomats	  and	  people	  
working	   for	  UNCTAD	  can	  be	   considered	   to	  be	  key	   respondents	   that	  have	  extra	   knowledge	  
and	   familiarity	   with	   the	   topic	   (Andersen	   2006:279).	   Through	   these	   interviews	   one	   could	  
confirm	  information	  from	  other	  sources,	  for	  example	  triangulation	  of	  my	  data	  that	  increases	  
validity9	  and	  reliability	  of	  my	  findings.	  
The	  other	   reason	   (2)	  was	   to	  capture	  how	  the	  key	   respondents	  viewed	  UNCTAD	  differently	  
(see	   figure	  3).	   Some	   respondents	  had	   insightful	  observations	  as	   they	  had	  experience	   from	  
sitting	  at	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  table	  (working	  as	  delegates,	  and	  then	  later	  as	  being	  employed	  
in	  UNCTAD).	  	  One	  example	  of	  different	  views	  was	  based	  on	  my	  participative	  observation	  in	  
2011	  where	  I	  thought	  the	  head	  of	  G77	  seemed	  confrontational	  and	  not	  cooperative.	  During	  
interviews	  the	  previous	  heads	  of	  G77	  explained	  why	  they	  had	  to	  take	  such	  a	  strong	  position	  
in	  plenary;	  they	  had	  to	  show	  all	  the	  136	  member	  countries	  of	  the	  G77	  that	  they	  were	  fighting	  
for	  their	   interests.	  These	  insights	  made	  me	  understand	  the	  difficulties	  one	  is	  facing	  in	  large	  
                                                
9	  A	  definition	  of	  validity	  which	  is	  relevant	  for	  qualitative	  study	  is	  «whether	  a	  variable	  measure	  what	  it	  is	  supposed	  
to	  measure”	  (Bollen	  cited	  in	  Adcock	  and	  Collier	  2001:530).	  There	  are	  different	  validity	  terms	  proposed	  by	  Adcock	  
and	  Collier	  (2001:529),	  KKV	  (1994:25),	  Cook	  and	  Campbell	  (1979	  cited	  in	  Lund	  2002:105).	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negotiations	  and	  how	  one	  as	  a	   researcher	  can	  easily	  make	   judgments	   that	  do	  not	  capture	  
the	  whole	  story.	  	  	  	  
(3)	   Elite	   interviews	   can	   also	   help	   in	   reconstructing	   an	   incident,	   like	   a	   conference	   (Checkel	  
2008)	  and	  reveal	  what	  a	  certain	  group	  think.	  In	  this	  thesis	  it	  would	  be	  how	  the	  diplomats	  in	  
UNCTAD	   negotiations	   think.	   For	   example,	   through	   my	   fieldwork	   I	   found	   out	   how	   one	  
managed	   to	   create	   consensus	   in	   one	   of	   the	   most	   controversial	   UNCTAD	   negotiations,	  
namely	  UNCTAD	  XIII.	  One	  respondent	  was	  able	   to	  help	  me	  reconstruct	   the	  proceedings	  of	  
the	   conference;	  he	  explained	  how	  some	  of	   the	  main	  member	   countries	  disappeared	   from	  
plenary	  and	  did	  a	  trade-­‐off.	  Further	  details	  will	  be	  presented	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  
Stage	  3:	  Fieldwork	  in	  Geneva	  (2013)	  
Before	   travelling	   to	  Geneva	   in	   January	   2013	   the	   respondents	   had	   been	   contacted	   several	  
weeks	   ahead	   and	  meetings	  were	   scheduled.	   Respondents	   came	   from	   different	   groupings.	  
Interviews	   were	   conducted	   with	   respondents	   from	   the	   coalitions	   (G77	   and	   B-­‐group),	  
independent	   experts	   (South	   Centre,	   International	   Institute	   of	   Sustainable	   Development),	  
respondents	  from	  UNCTAD	  secretariat	  dealing	  with	  the	  negotiations,	  and	  finally	  respondents	  
working	  with	  the	  other	  pillars	  of	  UNCTAD.	  
For	   the	  different	   groups	   the	   interview	  guide	  was	   adjusted	   and	   suited	   to	   the	   respondents’	  
positions	   and	   based	   on	   the	   specific	   type	   information	   I	   believed	   they	   would	   be	   able	   to	  
provide.	  By	  adjusting	  the	  interview	  guide	  one	  was	  more	  able	  to	  capture	  the	  nuances	  and	  the	  






Figure	  3:	  Overview	  of	  the	  interviewees 	  
The	  interviews	  began	  with	  a	  “grand	  tour	  question”	  (Leech	  2002).	  This	  was	  a	  simple	  question	  
and	   put	   the	   respondents	   at	   ease	   and	   comfortable.	   In	   order	   to	   reduce	   the	   risk	   of	  
measurement	   error	   I	   asked	   the	   interview	   objects	   to	   critically	   view	   their	   own	   arguments	  
(Berry	   2002).	   This	   was	   done	   by	   asking	   what	   the	   respondent	   thought	   the	   other	   coalition	  
position	  was.	  However,	  many	  of	  the	  respondents	  did	  it	  naturally	  themselves,	  as	  they	  would	  
always	  refer	  to	  the	  other	  party	  (either	  G77	  or	  the	  B-­‐group).	  One	  question	  concerning	  their	  
position	   on	   NIEO	   was	   posed	   in	   order	   to	   find	   out	   whether	   the	   interview	   object	   had	   any	  
specific	   relationship	   to	   “NIEO”.	  This	  was	   important	  because	   from	  secondary	   literature	  one	  
could	  note	  how	  the	  authors’	  relation	  to	  NIEO	  influenced	  how	  they	  perceived	  UNCTAD.	  The	  
respondents	  were	  also	  asked	  to	  rate	  “to	  what	  extent	  UNCTAD	  has	  succeeded	  in:	  (1)	  setting	  
the	   agenda,	   (2)	   promoting	   a	   common	   understanding	   and	   (3)	   giving	   policy	   advice”.	   The	  
respondents	   were	   presented	   with	   the	   definitions	   of	   the	   criteria	   as	   well	   as	   a	   timeline	  
outlining	  the	  13	  quadrennial	  conferences.	  This	  was	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  respondents	  knew	  the	  
content	  of	   the	  criteria	  and	  were	  able	   to	  point	   to	  historical	   trends	   in	   relation	   to	  UNCTAD’s	  
development	   (see	   appendices	   B	   and	   C).	   The	   interviews	   were	   analyzed	   in	   light	   of	   what	  
coalition	  or	  whether	  the	  people	  interviewed	  worked	  in	  UNCTAD.	  Positive	  self-­‐representation	  
of	  your	  own	  role	  and	  organization	  is	  typical	  in	  elite	  interviews’,	  triangulation	  of	  information	  
was	   therefore	   necessary	   (Berry	   2002:680).	   Hence	   elite	   interviews	   were	   backed	   up	   by	  
relevant	  secondary	  literature	  and	  checked	  against	  each	  other.	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Most	  of	   the	   interviews	  would	   last	   about	   1	   hour	   and	  30	  minutes.	   Some	   respondents	  were	  
constrained	   to	   what	   they	   could	   say	   (i.e.	   higher-­‐level	   officials	   of	   UNCTAD).	   The	   most	  
rewarding	   interviews	  were	  with	   respondents	   from	  NGO’s	   and	   think	   tanks	  who	  were	  open	  
and	   gave	   detailed	   descriptions	   of	   the	   North	   and	   South	   coalitions	   and	   how	   the	   UNCTAD	  
secretariat	  was	  in	  the	  middle.	  	  
The	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  their	  offices.	  In	  order	  to	  improve	  reliability	  the	  stimuli	  that	  
the	   respondents	   were	   exposed	   to	   was	   standardized.	   For	   example,	   the	   way	   I	   presented	  
myself,	  how	  questions	  were	  asked	  and	  the	  information	  provided	  (see	  appendices	  B	  and	  C).	  
This	   is	   type	  of	  data	   collection	   is	   in	   line	  with	  an	  epistemological	  perspective	  which	   is	  more	  
‘positivist’	   in	   nature.	   From	   a	   positivist	   perspective	   one	   can	   postulate	   that	   through	   elite-­‐
interviews	   one	   can	   establish	   objective	   knowledge	   on	   the	   topic	   one	   is	   discussing,	   i.e.,	  
objective	  information	  on	  what	  happened	  during	  the	  UNCTAD	  XIII	  conference.	  
Each	  interview	  was	  taped	  with	  the	  consent	  from	  the	  respondent.	  I	  noticed	  that	  respondents	  
would	  often	  come	  with	  more	  outspoken	  statements	  and	  personal	  views	  “after	  the	  interview	  
was	  finished”,	  i.e.,	  while	  I	  was	  packing	  away	  my	  notebook	  and	  turning	  off	  my	  recorder10.	  This	  
information	   was	   vital	   when	   attempting	   to	   understand	   “how	  members	   of	   a	   certain	   group	  
think”.	   I	  experimented	  with	  this	  effect	  and	  would	  often	  end	  up	  with	  a	  casual	  conversation	  
that	  would	   last	   up	   to	   15	  minutes	   after	   the	   interview	  was	   finished.	   This	   approach	   is	  more	  
along	   the	   line	   of	   an	   ‘active’	   approach	   of	   gathering	   data	   where	   one	   is	   attempting	   to	  
understand	  the	  respondents’	  perceptions	  of	  a	  given	  phenomenon	  (Andersen	  2006:283).	  	  
All	   citations	   where	   sent	   to	   the	   respondents	   for	   approval	   before	   publishing. One	   possible	  
drawback	  was	  that	  respondents	  might	  withdraw	  quotes	  that	  are	  too	  direct	  and	  serve	  to	  put	  
them	   in	   an	   undesirable	   light.	   Another	   challenge	  was	   that	  many	   respondents	   followed	   the	  
diplomatic	   principle	   of	   “being	   cited	   on	   what	   they	   should	   have	   said,	   and	   not	   what	   they	  
actually	  said”.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  approach	  increased	  validity	  because	  then	  inaccuracies	  and	  
misunderstandings	  were	  cleared	  up.	  All	  my	  respondents	  agreed	  that	  their	  names	  and	  titles	  
could	  be	  published	  in	  the	  respondent	  list,	  but	  the	  citations	  in	  the	  text	  did	  not	  include	  their	  
names.	  In	  the	  citations	  their	  grouping	  has	  been	  outlined	  as	  it	   influences	  how	  they	  perceive	  
                                                
10	  This	  is	  a	  common	  phenomenon	  that	  Bryman	  (2004:333)	  discuses.	  Being	  able	  to	  capture	  this	  information	  
through	  a	  flexible	  approach	  shows	  the	  strengths	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews.	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UNCTAD	  and	  GCD.	  This	  is	  done	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  analytical	  clarity.	  Citations	  without	  names	  
may	  serve	  to	  lower	  the	  reliability	  as	  it	  becomes	  more	  difficult	  to	  replicate.	  However,	  I	  believe	  
the	  respondents	  would	  have	  been	  less	  open	  if	  they	  knew	  that	  their	  names	  were	  going	  to	  be	  
published	  in	  the	  text.	  One	  can	  therefore	  argue	  that	  the	  validity	  increased	  as	  the	  respondents	  
allowed	  themselves	  to	  speak	  more	  freely.	  In	  my	  analysis	  my	  interpretations	  and	  inferences	  
are	   supported	  with	  quotes	   from	  my	   respondents.	   This	  was	  done	   so	   that	   the	   reader	   could	  
clearly	  see	  what	  my	  inferences	  are	  based	  on,	  thus	  enhancing	  my	  reliability	  and	  validity.	  The	  
letters	  assigned	  to	  the	  respondents	  are	  random	  and	  are	  from	  A-­‐S.	  Consequently,	  the	  reader	  
can	  follow	  the	  different	  respondents	  and	  see	  their	  opinions	  on	  the	  different	  issues.	  	  
Stage	  4:	  Transcription	  and	  a	  final	  round	  of	  expert	  interviews	  in	  Oslo	  
After	  the	  fieldwork	  an	  important	  phase	  was	  the	  transcription.	   I	  also	  had	  a	  final	  round	  with	  
interviews	  of	  experts	  I	  had	  been	  in	  touch	  with	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  research	  process.	  It	  
was	  analytically	  rewarding	  to	  hear	  their	  views	  on	  my	  findings	  and	  follow	  up	  on	  some	  of	  the	  
issues	  that	  were	  underlined	   in	  the	  first	   interview.	  This	  served	  as	  triangulation.	  The	  experts	  
allowed	  me	  to	  use	  their	  names	  for	  direct	  citations.	  
4.3 Limitations	  and	  strengths	  of	  research	  design,	  	  
	   	   resource	  base	  and	  findings	  
“All	  knowledge	  and	  all	  inference-­‐	  in	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  research-­‐	  are	  uncertain”	  
(KKV	  1994:31)	  
According	   to	  KKV	  an	   important	  part	  of	   the	  research	  process	   is	   to	   report	  uncertainty	  of	  
inferences.	   There	   were	   limitations	   in	   my	   research	   design	   relating	   to	   reliability	   and	  
validity.	  An	   ideal	  research	  design	   is	  when	  another	  researcher	  manages	  to	  get	  the	  same	  
results	   using	   the	   same	   research	   design	   and	  methods.	   This	   can	   prove	   to	   be	   difficult	   in	  
qualitative	   research	   designs	   like	   mine.	   An	   interview	   setting	   will	   always	   be	   difficult	   to	  
copy.	   I	   tried	   to	  overcome	  this	  weakness	  by	  describing	   the	   research	  process	   in	  detail	   in	  
section	  4.2,	  as	  well	   as	  being	   transparent	   relating	   to	  which	  documents	  and	   information	  
inferences	   are	   based	  upon.	  Validity	   is	   especially	   relevant	   for	  my	   interview	   guide.	   Pilot	  
interviews	  were	  conducted	   to	   test	   the	   interview	  guide	  and	   to	   see	  whether	   there	  were	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several	   interpretations	  of	   the	  questions.	   The	  questions	  were	   framed	   in	   such	  a	  manner	  
that	   my	   operationalized	   concept	   captures	   the	   concept	   that	   this	   thesis	   wants	   to	  
measure11.	  Through	  my	  pilot	  interviews	  I	  noticed	  that	  Underdal’s	  theoretical	  variables	  were	  
easier	  to	  operationalize.	  This	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  clarity	  and	  practicality	  of	  these	  variables.	  It	  
was	  more	  difficult	  to	  ask	  questions	  concerning	  the	  variable	  “productive	  power”.	  It	  was	  here	  
one	  had	  to	   interpret	   the	  statements	  within	  a	   larger	  “system	  of	  significance	  and	  meaning”.	  
This	  was	  harder,	  but	  proved	  necessary	  and	  essential	  to	  understand	  the	  G77’s	  unity	  and	  the	  
rise	  of	  UNCTAD.	  After	  conducting	  the	  interviews	  the	  statements	  from	  the	  respondents	  were	  
viewed	   critically	   as	   the	   researcher	   should	   not	   just	   accept	   the	  perspectives	   and	   the	  world-­‐
view	   that	   the	   interview	   objects	   hold.	   According	   to	   Andersen	   (2006:2)	   the	   interviewer	   is	  
supposed	  to	  be	  critical	  and	  have	  analytical	  control	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  validity	  and	  reliability.	  
Skogen	   et	   al	   (2007:262)	   argue	   that	   the	   point	   is	   to	   put	   the	   interpretation	   of	   an	   interview	  
object	   in	  a	   larger	  context	  and	   identify	  broader	  patterns	  or	  even	  structures	   that	  are	  not	  as	  
easily	  seen	  for	  others.	  I	  attempted	  to	  do	  this	  throughout	  the	  research	  process,	  both	  relating	  
to	   primary	   and	   secondary	   literature	   and	   relating	   to	   the	   interviews	   conducted.	   This	   was	  
therefore	   a	   major	   task	   to	   map	   out	   the	   different	   perceptions,	   especially	   as	   this	   was	   an	  
element	   that	   complicates	  negotiations	  between	   the	  North	  and	  South.	  A	   further	  discussion	  
on	  contending	  perceptions	  and	  narratives	  is	  outlined	  in	  section	  5.2.1.	  	  
	   It	  was	  clear	  that	  my	  respondents	  had	  an	  agenda.	  High-­‐level	  officials	  felt	  constrained	  
in	  what	  they	  could	  say.	  One	  potential	  source	  of	  bias	  was	  concerning	  my	  own	  role.	   I	  began	  
collecting	  information	  already	  while	  stationed	  in	  Geneva.	  The	  Norwegian	  archives	  in	  Geneva	  
on	   this	   topic	   were	   very	   much	   based	   on	   the	   “Northern	   perspective”.	   Therefore	  
representatives	   from	   the	  G77,	   the	  South	  Center	  were	   interviewed	  and	   secondary	  material	  
used	  to	  capture	  what	  represents	  a	  more	  “Southern	  perspective”.	  	  
A	  methodological	  challenge	  in	  this	  thesis	  was	  to	  determine	  the	  potential	  for	  generalization	  
to	   the	   broader	   UN	   family.	   This	   thesis	   attempts	   to	   (1)	   capture	   what	   has	   happened	   with	  
UNCTAD,	  while	   the	   secondary	   research	   question	   (2)	   attempts	   to	   draw	   lessons	   learnt	   that	  
may	   be	   relevant	   to	   organizations	   sharing	   similar	   characteristics.	   From	   a	   methodological	  
perspective	   this	   means	   that	   this	   thesis	   attempts	   to	   project	   conclusions	   onto	   other	  
                                                
11	  This	  is	  called	  construct	  validity	  in	  Cook	  and	  Campbell’s	  validity	  system;	  “construct	  validity	  is	  whether	  the	  
operationalized	  concept	  is	  relevant	  and	  captures	  the	  concept	  that	  we	  want	  to	  measure”	  (Lund	  2002:105).	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organizations	  within	   the	  broader	  UN	   family.	   This	  was	   challenging,	   yet	   secondary	   literature	  
(Williams	   1991)	   argued	   that	   empirical	   data	   drawn	   solely	   from	   the	   UNCTAD	   context	   are	  
relevant	   and	   can	   be	   generalized	   to	   cover	   the	   G77	   in	   other	   organizational	   contexts.	   Even	  
though	   respondents	   also	   argued	   that	   I	   could	   generalize	   findings	   in	   UNCTAD	   to	   other	  
institutions,	   I	   have	   decided	   that	   this	   thesis	  will	   not	   attempt	   to	   generalize	   its	   findings,	   but	  
rather	  reflect	  on	  the	  potential	  and	  point	  to	  relevant	  cases	  where	  these	  drivers	  may	  have	  had	  
an	  impact.	  	  	  
A	   strength	   in	  my	   research	   design	   was	   that	   I	   could	   underline	   in	   the	   interviews	   that	   I	   had	  
participated	   in	  the	  UNCTAD	  negotiations	  myself.	  This	  helped	  me	  in	  focusing	  the	  questions.	  
For	  example	  I	  used	  an	  instance	  that	  I	  had	  observed	  in	  2011	  concerning	  Iran’s	  active	  role.	  This	  
insight	  helped	  me	  obtain	  interesting	  information	  on	  how	  Iran	  is	  radicalizing	  the	  G77	  position	  
(discussed	   in	  5.2.4).	  However,	   sometimes	  my	  previous	  experience	  made	   respondents	  view	  
me	  as	  someone	  from	  the	  B-­‐group.	  Respondents,	  who	  knew	  me	  from	  beforehand	  would	  even	  
specify	  this	  when	  they	  were	  talking	  about	  “my	  group”.	  For	  example,	  “Even	  in	  terms	  of	  Group	  
B,	  your	  group,	  recent	  events	  have	  polarized	  the	  group	  entirely”.	  Thus,	  my	  role	  had	  an	  impact	  
on	  what	   type	  of	   information	   I	  obtained.	  However,	  whether	   this	  would	  have	  been	  the	  case	  




5 Has	  there	  been	  a	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  UNCTAD?	  
The	  development	  of	  an	  organization	  can	  be	  described	  in	  different	  ways.	  The	  hypothesis	  
of	  this	  thesis	  describes	  UNCTAD	  as	  an	  organization	  that	  has	  experienced	  a	  rise	  and	  a	  fall.	  
The	   rise	   and	   fall	   are	   strong	   characteristics	   that	   convey	   a	   breaking	   point.	   It	   must	  
therefore	  be	  examined	  closer.	  This	  chapter	  will	  address	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  “there	  
has	  been	  a	  rise	  and	   fall	  of	  UNCTAD?”	  First	   the	  secondary	   literature	  will	  be	   referred	  to,	  
then	  I	  will	  examine	  the	  empirical	  findings	  from	  my	  own	  fieldwork	  in	  2011-­‐2013.	  
5.1 What does the secondary literature say? 
When	  using	  secondary	  and	  primary	  literature	  to	  obtain	  an	  overview	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  history	  one	  
must	  be	  aware	  that	  authors	  may	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  an	  ideological	  perspective.	  I	  have	  
attempted	   to	  be	   critical	   of	  my	   sources	  and	   therefore	  used	  various	  papers	   from	  UNCTAD’s	  
own	  publications	  as	  well	  as	  other	  sources	  to	  capture	  contrasting	  views12.	  	  	  
Below	   is	   a	   timeline	   that	   contains	   13	   UNCTAD	   conferences.	   I	   have	   categorized	   the	  
conferences	   in	   different	   phases.	   The	   5	   phases	   are	   taken	   from	   UNCTAD’s	   own	   history	  
document13.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Timeline	  over	  the	  thirteen	  UNCTAD	  conferences 
                                                
12	  Some	  of	  the	  literature	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  are:	  Righter	  (1995),	  Williams	  (1991	  and	  1994),	  Aschim	  (1995),	  
Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  (1999),	  Gosovic	  (1968),	  Krasner	  (1981	  and	  1985),	  Keohane	  and	  Underdal	  (2011),	  Walters	  
(1971),	  Rothstein	  (1984),	  Nye	  (1973)	  and	  Love	  (2001).	  
13	  UNCTAD	  (2006).	  “UNCTAD	  -­‐	  a	  brief	  historical	  overview”.	  	  United	  Nations	  Geneva.	  (UNCTAD/GDS/2006/1).	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5.1.1 Phase 1: The establishment of UNCTAD in 1964 
Prior	   to	   the	   first	  UNCTAD	  conference	   it	  was	  broadly	   recognized	   that	   there	  was	  need	   for	  a	  
major	  cooperation	  between	  third	  world	  countries	  as	  the	  developing	  countries	  felt	  they	  had	  
little	   influence	   in	   the	   existing	   trade	   organizations	   in	   the	   1960’s	   (UNCTAD	   2006:9).	   When	  
seventy-­‐seven	   developing	   countries	   signed	   a	   “Joint	   Declaration	   of	   the	   Seventy-­‐Seven	  
Countries”	   in	  June	  1964	  (in	  UNCTAD	  I)	  the	  G77	  was	  officially	  established.	  The	  coalition	  has	  
grown	  and	   includes	  131	   countries,	   but	   the	   “original	  name	  was	   retained	  due	   to	   its	  historic	  
significance”	   (G77	   2012).	   The	   grand	   coalition	   of	   G77	   had	   its	   roots	   in	   the	   “process	   of	  
decolonization,	   growing	   disillusionment	   with	   the	   working	   liberal	   international	   economic	  
order	   […]	   and	   the	   role	   of	   international	   organizations	   in	   providing	   a	   forum	   in	   which	  
developing	  countries	  could	  articulate	  and	  aggregate	  their	   interest”	  (Williams	  1994:181,	  see	  
Rothstein	  1984,	  see	  Walters	  1972).	  	  
UNCTAD	   I	   was	   held	   in	   Geneva	   and	   happened	   simultaneously	  with	   the	   Kennedy	   Round	   of	  
GATT	   negotiations	   that	   was	   about	   to	   begin	   (1964-­‐1967)	   (UNCTAD	   2006:12).	   According	   to	  
Love	  (2006:4)	  UNCTAD	  I	  was	  a	  ‘mega-­‐conference’	  and	  had	  over	  “4000	  official	  delegates	  from	  
119	  countries,	  along	  with	  representatives	  of	  numerous	  international	  organizations,	  and	  was	  
the	  largest	  international	  event	  ever	  held	  on	  any	  subject	  to	  that	  time”.	   	   It	  was	  Prebisch	  and	  
the	  UN	   economist	  Malinowski	   during	  UNCTAD	   I	  who	   achieved	   to	   establish	   “UNCTAD	   as	   a	  
permanent	  UN	  organization,	  rather	  than	  a	  one-­‐off	  conference”	  (Love	  2001:5).	  	  
According	   to	   Righter	   (1995:103)	   the	   UNCTAD	   I	   conference	   produced	   little	   in	   terms	   of	  
agreement	  in	  the	  North-­‐	  South	  negotiations.	  However,	  UNCTAD	  “gave	  the	  new	  block	  more	  
than	  a	  sense	  of	  itself:	  it	  gave	  it	  a	  theory	  […]	  at	  least	  Raul	  Prebisch	  did	  so”	  (ibid).	  However,	  it	  
must	  be	  mentioned	  that	  there	  never	  was	  “one	  theory”	  in	  NIEO,	  there	  were	  several	  strands	  
of	  theory	   in	  the	  Latin	  American	  Dependencia	  school	  from	  different	  scholars14.	  Still	   the	  first	  
Secretary	   General	   of	   UNCTAD,	   Prebisch,	   was	   a	   famous	   scholar	   within	   the	   Latin	   American	  
School.	  Prebisch	  had	  been	  a	  former	  governor	  of	  Argentines	  Central	  Bank	  and	  then	  director	  at	  
the	  UN’s	  Economic	  Commission	   for	  Latin	  America	   (ECLA)	   (ibid).	  The	  choice	  of	  a	   radical	   left	  
wing	  Secretary	  General	  conveyed	  an	  impression	  to	  many	  governments	  that	  UNCTAD	  was	  a	  
                                                
14	  Other	  dependencia	  scholars	  included	  Paul	  A.	  Baran,	  Yves	  Lacosto	  and	  Celso	  Furtado	  among	  others.	  Their	  
perspectives	  influenced	  writers	  with	  a	  Marxist	  persuasion:	  Samir	  Amin,	  Gunder	  Frank	  and	  Wallerstein.	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radical	  oriented	  UN-­‐body,	  or	  a	  protest	  organization.	  His	  strong	  and	  visionary	  leadership	  had	  
a	  great	  influence	  on	  the	  organization.	  
Thus	   in	   the	   institutional	   UN	   landscape,	   UNCTAD	   presented	   a	   counterweight	   to	   other	  
organizations	   that	   dealt	   with	   trade	   at	   the	   time	   of	   its	   establishment	   (Williams	   1994:183).	  
UNCTAD	  was	   in	  that	  sense	  not	  the	  “first	  organization”	  that	  had	  dealt	  with	  trade	  and	  trade	  
regimes.	  The	  existing	  organizations,	  OECD,	  GATT	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	   regional	  EU,	  were	  
liberal	   western	   institutions	   which	   it	   had	   taken	   a	   long	   time	   to	   build	   up.	   They	   saw	   the	  
formation	   of	   a	   radically	   different	   trade	   organization	   as	   a	   nuisance	   (Gosovic	   1968:77).	  
UNCTAD	  had	  a	  global	  strategy	  and	  was	  assigned	  a	  broad	  mandate	  (terms	  of	  reference)	  which	  
encompassed	  financing,	  trade,	  integration,	  technical	  assistance	  and	  shipping	  (ibid).	  	  
5.1.2 Phase	  2:	  The	  period	  of	  systemic	  turbulence	  –	  1970’s	  
	  “The	  old	  order	  seemed	  ripe	  for	  a	  decisive	  attack”	  (Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  1999:52)	  
In	  the	  early	  1970’s	  there	  were	  conflicting	  signals	  about	  where	  the	  organized	  global	  society	  
was	   headed	   (Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	   1999:51-­‐52).	   At	   this	   time	   the	   international	   context	  was	  
influenced	  by	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  monetary	  system	  which	  increased	  
uncertainty	  and	  volatility.	  In	  this	  context	  the	  third	  world	  countries	  had	  high	  expectations	  and	  
ambitions	   on	   using	   their	   numerical	   majority	   in	   the	   UN	   to	   “influence	   the	   world	   economic	  
structures”	  (ibid).	  The	  uncertainty	  and	  volatility	  strengthened	  the	  case	  for	  G77	  to	  structurally	  
change	   the	  world	   economy.	  During	  UNCTAD	   III	   in	   Santiago	   (1972)	   there	  was	   an	   increased	  
self-­‐confidence	   among	   the	   G77.	   Especially,	   as	   the	   G77	   managed	   to	   force	   through	   the	  
elaboration	   of	   the	   “Charter	   of	   the	   Economic	   rights	   and	   Duties	   of	   States”	   (Bergesen	   and	  
Lunde	  1999:53).	  However,	  it	  was	  in	  the	  fourth	  Non-­‐alignment	  summit	  in	  Algiers	  in	  1973	  that	  
“became	  the	  catalyst	  that	   fused	  the	  disparate	  elements	  of	  third	  world	  radicalization	   into	  a	  
militant	  political	  platform”	   (ibid).	   The	  militant	  political	  platform	  was	   the	  demands	  of	  NIEO	  
which	   were	   formulated	   into	   a	   programme	   of	   action.	   Righter	   (1995:107)	   argues	   that	   the	  
content	  of	  the	  programme	  of	  action	  “was	  in	  fact	  the	  old	  UNCTAD	  agenda,	  but	  it	  was	  set	  in	  a	  
framework	   which	   transfigured	   it”.	   Thus,	   the	   programme	   of	   action	   at	   the	   Algiers	   summit	  
“established	  Third	  World	  solidarity,	  as	  a	  galvanizing	  political	  principle	  and	  provided	   it	  with	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sacred	  texts”	  (Righter	  1995:107).	  Many	  people	  regarded	  UNCTAD	  as	  the	  operationalization	  
of	  NIEO	  in	  the	  1970’s	  through	  to	  the	  1980’s.	  	  
Another	  event	  that	  encouraged	  G77’s	  quest	  of	  NIEO	  was	  the	  first	  OPEC	  (Organization	  of	  the	  
Petroleum	   Exporting	   Countries)	   Oil	   shock	   in	   1973	   which	   exposed	   the	   politico-­‐economic	  
vulnerabilities	  of	  the	  western	  world	  for	  all	  to	  see	  (Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  1999:53).	  In	  short,	  it	  
was	   the	   Arab	   members	   of	   OPEC	   who	   proclaimed	   an	   oil	   embargo	   against	   the	   US	   as	   a	  
punishment	   for	   their	   support	  of	   Israel	   (Moyaert	  et	   al.	   2007:5).	   The	  oil	   embargo	  had	  great	  
economic	   and	  political	   consequences	   for	   the	  West	   and	  even	   caused	  a	   rift	   in	  NATO.	   These	  
consequences	   functioned	   as	   a	   major	   encouragement	   for	   the	   poor	   commodity	   exporting	  
countries	   that	   “sensed	  a	  unique	  opportunity	   for	   increased	  earnings”	   (Bergesen	  and	   Lunde	  
1999:53).	   By	   understanding	   “OPEC’s	   power	   demonstration”	   one	   can	   capture	   how	   this	  
functioned	  as	   “a	  new	  political	   energy	   that	   fuelled	  G77	  demands	   for	  NIEO”	  and	   the	   strong	  
belief	  in	  commodity	  power	  (ibid).	  	  	  	  	  
Thus,	  the	  UNCTAD	  conferences	  in	  the	  1970’s15	  presented	  a	  month-­‐long	  session	  where	  “G77	  
attempted	   to	   make	   NIEO	   proposals	   for	   structural	   economic	   change	   subject	   to	   global	  
negotiations”	  (ibid).	  	  
5.1.3 Phase	  3:	  The	  “second”	  Cold	  War	  and	  global	  recession	  -­‐	  the	  1980’s	  
“North/South	  stand-­‐offs	  in	  UN	  fora	  had	  come	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  futility	  by	  the	  
world’s	  major	  powers”	  (Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  1999:60)	  
Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  (1999:53)	  argue	  that	  “the	  second	  oil	  shock	  of	  1979	  further	  challenged	  
battered	  western	  economies	  […]	  It	  also	  introduced,	  however,	  what	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  
‘lost	   decade’	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   (oil	   importing)	   poor	   countries”.	   These	   countries	   “were	  
bogged	  down	  in	  a	  viscous	  debt	  crisis	  circle”	  as	  well	  as	  experiencing	  stagnating	  development	  
performance	  (ibid).	  Recession	  in	  the	  battered	  western	  economies	  led	  to	  reduced	  demand	  for	  
products	   from	   developing	   countries	   and	   increased	   protectionist	   interests	   among	   the	  
western	   economies.	   Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	   (ibid)	   noted	   how	   the	   first	   oil	   shock	   raised	  
“unrealistic	  expectations	  for	  significant	  developing	  world	  economic	  and	  political	  advances”,	  
while	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  second	  oil	   shock	  “touched	  off	  developments	   that	  effectively	  killed	  
                                                
15	  UNCTAD	  III-­‐	  Santiago,	  UNCTAD	  IV-­‐	  Nairobi,	  UNCTAD	  V-­‐	  Manila	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any	   ambition	   of	   unified	   G77	   advances	   towards	   a	   new	  world	   order”	   (Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	  
1999:53).	  
This	   happened	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   UNCTAD	   experienced	   a	   “retreat	   phase”	   (1980-­‐1991)	  
(Williams	   1991:2).	   It	   was	   especially	   after	   UNCTAD	   VI	   in	   1983	   in	   Belgrade	   that	   a	   more	  
pragmatic	  approach	  had	  to	  be	  taken.	  	  Hence,	  UNCTAD	  “retreated	  from	  its	  high	  profile”	  due	  
to	  three	  main	  factors:	  (1)	  Attacks	  from	  the	  US	  on	  UNCTAD’s	  broad	  mandate.	  (2)	  UNCTAD’s	  
“failure	  to	  produce	  concrete	  results	  during	  the	  earlier	  period”	  (ibid).	  At	  this	  time	  it	  became	  
clear	  that	  one	  could	  not	  bring	  forward	  a	  major	  reform	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  order	  
(Keohane	   and	   Underdal	   2011:55).	   (3)	   UNCTAD	   had	   been	   marginalized	   by	   the	   changing	  
international	  political	  economy	  especially	  influenced	  by	  the	  liberation	  of	  capital	  movements	  
that	  were	  decided	  independent	  of	  the	  multilateral	  system	  (Williams	  1991:2).	  This	  served	  to	  
increase	  the	  values	  in	  world	  trade	  and	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  drivers	  of	  globalization.	  	  
Cox	   (1994:105)	   argued	   that	   NIEO	   and	   UNCTAD	   became	   marginalized	   due	   to	   the	   political	  
climate	  and	  international	  agenda	  which	  changed	  in	  the	  1980’s.	  The	  change	  was	  mostly	  due	  
to	   the	   election	   of	   Thatcher,	   Reagan	   and	   several	   other	   conservative	   governments	   which	  
represented	  and	  promoted	  a	  neoliberal	  ideology	  which	  stood	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  NIEO.	  	  
5.1.4 Phase	  4:	  Global	  uncertainty	  -­‐	  mid-­‐1980’s	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s	  
Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980’s	  one	  witnessed	  how	  socialist	  regimes	  in	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  
Europe	   collapsed	   after	   the	   disintegration	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   in	   1991	   (UNCTAD	   2006:22).	  
This	   had	   a	   disadvantageous	   effect	   on	   the	   negotiations	   in	   the	   UN-­‐system;	   “the	   pattern	   of	  
North-­‐South	  bloc	  confrontation	  was	  further	  pronounced	  by	  the	  disappearance	  of	  the	  bloc	  of	  
centrally	   planned	   economies	   led	   by	   the	   Soviet	   Union”	   (Kjellén	   (1992)	   cited	   in	   Gunnar	  
Sjøstedt	   2002:181).	   The	   role	   of	   the	   “Bretton	   Woods	   system	   in	   the	   management	   of	  
international	  economic	  relations	  was	  further	  enhanced	  as	  they	  were	  assigned	  a	  central	  role	  
in	  assisting	  the	  economies	  in	  transition”	  (UNCTAD	  2006:22).	  
In	   the	  mid-­‐1990’s	  UNCTAD	  was	   in	  a	   “severe	   crisis	   that	  many	   saw	  as	  a	   terminal”	   (UNCTAD	  
2004:ix).	  UNCTAD’s	  SG	  Rubens	  Ricupero	  wrote	  “the	  year	  1995	  and	  the	  immediate	  following	  
years	  also	  coincided	  with	  the	  broader	  crisis	  of	  the	  UN,	  of	  which	  the	  acute	  financial	  difficulties	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mainly	  created	  by	  the	  arrears	  on	  payment	  of	   the	  United	  States’	  contributions	  were	  one	  of	  
the	  most	   damaging	   aspects”	   (UNCTAD	  2004:ix).	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  US	   chose	   not	   to	   pay	   its	  
contributions	  was	  a	  strong	  statement	  to	  the	  UN	  system.	  Thus,	   in	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s	  there	  was	  
increasing	   pressure	   to	   reform	   the	  UN	   system	   to	   become	  more	   streamlined	   and	   effective.	  
UNCTAD	  underwent	  reformations	  after	  UNCTAD	  IX	  in	  Midrand	  (South	  Africa).	  UNCTAD’s	  SG	  
Ricupero	  stated	  that	  “it	  became	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  UNCTAD	  should	  undergo	  a	  drastic	  process	  
of	  reform	  and	  downsizing”	  (ibid).	  	  
The	  decision	  to	  create	  the	  WTO	  in	  1994	  was	  a	  result	  of	  the	  “long	  and	  difficult”	  negotiations	  
of	  the	  GATT	  Uruguay	  round	  (UNCTAD	  2006:19).	  Love	  (2006:18)	  noted	  how	  “WTO	  was	  just	  as	  
much	   a	   rich	  man’s	   club	   as	   GATT	   had	   been”.	  WTO	  was	   assigned	   a	   “broad	  mandate	  which	  
extended	  far	  beyond	  tariff	  reduction”	  (UNCTAD	  2006:19).	  It	  was	  at	  this	  stage	  that	  concerns	  
of	  duplication	  of	  work	  between	  UNCTAD	  and	  WTO	  were	   raised.	   SG	  Ricupero	   claimed	   that	  
allegations	   against	   UNCTAD	   voicing	   that	   “UNCTAD	   had	   become	   redundant	   after	   the	  
establishment	   of	   the	   WTO”	   was	   an	   allegation	   of	   ideological	   nature.	   SG	   Ricupero	   argued	  
“UNCTAD	   has	   been	   the	   primary	   forum	   shared	   between	   the	   North	   and	   the	   South,	   i.e.	  
between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor	  countries,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  bipolar	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War”.	  
Just	   when	   the	   East	   and	  West	   collapsed	   one	   argued	   that	   the	   “North/South	   confrontation	  
would	  give	  way	  to	  a	  unified	  economy	  of	  planetary	  dimension	  through	  globalization	  of	  trade,	  
investment	  and	  financial	   flows”	  (UNCTAD	  2004:x).	  Finally,	   the	  critics	  of	  UNCTAD	  argued	  “If	  
the	  North-­‐South	  antagonism	  was	  to	  be	  thrown	  into	  the	  history	  dustbin,	  this	  should	  also	  be	  
the	  fate	  of	  the	  institutions	  that	  had	  promoted	  or	  encouraged	  it”	  (ibid).	  However,	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  bipolar	  world	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  North/South	  division.	  	  
UNCTAD	   (2006:23)	   also	   argued	   that	   their	  work	   and	   the	  work	   of	  WTO	  would	   complement	  
each	   other.	   In	   other	  words,	  UNCTAD	  would	   prepare	   the	   LDC	   for	   the	   negotiations	   in	  WTO	  
(ibid).	  	  
5.1.5 Phase	  5:	  After	  the	  mid-­‐1990’s	  
After	   UNCTAD	   IX	   in	   Midrand	   (1996),	   UNCTAD	   has	   organized	   four	   more	   conferences.	   The	  
South	  Centre	  argued	  that	  UNCTAD	  X	  in	  Bangkok	  (2000)	  and	  UNCTAD	  XI	  in	  Sao	  Paulo	  (2004)	  
functioned	   as	   a	   “rescue	   operation”	   to	   retrieve	   some	   of	   the	   previous	   ideological	   ground	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(South	  Centre	  2006:9).	  This	  was	  after	  the	  Asian	  financial	  crisis	  and	  failure	  of	  the	  WTO	  round	  
in	  Seattle	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  “The	  Battle	  of	  Seattle”).	  After	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  one	  began	  to	  see	  
the	   negative	   effects	   of	   applying	   the	   Washington	   consensus	   through	   the	   Structural	  
Adjustments	  Programs	  (SAP’s)	  designed	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  (WB)	  and	  International	  Monetary	  
Fund	  (IMF).	  The	  SAP’s	  demanded	  structural	  adjustment,	  downsizing	  public	  sectors	   in	  order	  
for	   third	   world	   countries	   to	   receive	   debt	   relief.	   The	   effects	   of	   the	   SAP’s	   were	   sharply	  
criticized	  by	  the	  UN	  through	  a	  UNICEF	  report	  titled	  “Adjustment	  with	  a	  human	  face”	  (Cornia	  
et	   al.	   1987).	   According	   to	   the	   South	   Centre	   this	   situation	   “highlighted	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
external	  debt	  overhang	  of	  developing	  countries	  crippled	  the	  development	  process,	  and	  that	  
the	   liberalization	   of	   capital	  markets	   and	   instability	   caused	   by	   unregulated	   global	   financial	  
flows	  posed	  a	  major	  threat	  for	  developing	  countries”	  (South	  Centre	  2006:9).	  	  
During	  UNCTAD	  XIII	  in	  Doha,	  April	  21-­‐26	  2012,	  there	  was	  again	  a	  “battle”	  between	  the	  North	  
and	   South	   concerning	  UNCTAD’s	  mandate.	   The	  North-­‐South	   battle	   can	   be	   illustrated	   by	   a	  
statement	  made	  by	  Ambassador	  Pisanu	  Chanvitan	  of	  Thailand	  who	  was	  the	  spokesperson	  for	  
G77	  and	  China.	  He	  presented	  the	  following	  statement	  during	  the	  conference	  (cited	  in	  Khor	  
2012):	  	  
“The	  G77	  and	  China	  believed	  that	  UNCTAD	  XIII	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  new	  beginning,	  
and	  that	  the	  theme	  of	  development-­‐centered	  globalization	  could	  articulate	  a	  vision	  of	  
development	  based	  on	  equality	  and	  equal	  respect	  for	  all.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  developing	  
countries	  feel	  increasingly	  marginalized	  by	  our	  partners,	  especially	  when	  they	  seem	  to	  deny	  
us	  our	  own	  priorities”.	   	  
According	   to	   Bhatterai	   (2012:9)	   “UNCTAD	   XIII	   saw	   the	   growing	   confidence	   of	   the	   South,	  
which	  resisted	  attempts	  to	  unduly	  restrict	  the	  mandate	  of	  the	  UN	  agency”.	  UNCTAD	  XIII	  will	  
be	   revisited	   in	   the	   analysis	   as	   the	   respondents	   would	   provide	   details	   and	   examples	   from	  
UNCTAD	  XIII.	  
5.2 What does my empirical information   
  suggest? 
From	  the	  previous	  section	  one	  can	  discern	  a	  ‘rise’	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  UNCTAD	  (phase	  1)	  and	  
throughout	  the	  period	  of	  systemic	  turbulence	  in	  the	  1970’s	  (phase	  2).	  The	  ‘fall’	  began	  during	  
the	  “second	  Cold	  War”	  and	  the	  global	   recession	   in	   the	  1980’s	   (phase	  3).	   It	  was	  during	   the	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UNCTAD	   conferences	   following	   this	   period	   that	   UNCTAD	   as	   an	   organization	   changed	  
character	   to	   become	   a	   consensus-­‐building	   forum	   after	   pressure	   from	   the	  North	   (phase	   4;	  
Global	  uncertainty	  mid	  1980’s-­‐mid	  1990’s).	  In	  phase	  5	  (after	  the	  mid	  1990’s)	  UNCTAD	  further	  
declined.	  From	  the	  secondary	  literature	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  UNCTAD	  has	  experienced	  a	  rise	  
and	  fall.	  However,	  is	  this	  development	  supported	  by	  my	  empirical	  information?	  	  	  
This	   section	   presents	   empirical	   findings	   from	  my	   fieldwork.	   In	   order	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	  
development	  of	  UNCTAD	  (Y)	  three	  evaluation	  criteria	  were	  used.	  Each	  criterion	  is	  presented	  
with	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   preliminary	   hypothesis	   made	   based	   on	   secondary	   and	   primary	  
literature,	   participative	   observation	   and	   interviews	   conducted	   in	   2011.	   Afterwards	   the	  
information	  from	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  Geneva	  2013	  will	  be	  presented.	  	  
5.2.1 Agenda setting 
Based	  on	  literature	  one	  can	  hypothesize	  that	  UNCTAD	  managed	  to	  set	  the	  agenda	  in	  the	  
1960’s-­‐1980’s	   as	   there	   were	   few	   ‘radical’	   organizations	   that	   dealt	   with	   trade,	  
development	  and	  economic	  issues.	  GATT	  operated	  in	  this	  time	  period,	  yet	   it	  was	  called	  
the	  “Trader’s	  club”	   that	  consisted	  mainly	  of	   industrialized	  countries	  dealing	  exclusively	  
with	   trade	   (Curzon	   and	  Curzon	  1973:298).	   The	  multilateral	   landscape	   and	   focus	   in	   the	  
economy	  changed	   in	  the	  era	  of	  Thatcher	  and	  Reagan	   in	  the	  1980’s	  and	  when	  the	  WTO	  
was	  established	  in	  1995.	  These	  were	  external	  factors	  that	  had	  an	  influence	  on	  UNCTAD’s	  
ability	  to	  set	  the	  agenda.	  
The	  Rise	  -­‐	  UNCTAD	  was	  the	  center	  of	  attention	  relating	  to	  development	  issues	  
This	  preliminary	  hypothesis	  was	  confirmed	  in	  my	  interviews	  as	  most	  of	  my	  respondents	  
believed	  that	  UNCTAD	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  setting	  the	  ‘development	  agenda’	   in	  
the	  1960’s	  and	  the	  1970’s,	  but	  that	  in	  the	  1980’s-­‐1990’s	  UNCTAD	  lost	  its	  agenda	  setting	  
power.	  The	  institutional	  context	  around	  UNCTAD	  changed	  and	  the	  organization	  entered	  
into	  “a	  world	  with	  a	  multitude	  of	  actors	  and	  causes	  competing	  for	  attention”	  (Bergesen	  
and	  Lunde	  1999:4).	  	  
According	   to	   observers,	   UNCTAD	   shaped	   the	   development	   agenda	   through	   innovative	  
research	   “UNCTAD	   has	   done	   quite	   a	   good	   job	   promoting	   the	   importance	   of	   development	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issues	  as	  well	  as	  functioning	  as	  the	  voice	  of	  developing	  countries”	  (NGO,	  respondent	  N).	  SG	  
Prebisch	  and	  UNCTAD	  functioned	  as	  an	  “amplifier”	  and	  represented	  the	  voice	  of	  more	  than	  
136	   developing	   countries	   within	   the	   UN	   system;	   this	   was	   a	   significant	   achievement.	  
Developing	  countries	  demanded	  that	  development	  issues	  should	  be	  put	  on	  the	  international	  
agenda,	   and	   that	   these	   issues	   should	   serve	   to	   “focus	   governments	   and	   stakeholders’	  
attention	   worldwide”	   (Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	   1995:5).	   The	   flagship	   reports	   prepared	   by	  
UNCTAD	   are	   widely	   distributed	   and	   are	   well	   recognized;	   many	   respondents	   used	   these	  
reports	  as	  an	  example	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  ability	  to	  set	  the	  agenda16.	  	  
The	  fall	  –	  An	  ideological	  and	  political	  shift	  changing	  UNCTAD’s	  role	  as	  an	  agenda	  setter	  
In	   line	   with	   my	   preliminary	   hypothesis,	   the	   respondents	   from	   the	   North	   and	   South	  
mentioned	   an	   ideological	   and	   political	   shift	   in	   the	   international	   political	   climate.	   In	   the	  
1970’s	   one	   witnessed	   strong	   disagreement	   in	   relation	   to	   NIEO,	   which	   the	   Carter	  
administration	   in	   the	   US	   did	   not	   support.	   UNCTAD	   was	   dominated	   by	   the	   developing	  
countries’	   perspectives	   on	   trade.	   Developing	   countries	   supported	   a	   strong	   state,	   state	  
governed	  economic	  processes	  and	  that	  the	  UN	  (and	  the	  developing	  countries)	  should	  acquire	  
a	  stronger	  role	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  economic	  issues	  (especially	  in	  trade,	  commodities,	  debt,	  
shipping	  and	  transnational	  companies).	  
One	  observer	  underlines	  that	  in	  the	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s	  there	  had	  been	  a	  “general	  good	  will	  
and	  a	  genuine	  belief	  that	  one	  had	  to	  help	  the	  developing	  countries”,	  but	  when	  the	  “Thatcher	  
and	   Reagan	   era	   kicked	   in,	   the	   rich	   countries	   said	   that	   the	   direction	   of	   UNCTAD	   is	   not	   the	  
direction	  we	  are	  going	  […]	  If	  UNCTAD	  continues	  with	  their	   issues	  we	  will	  not	   invite	  them	  to	  
the	   party”	   (NGO,	   respondent	   N).	   The	   direction	   of	   UNCTAD	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   the	  
“political	   governance	   of	   the	   market	   economy”,	   which	   was	   challenging	   the	   principles	   of	  
liberalism.	   However,	   liberal	   market	   forces	   shot	   down	   the	   state-­‐centric	   perspectives	   in	  
UNCTAD	  and	  this	  process	  accelerated	  in	  the	  1980’s	  with	  the	  Thatcher	  and	  Reagan	  era.	  This	  
shift	   shaped	   how	   actors	   from	   the	   West	   viewed	   the	   relationship	   with	   the	   developing	  
countries,	   and	   UNCTAD’s	   role	   in	   promoting	   the	   developing	   countries’	   interests	   in	   the	  
                                                
16	  Some	  of	  the	  flagship	  reports	  are	  Trade	  and	  Development	  Report	  (TDR),	  World	  Investment	  Report	  (WIR),	  
Least	  Developed	  Countries	  Report	  (LDC)	  and	  other	  reports	  dealing	  with	  technology	  and	  innovation,	  Maritime	  
transport	  and	  information	  economy.	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multilateral	   system.	  An	  LDC	   respondent	   illustrated	   the	  political	   and	   ideological	   shift	   in	   the	  
development	   agenda	   with	   the	   SAP’s	   that	   had	   detrimental	   consequences	   for	   developing	  
countries	  (mentioned	  in	  phase	  5).	  	  
Respondents	   from	  the	  North	  and	  South	  claimed	  that	   it	  was	  during	   the	   two	  conferences	   in	  
the	   1990’s	   (Cartagena	   (1992)	   and	   Midrand	   (1996))	   UNCTAD	   further	   declined	   and	   lost	   its	  
agenda	   setting	   function.	   The	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   the	   triumph	   of	   capitalism	   and	   the	  
establishment	  of	  WTO	  were	  important	  events	  influencing	  UNCTAD.	  In	  these	  conferences	  the	  
developed	   countries	   fought	   to	   alter	   UNCTAD’s	   mandate	   to	   reflect	   ‘a	   changed	   world’.	  
UNCTAD	  was	  pushed	  by	  the	  North	  to	  change	  from	  being	  a	  ‘negotiation	  forum’	  to	  become	  a	  
‘consensus-­‐building	  forum’.	  	  
One	  respondent	  from	  the	  South	  argues	  “the	  development	  agenda	  which	  was	  originally	  set	  by	  
UNCTAD	   has	   been	   fragmented	   due	   to	   increased	   competition	   from	   other	   multilateral	  
institutions	  that	  also	   focus	  on	  development,	   like	  UNDP	  and	  sections	  within	  the	  World	  Bank	  
and	  IMF”	  (LDC,	  Respondent	  P).	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  UNCTAD	  is	  a	  political	  organization	  and	  
cannot	   be	   compared	   to	   the	   operative	   organization	   of	   UNDP.	   UNDP	   has	   a	   completely	  
different	  mandate	  with	  country-­‐office	  presence.	  In	  the	  competition	  of	  attention	  and	  agenda	  
setting	  among	  the	  institutions,	  many	  member	  countries	  do	  not	  distinguish	  between	  political	  
and	  operative	  organizations	   in	   the	  UN	   landscape.	   This	   lack	  of	   distinction	   serves	   to	   further	  
dilute	  the	  mandates	  and	  what	  is	  expected	  of	  the	  different	  UN-­‐institutions	  (discussed	  briefly	  
in	  6.2.1).	  
Today,	   the	  agendas	  of	  organizations	  have	  become	  much	  more	   specialized	  and	  have	   taken	  
over	  UNCTAD’s	  areas	  of	  work;	  “the	  agenda	  on	  finance	  is	  set	  by	  the	  WB	  and	  IMF,	  and	  trade	  is	  
set	  by	  the	  WTO	  […]	  it	  is	  not	  that	  we	  in	  UNCTAD	  do	  not	  try	  and	  we	  do	  come	  up	  with	  a	  lot	  of	  
interesting	   ideas,	   it	   is	   just	   that	  we	  are	  not	  heard,	  we	  are	  not	  significant	  enough”	   (UNCTAD	  
staff,	  respondent	  K).	  With	  a	  diverse,	  fragmented	  multilateral	   landscape	  “you	  cannot	  expect	  
that	  UNCTAD	  is	  going	  to	  define	  the	  agenda	  in	  its	  totality,	  but	  we	  do	  it	  in	  our	  own	  way	  […]	  the	  
reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  ‘one	  single	  agenda’	  anymore”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  respondent	  I).	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Respondents	   from	   the	   South	   pointed	   out	   that	   after	   the	   1980’s	   UNCTAD	   had	   pushed	   for	  
ideas,	  which	  have	  been	  incorporated	  and	  integrated	  in	  the	  work	  of	  larger	  institutions17.	  This	  
role	  of	  UNCTAD	  was	  echoed	  by	  a	  respondent	  from	  the	  North	  who	  argued	  that	  through	  its	  
analytical	  work,	  UNCTAD	  has	  “attempted	  to	  position	  itself	  as	  a	  corrective	  to	  the	  agenda	  
which	  has	  been	  outlined	  and	  set	  elsewhere”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  respondent	  A).	  UNCTAD’s	  
approach	  has	  generally	  stressed	  the	  role	  of	  governments,	  the	  state	  and	  the	  public	  sector	  
in	  economic	  policies	  –	   in	  contrast	   to	   the	  more	  market-­‐oriented	  and	   liberalistic	  policies	  
of	   the	  World	   Bank	   and	   IMF	   promoted	   through	   the	  Washington	   consensus	   period,	   and	  
supported	  by	  OECD/DAC	  donors	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  respondent	  A).	  
There	  are	  contrasting	  views	  between	  the	  respondents	  on	  UNCTAD’s	  agenda	  setting	  role.	  
Some	  respondents	  from	  the	  North	  were	  more	  critical;	  “As	  of	  today	  I	  see	  that	  UNCTAD	  has	  
limited	   influence	   in	   the	   field	   of	   Trade	   and	   development.	   UNCTAD	   does	   not	   have	   a	   high	  
standing	  and	  is	  met	  with	  little	  respect	  in	  the	  UN	  system”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent	  S).	  
5.2.2 Promoting a common understanding 
Promoting	  a	  common	  understanding	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  goals,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  example	  of	  
success,	   for	   most	   political	   organizations.	   UNCTAD’s	   initial	   vision	   during	   its	   rise	   was	   a	  
more	   fair	   and	   just	   regime	   for	   commodities	   and	   trade.	   The	   establishment	   of	   UNCTAD	  
presented	  in	  a	  sense	  an	  “alternative	  vision”	  to	  the	  pure	  “free-­‐trade	  vision”.	  Based	  on	  my	  
hypothesis	  one	  would	  expect	  that	  UNCTAD	  managed	  to	  create	  a	  common	  understanding	  
on	  development	   issues	   and	   its	   alternative	   vision	  during	   its	   rise.	   The	  hypothesis	   is	   that	  
this	   role,	   vision	   and	   function,	   would	   weaken	   as	   UNCTAD	   lost	   parts	   of	   its	   mandate	   to	  
WTO,	  and	  after	  the	  1980’s	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  free	  trade	  paradigm.	  
The	  Rise-­‐	  UNCTAD	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  negotiation	  forum,	  not	  promoting	  a	  common	  
understanding	  
My	  hypothesis	  proved	  to	  be	  wrong.	  Respondents	  from	  the	  South	  underlined	  that	  UNCTAD	  
had	  been	  successful	  over	  time	  in	  creating	  a	  common	  understanding	  between	  the	  developing	  
countries.	   But,	   UNCTAD	   had	   been	   unsuccessful	   in	   affecting	   the	   developed	   countries,	   and	  
                                                
17	  Examples	  provided	  were	  “Policy	  space”	  which	  is	  widely	  used	  and	  “productive	  capacity	  building	  for	  LDC”.	  
53 
 
creating	  a	  common	  understanding	  that	  included	  the	  North.	  Some	  even	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  
not	  the	  point	   in	  the	  beginning	  of	  UNCTAD.	  An	  expert	  noted	  that	  UNCTAD	  attempted	  to	  do	  
this	  with	   regard	   to	  NIEO,	  but	  because	   the	  content	  of	  NIEO	   is	  “favorable	   to	  G77”	   it	  proved	  
difficult.	  Respondents	  from	  the	  South	  argued	  that	  developed	  countries	  had	  ideological	  and	  
material	   barriers	   against	   a	   common	   understanding	   on	   the	   issues	   that	   were	   discussed	   in	  
UNCTAD	  in	  the	  1960’s-­‐	  1980’s.	  However,	  these	  ideological	  barriers	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  go	  both	  
ways.	  For	  example,	  UNCTAD’s	  SG	  Prebisch	  criticized	  “the	  role	  of	  Third	  World	  elites—African	  
politicians,	   he	   thought	   were	   abusing	   the	   “trade	   gap”	   concept	   to	   cover	   up	   their	   own	  
corruption”	   (Love	   2001:13).	   Prebisch	   underlined	   the	   importance	   of	   internal	   redistribution	  
within	   developing	   countries	   to	   increase	   development,	   but	   there	   were	   ideological	   and	  
material	  barriers	  to	  this	  type	  of	  knowledge	  among	  the	  third	  world	  elites.	  Prebisch	  meddled	  
with	   a	   prevalent	   ‘belief	   system’	   where	   underdevelopment	   could	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	  
‘workings	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  system	  rather	  than	  the	  indigenous	  characteristics	  of	  
their	  own	  societies’	  (Krasner	  1981:143)	  (further	  discussed	  in	  section	  6.4.2).	  
An	  observer	  argues	   that,	   “UNCTAD	  has	  played	  a	  positive	   role	  by	   looking	  at	   the	   impacts	  of	  
trade	   on	   development,	   since	   trade	   is	   a	   complex	   issue	  with	   lots	   of	   different	   effects”	   (NGO,	  
Respondent	  N).	  Much	  of	   the	   research	  UNCTAD	  conducts	   reveals	   that	   certain	   conditions	   in	  
developing	   countries	  must	   be	   present	   in	   order	   for	   trade	   to	   have	   a	   positive	   impact.	   Thus,	  
UNCTAD’s	  opinion	  is	  that	  trade	  is	  not	  intrinsically	  “good”.	  One	  observer	  underlines	  that	  the	  
alternative	  view	  has	  been	  helpful	   in	  questioning	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  principles	   in	  the	  
Washington	   consensus.	   Other	   respondents	   argued	   that	   this	   belief	   has	   experienced	   a	  
crushing	  defeat.	  One	  expert	  commented	  on	  this	  statements	  and	  argued	  that	  there	  has	  been	  
a	   misunderstanding,	   “UNCTAD	   has	   not	   been	   against	   freer	   trade,	   the	   organization	   just	  
wanted	  to	  promote	  fairer	  trade”	  (Expert	  Skogmo). 
The	  fall	  -­‐	  UNCTAD	  became	  a	  consensus	  building	  forum,	  but	  was	  not	  successful	  
A	   respondent	   from	   the	   North	   argues	   that	   “if	   UNCTAD	   had	   been	   good	   at	   promoting	   a	  
common	  understanding	  one	  would	  have	  managed	  to	  track	  UNCTAD's	  contribution	  to	  public	  
understanding	  in	  other	  trade	  and	  development-­‐oriented	  organizations.	  However,	   I	  have	  not	  
seen	  UNCTAD’s	  footprint”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent	  C).	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5.2.3 Give Policy advice 
Along	   the	   lines	  of	   the	  other	   institutional	  criteria,	  one	  could	  hypothesize	   that	  UNCTAD	  was	  
much	  more	  successful	   in	  giving	  policy	  advice	   in	  phase	  1	  and	  2.	   In	  phase	  3	  there	  was	  much	  
competition	  for	  attention	  due	  to	  (1)	  an	  increased	  number	  of	  development	  agencies	  and	  (2)	  
because	  of	  the	  contrasting	  policy	  advice	  (Washington	  consensus	  vs.	  UNCTAD’s	  state	  oriented	  
policy	  advice)18.	  	  
The	  Rise-­‐	  UNCTAD	  successful	  in	  giving	  advice	  to	  developing	  countries	  
Observers	   and	   respondents	   from	   the	   South	  were	   positive	   concerning	   UNCTAD’s	   ability	   to	  
give	  policy	  advice	  to	  developing	  countries.	  “If	  UNCTAD	  was	  just	  for	  the	  G77,	  then	  these	  three	  
objectives	   (Agenda	   setting,	   promoting	   a	   common	   understanding	   and	   give	   policy	   advice)	  
would	   have	   been	   achieved.	   But	   for	   the	   developed	   countries	   none	   of	   these	   objectives	   are	  
achieved.	  The	  developed	  countries	  see	  UNCTAD	  as	  an	  obligation	  and	  they	  are	  not	  happy	  with	  
this	  obligation.	  If	  they	  decide	  to	  join	  in	  the	  meetings	  it	  is	  just	  to	  counteract	  the	  discourse	  of	  
the	  G77”	  (MIC,	  respondent	  O).	  	  
A	  respondent	   from	  the	  North	  argues	  “I	  actually	  believe	  that	  UNCTAD	  has	  had	  an	   influence	  
and	  a	  role	  in	  giving	  policy	  advice	  to	  developing	  countries”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  respondent	  A).	  
The	   respondent	   referred	   to	   economic	   measures	   in	   developing	   countries	   promoted	   by	  
UNCTAD	   after	   the	   Asian	   crisis,	   which	  made	   them	   less	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   current	   financial	  
crisis.	   The	   respondent	   also	   believed	   that	   there	   is	   broad	   agreement	   among	   actors	   in	   the	  
North	   that	   UNCTAD	   has	   had	   a	   constructive	   advisory	   role	   in	   preparing	   the	   developing	  
countries	   for	  WTO	  membership	   and	  WTO	   negotiations.	   However,	   “this	   role	   has	   probably	  
weakened	  during	   the	   last	   years	   as	  more	   developing	   countries	   have	  adopted	  market-­‐based	  
economic	  policies	  and	  strategies”	  (ibid).	  
Respondents	  from	  the	  South	  underlined	  the	  importance	  of	  having	  an	  alternative	  perspective	  
on	   development	   and	   trade	   policies	   which	   is	   challenging	   the	   neo-­‐liberal	   paradigm.	   This	   is	  
done	  through	  the	  trade	  and	  development	  reports	  published	  by	  UNCTAD.	  “UNCTAD’s	  policy	  
                                                
18	  Love	  (2001:12)	  noted	  how	  “cleavages	  within	  Third	  World	  Countries’	  bureaucratic	  elites:	  The	  minister	  of	  
development	  would	  tend	  to	  favor	  UNCTAD	  recommendations,	  while	  the	  minister	  of	  finance	  would	  tend	  to	  
favor	  those	  of	  the	  IMF”.	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research	   has	   been	   useful	   because	   it	   provides	   government	   with	   a	   second	   opinion	   to	   what	  
comes	   out	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   UN	   system	   or	   the	  WB”	   (Think	   tank,	   respondent	   D).	   Another	  
element	   is	   that	   UNCTAD	   has	   demonstrated	   anomalies	   of	   the	   Washington	   Consensus	  
paradigm	   (CUTS	   2012).	   UNCTAD	   therefore	   serves	   to	   create	   pluralism	   in	   policy	   analysis	  
relating	  to	  trade	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  issues	  (ibid).	  	  
A	   respondent	   from	   the	   North	   argued	   that	   UNCTAD’s	   policy	   advice	   and	   analysis	   has	   been	  
partly	   ignored	  by	   the	  North	   because	   some	  parts	   of	  UNCTAD	  went	   too	   far	   in	   its	   economic	  
orthodoxies.	   In	   intergovernmental	   negotiations,	   it	   was	   –	   for	   instance-­‐	   “very	   difficult	   to	  
include	  any	  positive	  wordings	  about	  opportunities	  for	  development	  from	  globalization,	  even	  
during	  a	  period	  where	  many	  developing	  countries	  opened	  up	   their	  economies”	   (Norwegian	  
MFA,	   respondent	  A).	  This	  made	   it	  difficult	  even	   for	   industrialized	  countries	  sympathetic	   to	  
UNCTAD’s	   analytical	   work	   to	  make	   their	   capitals	   interested	   in	   the	   work	   of	   UNCTAD.	   	   “In	  
some	   ways,	   UNCTAD	   has	   cursed	   in	   church,	   advocating	   a	   policy	   which	   is	   contrary	   to	   the	  
policies	  of	  liberalization,	  privatization	  and	  status	  quo;	  this	  has	  led	  to	  industrialized	  countries	  
ignoring	   and	   not	   referring	   to	  UNCTAD’s	  work	   even	   in	   cases	  where	  UNCTAD	  was	   right,	   for	  
instance	   in	  warning	  about	   the	   risks	   of	   a	   rapid	  deregulation	  of	  weak	   economies	  before	   the	  
Asian	  crisis	  in	  the	  late	  1990’s”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  respondent	  A).	  	  
The	  Fall-­‐	  UNCTAD	  “too	  political”	  to	  give	  clear	  policy	  advice	  
There	  was	  a	  more	  critical	  perspective	  on	  UNCTAD’s	  ability	  to	  “translate	  normative	  principles	  
into	  action	  at	  the	  nation	  level”	  (Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  1999:8).	  One	  respondent	  argues	  “much	  
of	   what	   is	   said	   and	   written	   in	   UNCTAD	   will	   not	   be	   translated	   into	   practical	   and	   feasible	  
actions.	  Proposals	  will	  be	  discussed	  at	  meetings,	  elaborate	  documents	  will	  be	  written,	  then	  
they	  will	  be	  reviewed	  internally	  in	  UNCTAD	  and,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  handful	  of	  so-­‐called	  
"flag-­‐ship	  documents",	  put	   in	   the	  archives	  and	   that’s	   it.	   	  UNCTAD	   is	   seriously	   lacking	   in	   its	  
ability	   to	   create	   public	   awareness	   of	   its	   work”	   (UNCTAD	   staff,	   Respondent	   K).	   Another	  
respondent	  underlined	  the	  reason	  why	  UNCTAD	  does	  not	  manage	  to	  ‘break	  through’	  with	  its	  
policy	  advice	  is	  “the	  misuse	  of	  competence	  in	  UNCTAD	  headquarters.	  Resources	  and	  time	  are	  
mostly	  used	  for	   internal	  operations	  and	  events	  etc.	   instead	  of	  spending	  more	  time	  on	  their	  
mandate	   and	   establishing	   unbroken	   chains	   between	   the	   normative	   and	   operative	   level”	  
(Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent	  C).	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A	  respondent	  from	  the	  South	  argued	  that	  UNCTAD	  has	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  been	  successful	  in	  
giving	  policy	  advice	  to	  developing	  countries.	  However,	  “You	  have	  been	  telling	  us	  what	  to	  do,	  
but	  we	  still	  have	  a	  problem.	  We	  need	  policy	  advice	  that	   is	  more	  practical	  because	  now	  it	   is	  
vague.	  We	  are	  asking	  UNCTAD	  to	  give	  us	  policy	  advice	  addressing	  my	  countries’	   issues	  and	  
problems”	   (LDC,	   respondent	   P).	   Again	   it	  must	   be	   noted	   that	   UNCTAD	   is	   not	   an	   operative	  
organization,	  therefore	  this	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  tall	  order	  for	  a	  political	  organization.	  The	  
respondent	  perceived	  that	  UNCTAD’s	  ability	  to	  give	  policy	  advice	  was	  affected	  by	  “the	  North	  
who	  restricts	  what	  kind	  of	  advice	  UNCTAD	  can	  give	  us	  because	  they	  say	  that	  certain	   issues	  
and	   topics	   belong	   to	   other	   organizations.	   However,	   all	   these	   issues	   are	   interconnected;	  
therefore	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  give	  advice	  on	  only	  one	  issue”	  (LDC,	  respondent	  P).	  An	  observer	  also	  
noted	   that	   “UNCTAD	   is	   so	   constrained	  with	  what	   it	   can	   say,	   it	   only	   gives	   policy	   advice	   in	  
specific	  fields	  where	  it	  has	  clear	  mandates”	  (NGO,	  respondent	  N).	  	  
5.3 Summary	  
The	  secondary	  literature	  review	  conveys	  how	  the	  broader	  international	  political	  climate	  had	  
clear	  consequences	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  negotiation	  process	  that	  took	  place	  
between	  the	  North	  and	  South.	  	  
The	  main	  trends	  documented	  in	  the	  secondary	  literature	  correspond	  with	  the	  empirical	  
findings	  from	  my	  fieldwork.	   It	  seemed	  that	  UNCTAD	  during	  its	  heydays	  managed	  to	  set	  
the	  development	  agenda	  and	  obtain	  more	  focus	  on	  an	  alternative	  trade	  scheme.	  After	  
the	   Cold	   War	   the	   Washington	   consensus	   shaped	   the	   development	   agenda.	   The	  
respondents	   described	   UNCTAD	   as	   having	   a	   role	   as	   a	   corrective	   to	   the	   development	  
agenda.	  However,	  this	  function	  diminished	  in	  later	  years.	  	  	  	  
Promoting	  a	  common	  understanding	  between	  the	  North	  and	  South	  was	  not	  the	  first	  priority	  
during	  UNCTAD’s	  rise.	  This	  was	  a	  function	  that	  became	  important	  when	  UNCTAD	  turned	  into	  
a	   consensus-­‐building	   forum.	   UNCTAD	   attempted	   to	   promote	   a	   common	   understanding	   of	  
NIEO	  during	  its	  rise,	  but	  it	  was	  difficult	  for	  the	  North	  to	  agree	  to	  an	  alternative	  trade	  scheme	  
that	   would	   be	   more	   favorable	   to	   developing	   countries.	   Later	   it	   became	   a	   hard	   task	   for	  
UNCTAD	  to	  promote	  a	  common	  understanding	  that	  would	  involve	  the	  North	  as	  “the	  crux	  lies	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in	   the	   impartiality	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   input”	   (Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	   1999:6).	   Today,	   UNCTAD	  
presents	  itself	  as	  neutral,	  but	  due	  to	  its	  history	  of	  being	  biased	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  gain	  the	  
developed	  countries’	  trust.	  
Some	   respondents	   believed	   that	   UNCTAD	   has	   been	   successful	   in	   giving	   policy	   advice	   to	  
developing	  countries	  through	  its	  policy	  research	  and	  policy	  reports.	  However,	  several	  factors	  
that	  restricted	  the	  ability	  to	  give	  policy	  advice	  were	  identified:	  (1)	  UNCTAD’s	  analytical	  work	  
has	  partly	  been	  ignored	  by	  the	  North	  since	  UNCTAD	  “has	  cursed	  in	  church”	  and	  challenged	  
the	   status	   quo,	   (2)	   A	   lot	   of	   ‘talk’	   and	  meetings	   that	   do	  not	   get	   translated	   into	   action	   and	  
results	   (3)	  misuse	  of	   resources	  on	   internal	  events	  and	  meetings	   in	  UNCTAD	  HQ,	   (4)	   it	  was	  
argued	   that	   the	   North	   is	   restricting	   UNCTAD’s	   ability	   to	   give	   policy	   advice	   to	   developing	  
countries	   by	   pressuring	   them	   to	   only	   focus	   on	   specific	   and	   technical	   topics.	   Some	  
respondents	  believed	  the	  underlying	  reason	  was	  because	  the	  North	  did	  not	  want	  UNCTAD	  to	  
give	  policy	  advice	  on	  sensitive	  topics	  where	   it	  could	  promote	  a	  different	   ideology	  than	  the	  
mainstream	  ideology.	  The	  debate	  concerning	  UNCTAD’s	  mandate	  has	  been	  a	  constant	  topic	  
during	  the	  negotiations	  and	  was	  one	  of	  the	  salient	  issues	  discussed	  in	  UNCTAD	  XIII	  in	  Doha.	  	  
Thus	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  literature	  and	  empirical	  findings	  one	  could	  
argue	  that	  UNCTAD	  has	  experienced	  a	  rise	  and	  fall.	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6 How	  can	  one	  explain	  the	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  
	   UNCTAD?	  
This	  chapter	  will	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  drivers	  that	  produced	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  UNCTAD.	  Again	  
secondary	  literature	  will	  be	  used	  when	  addressing	  the	  rise,	  while	  my	  empirical	   information	  
will	   be	   used	   when	   addressing	   the	   fall,	   as	   most	   respondents	   referred	   to	   their	   recent	  
experience	   with	   UNCTAD	   (phase	   4	   and	   5).	   Figure	   4	   illustrates	   my	   theoretical	   model	   of	  
inquiry.	  When	   assessing	  UNCTAD	   the	   three	   criteria	   on	   the	   dependent	   variable	  were	   used	  
(see	  chapter	  5).	  The	   independent	  variables	   represent	  different	  drivers	  behind	   the	   rise	  and	  
fall.	  
	  






6.1 Consensual	  knowledge	  
“The	  most	  common	  impediment	  to	  a	  negotiation	  is	  different	  perceptions	  or	  lack	  of	  
consensual	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  other	  side”	  (NGO,	  respondent	  N)	  
Joseph	   Nye	   studied	   UNCTAD	   under	   the	   influential	   leadership	   of	   Raul	   Prebisch	   in	   the	   late	  
1960’s	  (phase	  1).	  Nye	  argued	  that	  UNCTAD	  under	  Prebisch	  was	  “the	  symbol	  of	  some	  men’s	  
concern	  about	  the	  enormous	  challenge	  of	  development,	  their	  refusal	  to	  accept	  the	  existing	  
pattern	   of	   bureaucratic	   and	   international	   norms,	   and	   their	   attempt	   to	   use	   international	  
organization	   in	   an	   innovative	   way”	   (Nye	   1973:370).	   In	   other	   words,	   Prebisch	   played	   a	  
“leading	   role	   not	   only	   in	   founding	   the	  G77,	   but	   initiating	   the	  process	   that	  would	   result	   in	  
NIEO”	   (Love	   2001:13).	   However,	   Righter	   (1995:105)	   argues	   that	   Prebisch’s	   theories	   were	  
destructive	   and	   polarizing	   because	   they	   “launched	   international	   economic	   negotiations	  
down	  a	  dead-­‐end	  road;	  and	  because	  it	  lent	  itself	  to	  the	  evolving	  “block”	  approach,	  in	  which	  
blanket	  demands	  would	  be	  made	  with	  little	  regard	  for	  the	  quite	  different	  needs	  of	  individual	  
developing	  countries”.	  	  
The	   essence	   of	   consensual	   knowledge	   is	   a	   set	   of	   beliefs	   that	   the	  most	   relevant	   actors	  
can	   agree	   upon.	   The	   block	   approach	   noted	   by	   Righter	   (1995)	   coupled	   with	   a	  
Dependencia-­‐topic	   like	  NIEO,	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  consensual	  knowledge	  between	  
the	  blocks.	  Rothstein	  argued	  that	   lack	  of	  consensual	  knowledge	  between	  the	  North	  and	  
South	  was	  one	  of	   the	   reasons	  why	   the	   commodity	  negotiations	   (IPC)	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  
rise	   failed	   and	   little	   was	   learnt19.	   The	   negotiations	   during	   the	   rise	   of	   UNCTAD	   were	  
described	   as	   high-­‐level	   events	  with	   ambassadors	   and	   some	   of	   the	   best	   experts	   at	   the	  
time20.	  Rothstein’s	  article	  conveyed	  that	  not	  only	  realist	  perceptions	  of	  power	  and	  self-­‐	  
interest	  were	  affecting	  the	  negotiations	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  rise	  (Rothstein	  1984:733).	  
Yet,	   in	  phase	  1	  and	  2	  the	   lack	  of	  consensual	  knowledge	  seemed	  not	  to	  have	  a	  detrimental	  
effect	   on	   UNCTAD’s	   development.	   However	   in	   the	   1980’s	   and	   1990’s	   (phase	   3	   and	   4)	  
UNCTAD	  was	  pressured	  to	  change	  its	  character	  and	  become	  less	  confrontational	  and	  focus	  
                                                
19	  Rothstein	  (1984:733)	  wrote	  about	  the	  lessons	  learnt	  from	  the	  8	  years	  long	  commodity	  negotiations	  within	  
UNCTAD	  related	  to	  the	  Integrated	  Programme	  for	  Commodities	  (IPC).	  
20	  For	  example	  Prebisch	  ”recruited	  first-­‐rank	  economists	  to	  carry	  out	  commodity	  agreement	  studies,	  notably	  
Alfred	  Maizels	  of	  Britain	  and	  Jan	  Tinbergen,	  the	  future	  Nobel	  Prize	  Winner,	  of	  the	  Netherlands”	  (Love	  2001:9)	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on	   achieving	   consensual	   knowledge.	   The	   South	   Centre	   did	   not	   appreciate	   the	   reform	   of	  
UNCTAD.	  According	  to	  the	  South	  Centre	   (2006:5)	  UNCTAD	  VIII	   (Cartagena)	  and	  UNCTAD	  IX	  
(Midrand)	  “gave	  the	  finishing	  touches	  to	  the	  demolition	  job	  begun	  one	  decade	  earlier”.	  The	  
Cartagena	  agreement	   in	  UNCTAD	  VIII	   led	  to	  the	  change	  where	  UNCTAD	  went	  from	  being	  a	  
‘negotiation	  forum’	  to	  become	  a	  ‘consensus-­‐building	  forum’	  (ibid).	  Thus,	  UNCTAD	  “gave	  up	  
its	   opposition	   to	   the	   international	   system	   and	   redefined	   its	   objectives	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
liberalization	   and	   globalization”	   (South	   Centre	   2006:6).	   The	   South	   Centre	   argued	   that	  
UNCTAD	  became	  an	  organization	  that	  rendered	  practical	  assistance	  to	  LDC	  so	  that	  the	  third	  
world	   coalition	   could	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	   existing	   order	   “rather	   than	   indulging	   in	  
seemingly	  futile	  exercise	  of	  contesting	  this	  order”	  (ibid).	  Thus	  the	  changes	  and	  reforms	  that	  
took	  place	  in	  UNCTAD	  were	  regarded	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  design	  by	  the	  major	  developed	  
countries	  to	  “discourage	  and	  disarm	  collective	  action	  by	  developing	  countries	  to	  bring	  about	  
a	  change	  in	  the	  global	  economic	  structure”	  (South	  Centre	  2006:9).	  	  	  
The	   variable	   of	   consensual	   knowledge	   is	   important	   in	   negotiations	   because	   “uncertainty	  
makes	  consensus	  difficult	  since	  it	  impedes	  agreement	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  
what	  to	  do	  about	  it”	  (Rothstein	  1984:735).	  Righter	  (1995)	  argues	  that	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  rise	  
“consensus	   and	   consensual	   knowledge	   was	   not	   the	   goal”,	   while	   confrontation	   between	  
North	  and	  South	  was.	  
My	   respondents	   in	  Geneva	   and	  Oslo	  mentioned	   several	   elements	   that	  make	   it	   difficult	   to	  
create	  consensual	  knowledge	  in	  UNCTAD	  today:	  (1)	  uncertainty	  of	  knowledge	  due	  to	  limited	  
resources	   and	   the	   vicious	   cycle	   of	   deprioritization,	   (2)	   it	  was	   easier	   to	   achieve	   consensual	  
knowledge	   on	   practical	   issues	   than	   ‘sensitive’	   issues	   (3)	   contending	   perceptions	   and	  
narratives	  of	  the	  North	  and	  the	  South,	  and	  (4)	  contending	  perceptions	  within	  the	  G77.	  	  
6.1.1 Uncertainty	  of	  knowledge	  and	  the	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  deprioritization	  	  
A	  general	  opinion	  among	  my	  respondents	  was	  that	  the	  Permanent	  Missions	   in	  Geneva	  are	  
understaffed	   and	   lack	   the	   capacity	   to	   read	   and	   follow	   up	   technical	   papers	   provided	   by	  
UNCTAD.	  One	  expert	  argued	  that	  technical	  papers	  should	  be	  read	  by	  experts	  at	  the	  national	  
level,	  not	  at	  the	  delegation	  level.	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Yet,	   uncertainty	   around	   technical	   expert	   knowledge	  was	   a	  major	   difficulty	   in	   negotiations	  
and	   meetings	   in	   UNCTAD.	   A	   respondent	   from	   the	   North	   told	   me	   that	   the	   technical	  
information	   from	   the	   Trade	   and	   Development	   Board	   (TDB)	   meetings	   and	   expert	   panels	  
“goes	  way	  over	  the	  heads	  of	  all	  the	  delegates	  (both	  from	  the	  G77	  and	  the	  B-­‐group).	  However,	  
sometimes	  we	   felt	   that	   the	   G77	  was	   poorly	   prepared	   and	   did	   not	   have	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
discourse	  and	  the	  discussion	  around	  the	  issues	  raised.	  Many	  of	  the	  G77	  missions	  in	  Geneva	  
were	  poorly	   staffed	  and	  had	   to	  prioritize”	   (Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent	  C).	   The	  delegates	  
covering	  UNCTAD	  tended	  to	  be	  the	  generalists	  at	  the	  Mission,	  while	  the	  delegates	  with	  more	  
competence	  within	  trade	  and	  development	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  WTO.	  	  
Reduced	  participation	  in	  UNCTAD-­‐	  Interns	  and	  lower	  level	  diplomats	  
After	  UNCTAD	  lost	  its	  negotiation	  mandate	  to	  WTO	  in	  1995,	  the	  delegations	  in	  Geneva	  had	  
to	   prioritize.	   A	   respondent	   from	   the	   North	   argues	   “UNCTAD	   as	   an	   organization	   remains	  
mainly	   a	   conference,	   with	   programmes	   for	   technical	   cooperation,	   but	   without	   any	  
operational	  responsibilities.	  In	  a	  conference	  "the	  output	  is	  mostly	  non-­‐binding	  words";	  this	  is	  
a	   marked	   difference	   from	   the	   WTO	   where	   negotiations	   aim	   to	   establish	   contractual	  
obligations”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent	  A).	  	  
While	   the	   South	   sends	   lower	   level	   generalists	   to	   negotiations	   in	  UNCTAD,	  many	  Northern	  
Missions	   send	   interns.	   As	   an	   intern	   covering	   UNCTAD	   in	   2011,	   I	   participated	   in	   the	  
negotiations	  leading	  up	  to	  UNCTAD	  XIII.	  I	  was	  told	  by	  a	  respondent	  in	  2011	  that	  “no	  offence,	  
but	  when	  Group	   B	   are	   sending	   interns,	   they	   are	   deprioritizing	   the	   forum.	   This	   is	   a	   vicious	  
cycle”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  Respondent	   I).	  Another	   intern	  from	  a	  Northern	  mission	  told	  me	  that	  
she	  enjoyed	  the	  meetings	  in	  UNCTAD,	  since	  she	  could	  sit	  together	  with	  other	  interns	  and	  not	  
follow	  the	  discussion	  too	  closely.	  Her	  supervisor	  at	   the	  delegation	  had	  told	  her	  “you	  don’t	  
have	   to	  write	   any	   notes,	   nothing	   is	   going	   to	   happen	   anyway”.	   The	   Permanent	  Mission	   of	  
Norway	  echoed	  the	  same	  sentiment.	  A	  respondent	  from	  the	  UNCTAD	  staff	  observed	  “before	  
it	  was	  normal	  practice	  to	  send	  your	  ambassadors	  to	  UNCTAD.	  Now	  UNCTAD	  is	  becoming	  less	  
significant	  and	  therefore	  lower	  level	  diplomats	  are	  sent.	  	  In	  the	  end	  they	  don’t	  send	  anyone”	  
(UNCTAD	   staff,	   respondent	   H).	   After	   my	   internship	   ended	   in	   July	   2011,	   no	   one	   from	   the	  
Norwegian	  Mission	   in	  Geneva	  has	   actively	   covered	  UNCTAD.	   The	   trend	  of	   sending	   interns	  
and	  not	  having	  enough	  personnel	  puts	  Northern	  delegations	  in	  a	  position	  where	  they	  must	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respond	   rather	   than	   to	   initiate	   and	   this	   is	   not	   just	   the	   case	   of	   UNCTAD.	   This	   makes	  
multilateral	   negotiations	   easier	   victims	   for	   hijacking	   by	   more	   extreme	   actors	   (further	  
discussed	   in	   section	  6.4.3).	  One	  expert	   argued	   that	   “Adding	   to	   this	   disengagement	   from	  
UNCTAD,	   Western	   countries	   are	   in	   a	   situation	   where	   resources	   and	   people	   at	   the	  
permanent	   missions	   are	   reduced	   and	   cut.	   Even	   a	   country	   like	   Norway	   has	   shifted	  
diplomatic	  resources	  from	  European	  countries	  and	  UN-­‐delegations	  to	  emerging	  nations”	  
(Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent	  A).	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  a	  bigger	  strategy	  to	  attain	  
new	  strategic	  partners.	  Reduced	  participation	  at	  delegation	  level	  might	  be	  a	  symptom	  of	  an	  
underlying	   problem	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   deprioritization	   of	   UNCTAD	   and	   the	   broader	   UN	  
system.	  
Respondents	  from	  the	  South	  and	  observers	  stressed	  the	  difficulties	  in	  getting	  feedback	  from	  
the	  experts	  in	  capital	  on	  position	  papers.	  Therefore,	  position	  papers	  are	  often	  decided	  at	  the	  
delegation	   level	   without	   an	   expert	   opinion.	   According	   to	   Rothstein	   (1984:757),	   this	   is	   a	  
major	  problem	  because	   it	  causes	  politicization.	  Another	   issue	   is	   that	  countries	  are	  “lacking	  
the	  technical	  skills	  to	  develop	  independent	  positions”	  (ibid).	  Thus,	  UNCTAD	  staff	  told	  me	  that	  
they	   often	   drafted	   statements	   reflecting	   the	   positions	   of	   the	   different	   coalitions	   as	   the	  
delegates	  do	  not	  have	   the	   time	   to	  do	   this.	  One	   respondent	  believed	   that	  one	  of	   the	  main	  
challenges	  for	  UNCTAD	  is	  that	  it	  produces	  too	  many	  documents	  and	  arranges	  meetings	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  real	  demand	  for	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  respondent	  A).	  	  
Rothstein	   (1984:757)	   argued	   that	   expert	   groups	   could	   make	   a	   difference	   by	   preparing	  
technical	   reports	   before	   the	   actual	   negotiation	   takes	   place,	   this	   would	   lead	   to	   less	  
politicization.	  This	   is	  something	  that	  the	  UNCTAD	  staff	  does	  to	  some	  extent	  already;	   it	  still	  
does	  not	   seem	   to	   solve	   the	   stalemate.	  Rothstein	   argues	   “the	  expert	   groups	  would	  not	  be	  
bound	   by	   group	   positions”	   (ibid).	   This	   is	   not	   the	   case	   of	   the	   position	   papers	   drafted	   by	  
UNCTAD.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   UNCTAD	   experts	   are	   not	   an	   independent	   expert	   group	   and	  
therefore	   the	   delegates	   question	   the	   information	   and	   the	   position	   papers	   created	   by	   the	  
UNCTAD	   experts:	   “the	   only	   source	   of	   information	   the	   delegates	   of	   G77	   have	   is	   from	   the	  
briefings	  of	  the	  UNCTAD	  secretariat,	  so	  sometimes	  I’m	  afraid	  that	  when	  we	  are	  defending	  a	  
position	   in	   UNCTAD,	  we	   are	   defending	   the	   position	   of	   the	   secretariat	   in	   some	  way”	   (MIC,	  
respondent	  O).	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A	   similar	   argument	   to	   Rothstein’s	   view	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   consensual	   knowledge	   was	  
proposed	   as	   a	   ‘lesson	   learnt’	   from	  Keohane	   and	  Underdal	   (2011:55).	   They	   argued	   that	   “a	  
solid	  base	  of	  consensual	  knowledge	  seems	  to	  come	  close	  to	  being	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  
effective	   cooperation”	   in	   the	   North-­‐South	   negotiations	   (ibid).	   The	   proponents	   of	   NIEO	  
debated	   this	   topic	   in	  most	   of	   the	   conferences	   in	  UNCTAD	   from	   the	   1960-­‐1980’s	   and	   they	  
“never	  succeeded	  in	  building	  such	  a	  platform;	  in	  fact	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  problem	  as	  well	  as	  
the	   essence	   of	   the	   cure	   remains	   contested”	   (ibid).	   However,	   whether	   there	   would	   be	  
political	  will	  to	  gain	  more	  clarity	  in	  the	  UNCTAD	  negotiations	  is	  a	  question	  that	  will	  be	  dealt	  
with	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
6.1.2 Practical	  issues	  versus	  ‘sensitive’	  issues	  
“The	  breakdown	  in	  common	  language	  was	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  North-­‐South	  stalemate”	  
(Righter	  1995:97)	  
Most	  of	  my	  respondents	  from	  the	  South	  and	  North	  argued	  that	  it	   is	  easier	  to	  achieve	  a	  
common	  understanding	  on	  practical	  issues,	  than	  vague,	  unclear	  policy	  UN	  buzzwords.	  At	  
the	  last	  UNCTAD	  conference,	  diplomats	  used	  weeks	  negotiating	  words	  and	  phrases	  that	  
took	  on	  a	  huge	  symbolic	  value;	   the	  fundamental	  question	   is	  “whether	  this	  or	   the	  other	  
contentious	  language	  matters	  at	  all”	  (Mark	  Halle	  in	  CUTS	  2012:11).	  	  
	  	   Rothstein	   (1984:739)	   argued	   the	   North-­‐South	   negotiations	   “center	   around	   grand	  
principles	  rather	  than	  on	  practicalities”	  this	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  learn	  or	  to	  get	  feedback	  from	  
the	   implementation	   (ibid).	   The	   gap	   described	   by	   Rothstein,	   which	   concerns	   “the	   policy	  
process	  in	  Geneva”	  and	  the	  weak	  link	  to	  the	  “levels	  that	  will	  actually	  implement	  decision”	  is	  
something	  that	  still	  is	  relevant	  today.	  A	  Respondent	  from	  South	  echoed	  this	  and	  argued	  that	  
using	  vague	  terms	  is	  a	  strategy	  to	  include	  other	  elements	  that	  are	  not	  agreed	  upon.	  “At	  the	  
moment	   anyone	   can	   stretch	   these	   concepts	   to	   fit	   their	   interpretation	   and	   interests”	   (LDC,	  
respondent	  P).	  For	  example	  the	   ‘reform	  of	  UNCTAD’;	  The	  North	  wants	  to	  reform	  UNCTAD,	  
but	   there	   are	   different	   perceptions	   of	   what	   this	   should	   mean	   in	   practice.	   “All	   member	  
countries	  want	  to	  make	  UNCTAD	  more	  effective.	  The	  problem	  is	  how	  can	  we	  do	  this	  so	  that	  




Some	  practical	  issues,	  however,	  have	  been	  negotiated	  in	  UNCTAD.	  “In	  some	  areas	  there	  was	  
a	  mutual	  understanding	  between	  the	  North	  and	  the	  South,	  for	  example	  the	  DMFAS	  program	  
on	   advising	   developing	   countries	   to	   deal	   with	   debt	   relief21	   […]	   Here	   there	   are	   common	  
interests	   between	   the	   North	   and	   the	   South	   concerning	   practical	   application,	   which	   could	  
cause	   actual	   results”	   (Norwegian	   MFA,	   Respondent	   A).	   According	   to	   the	   respondent	   the	  
investment	  division	  of	  UNCTAD	  did	  valuable	  work	  in	  analyzing	  and	  advising	  how	  developing	  
countries	  could	  establish	  sound	  policies	  to	  attract	  foreign	  direct	   investments	  on	  conditions	  
that	  would	  serve	  both	  parties.	  UNCTAD	  SG	  Ricupero,	  a	  former	  Minister	  of	  Finance	  of	  Brazil,	  
(UNCTAD	   SG	   from	   1995-­‐2004)	   gave	   intellectual	   leadership	   to	   UNCTAD	   during	   his	   term-­‐	  	  
“drawing	  UNCTAD	  a	  little	  bit	  closer	  to	  the	  mainstream	  of	  current	  economic	  thinking“	  (ibid).	  
6.1.3 Contending	  perceptions	  and	  narratives	  of	  the	  North	  and	  South	  
“The	  truth	  of	  the	  matter	  is	  that	  when	  you	  are	  negotiating	  or	  analyzing	  a	  situation,	  there	  are	  
many	  realities.	  The	  first	  step	  in	  building	  consensus	  is	  to	  create	  a	  common	  reality”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(UNCTAD	  staff,	  Respondent	  I)	  
My	  respondents	  argue	  that	  the	  North	  and	  South	  have	  always	  had	  different	  ways	  of	  viewing	  
the	  world.	   In	  the	  literature	  this	  has	  also	  been	  underlined	  (Rothstein	  1984:759).	  One	  expert	  
claimed	   that	   in	   UNCTAD’s	   rise ”When	   dealing	   with	   NIEO	   there	   was	   never	   real	   consensus	  
concerning	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  had	   led	  to	  underdevelopment	   in	  developing	  countries	  and	  
what	   could	   be	   done.	   It	   was	   ‘agreement	   in	   appearance	   only’	   that	   Norwegian	   diplomats	  
contributed	   to	  maintain	   through	   continued	   lip	   service”	   (Expert	   Lunde).	  During	   the	   last	   few	  
years	  the	  contending	  perceptions	  have	  been	  especially	  poignant	  and	  become	  a	  crucial	  issue	  
in	  the	  major	  North-­‐	  South	  negotiations.	  One	  respondent	  from	  the	  South	  states	  “The	  North	  
and	  the	  South	  have	  different	  narratives.	  We	  have	  been	  struggling	  with	  finding	  a	  good	  basis	  
for	  dialogue	  […]	  What	  we	  are	  seeing	  now	  is	  that	  the	  developed	  countries	  narrative	  of	   	   ‘the	  
world	   has	   changed’	   is	   not	   driven	   by	   empirical	   facts,	   but	   by	   fear,	   a	   fear	   of	   losing	   its	  
preeminence”	   (Think	   tank,	   respondent	   D).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Human	   Development	  
Report	  	  (HDR)	  from	  2013	  notes	  that	  “For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  150	  years,	  the	  combined	  output	  of	  
the	  developing	  world’s	  three	  leading	  economies—Brazil,	  China	  and	  India—is	  about	  equal	  to	  
                                                
21	  DMFAS-­‐	  Debt	  Management	  and	  Financial	  Analysis	  System	  is	  a	  programme	  managed	  by	  UNCTAD	  to	  assist	  
developing	  countries	  to	  effective	  debt	  management.	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the	   combined	   GDP	   of	   the	   longstanding	   industrial	   powers	   of	   the	   North—Canada,	   France,	  
Germany,	   Italy,	   United	   Kingdom	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   This	   represents	   a	   dramatic	  
rebalancing	  of	  global economic	  power”	  (HDR	  2013a:2).	  	  
However,	   respondents	   from	   the	   South	   argued	   that	   there	   had	   been	   changes,	   but	   not	   real	  
changes	  on	   the	  ground:	   “if	   you	  go	   to	  most	  African	  countries	   the	  challenges	  on	   the	  ground	  
have	   not	   changed	   for	   the	   last	   30	   years”	   (LDC,	   respondent	   P).	   The	   view	   presented	   is	  
characteristic	  of	  the	  G77	  (this	  will	  be	  further	  discussed	  under	  Productive	  power).	  A	  Northern	  
expert	  who	  viewed	  the	  comments	  conveying	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  change	  uttered	  “this	  is	  
wrong,	  there	  has	  been	  strong	  growth	  in	  Africa	  in	  recent	  years”	  (Expert	  Skogmo).	  Hence,	  one	  
cannot	  argue	  that	  nothing	  has	  changed	  on	  the	  ground.	  The	  HDR	  (2013a:3)	  argues	  that	  the	  
LDC	   “pace	   of	   change	   is	   slower”	   than	   for	   the	   larger	   developing	   countries.	   In	   short,	   this	  
conveys	  the	  perspective	  and	  sentiments	  of	  the	  North.	  The	  B-­‐group	  argues	  that	  the	  world	  has	  
changed	  and	  that	  the	  negotiations	  must	  reflect	  this.	  Several	  respondents	  from	  the	  North	  and	  
the	   South	   exemplified	   the	   contending	   ‘North	   and	   South	   narratives’	   by	   explaining	   what	  
happened	  in	  UNCTAD	  XIII.	  In	  Doha	  2012	  the	  most	  salient	  issue	  concerned	  whether	  the	  larger	  
developing	  countries,	  namely	  the	  BRICS	  (Brazil,	  Russia,	  India,	  China	  and	  South	  Africa),	  should	  
be	   labeled	   ‘emerging	  economies’	   instead	  of	  developing	   countries.	  A	   respondent	  explained	  
that	   in	  UNCTAD	  XIII	   the	  message	   from	  the	  North	  was	   that	  “some	  of	   the	  bigger	  developing	  
countries	  should	  assume	  the	  burden	  that	  the	  B-­‐group	  has	  taken	  in	  the	  past”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  
Respondent	   I).	   The	  developing	   countries	   perceived	   this	  message	   as	   the	  North	   abandoning	  
their	  commitments	  before	  they	  were	  even	  realized.	  	  
Conflicting	  world-­‐views	  are	   intensified	  when	  the	  coalition	  base	   their	  positions	  on	  different	  
sets	  of	  information.	  Rothstein	  underlined	  in	  1984	  the	  difficulties	  of	  “in-­‐house	  research”	  that	  
is	   “designed	   primarily	   to	   backstop	   established	   policy”	   (Rothstein	   1984:759).	   This	   type	   of	  
research	  makes	  it	  harder	  to	  create	  consensual	  knowledge	  as	  “it	  starts	  from	  a	  single	  point	  of	  
view,	   while	   consensual	   knowledge	   is	   most	   likely	   from	   institutions	   that	   have	   both	   sides’	  
confidence	   and	   trust”	   (ibid).	   Today,	   both	   coalitions	   have	   information	   from	   different	  
organizations,	  which	   some	  may	  argue	  back	  up	   their	   established	  policy.	  G77	  has	   the	  South	  
Centre	  and	  UNCTAD	  who	  provides	  information	  and	  suggestions	  for	  positions.	  However,	  the	  
B-­‐group	  members	  get	  information	  from	  the	  OECD	  or	  from	  their	  ‘in-­‐house	  research’	  at	  capital	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level.	   What	   the	   BRICS	   countries	   base	   their	   positions	   on	   remains	   an	   open	   question.	  
Rothstein’s	   descriptions	   of	   the	   difficulties	   that	   complicate	   the	   creation	   of	   consensual	  
knowledge	  seem	  to	  be	  relevant	  explanation	  factors	  today	  as	  well.	  	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   one	   may	   also	   argue	   the	   opposite.	   There	   has	   been	   a	   change	   in	   the	  
external	   factors	   that	   influence	  consensual	  knowledge.	  The	  world	  economy	   is	  moving	  away	  
from	   the	   “extreme	   liberalism”	   that	   influenced	   development	   until	   the	   financial	   crisis	   hit	   in	  
2008.	  After	  the	  crisis	  there	  has	  been	  a	  new	  recognition	  that	  the	  state	  and	  political	  systems	  
should	   play	   a	   larger	   part	   and	   have	   more	   responsibility	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   economy.	   This	  
recognition	   should	  have	  had	   an	   influence	  on	   consensual	   knowledge	   in	   the	  negotiations	   in	  
UNCTAD.	  The	  respondents	  from	  the	  UNCTAD	  secretariat	  and	  G77	  expected	  the	  negotiations	  
during	   UNCTAD	   XIII	   would	   go	   more	   smoothly	   because	   of	   ‘possible	   increased	   consensual	  
knowledge	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  B-­‐group’:	  “I	  would	  have	  expected	  these	  countries	  would	  push	  for	  
a	   new	   agenda	   which	   would	   have	   resulted	   in	   richer	   outcome	   in	   UNCTAD	   XIII.	   What	   was	  
interesting	   was	   that	   we	   instead	   witnessed	   a	   hardening	   of	   positions”	   (UNCTAD	   staff,	  
Respondent	  I).	  He	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  not	  only	  restricted	  to	  UNCTAD	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  
same	   was	   seen	   in	   the	   RIO+20	   negotiations.	   	   He	   suspected	   that	   the	   withdrawal	   into	  
conservatism	  was	   due	   to	   a	   ”human	   tendency	   to	   retreat	   and	   grab	   onto	   the	   past	  when	   the	  
world	  is	  changing	  around	  you”.	  Unfortunately,	  this	  trend	  ”complicates	  tremendously	  North-­‐	  
South	  dynamics	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  create	  a	  common	  understanding”	  (ibid).	  
6.1.4 Contending	  perceptions	  within	  the	  G77	  
There	   are	   not	   only	   different	   perceptions	   of	   the	   world	   between	   the	   North	   and	   South	  
coalitions,	   but	   also	   within	   the	   G77.	   The	   LDC	   have	   a	   different	   view	   than	   the	  MIC	   in	   G77.	  
According	  to	  my	  respondents	  from	  the	  South	  there	  were	  tensions	  within	  the	  G77	  relating	  to	  
what	  they	  meant	  UNCTAD	  should	  focus	  on.	  However,	  one	  respondent	  from	  the	  South	  argues	  
that	   “there	   are	   different	   perceptions	   of	   the	   issues,	   but	   within	   the	   G77	   there	   is	   strong	  
consensus	   about	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   negotiations”	   (MIC,	   respondent	   O).	   In	   UNCTAD	   XIII	   the	  
G77’s	   basis	   was	   “to	   deal	   with	   the	   financial	   crisis,	   aiding	   the	   multilateral	   system	   and	  
technology	  transfer”	  (MIC,	  respondent	  O).	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Rothstein	  (1984:737)	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  G77	  is	  a	  heterogeneous	  grouping,	  yet	  he	  does	  not	  
delve	   into	   the	   contending	   perceptions	  within	   G77.	   Righter	   (1995:97)	   argues	   that	   one	   has	  
come	  to	  think	  of	  “confrontation	  as	  almost	  synonymous	  with	  third	  world	  identity”.	  However,	  
an	  observer	  nuances	  this	  perception.	  He	  states	  that	  because	  the	  developing	  countries	  are	  so	  
different	  “the	  only	  thing	  the	  G77	  can	  agree	  on	  is	  what	  they	  don’t	  like	  and	  what	  they	  want	  to	  
block,	  so	  they	  come	  across	  as	  incredibly	  obstructive.	  But	  it	   is	  not	  so	  much	  because	  they	  are	  
obstructive,	   it	   is	   just	   they	   can’t	   get	   together	   on	   anything	   that	   is	   constructive”	   (NGO,	  
respondent	  N).	   Rothstein	   (1984:736)	   argued	   that	   the	  G77	   had	   a	   tendency	   to	   end	   up	   in	   a	  
“group	  position	  which	  merely	  sums	  all	  demands,	   is	   impervious	  to	  knowledge	  and	   learning,	  
not	  to	  mention	  genuine	  bargaining”.	  This	  seems	  to	  still	  be	  the	  case.	  An	  expert	  exemplified	  
these	   cleavages	   within	   the	   G77	   with	   his	   experience	   from	   the	   1990’s	   where	   he	   noted	   a	  
significant	   frustration	   in	   the	   LDC	   group	   within	   the	   G77.	   The	   LDC	   group	   argued	   that	   they	  
received	  little	  priority	  by	  the	  UNCTAD	  secretariat,	  which	  consisted	  mainly	  of	  Latin	  American	  
MIC.	  The	  expert	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  the	  reason	  why	  a	  special	  LDC	  coordinator,	  OHRLLS,	  was	  
established	  in	  New	  York	  to	  focus	  on	  only	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  LDC’s	  and	  other	  vulnerable	  groups	  
(Unites	   Nations	   Office	   of	   the	   High	   Representative	   for	   the	   Least	   Developed	   Countries,	  
Landlocked	   Developing	   Countries	   and	   Small	   Island	   Developing	   States)22	   (further	   discussed	  
under	  the	  heading	  Intra-­‐block	  power).	  	  
6.1.5 Consensual	  Knowledge	  –	  Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  	  
The	   tentative	   conclusion	   based	   on	   secondary	   literature	   (in	   3.3.1)	   became	   more	   nuanced	  
after	   I	   had	   gathered	  empirical	   information.	   Consensual	   knowledge	   in	  most	  GCD	  processes	  
develops	   over	   time	   and	   is	   an	   iterative	   process.	   It	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   UNCTAD	   lacked	  
consensual	   knowledge	   during	   its	   rise.	   However,	   most	   organizations	   have	   built-­‐in	  
mechanisms	   that	   are	   supposed	   to	   create	   consensual	   knowledge	   over	   time	   (cf.	   UN	  
Framework	  of	   Climate	  Change	  Conventions	   (UNFCCC)).	   Thus	   the	   importance	   and	  need	   for	  
consensual	  knowledge	  will	  increase	  the	  longer	  one	  has	  been	  in	  the	  GCD	  process.	  
Most	   often	   it	   is	   the	   role	   of	   the	   secretariat	   to	   function	   as	   ‘brokers’.	   This	   mechanism	   was	  
lacking	   because	   during	   the	   rise,	  UNCTAD	  was	   first	   and	   foremost	  meant	   to	   “articulate	   and	  
                                                
22	  More	  information	  about	  OHRLLS	  visit	  http://www.un.org/special-­‐rep/ohrlls/ohrlls/aboutus.htm	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aggregate”	   the	   demands	   and	   ideas	   of	   G77	   (interplay	   between	   consensual	   knowledge	   and	  
institutional	  capacity).	  In	  this	  context	  there	  was	  less	  focus	  on	  knowledge	  and	  it	  was	  more	  a	  
question	  of	  what	  type	  of	  perspective	  one	  uses	  (cf.	  6.1.3	  Contending	  North-­‐South	  narratives).	  
Consensual	  knowledge	   is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  problem	  malignancy.	  When	  combining	  this	  
with	  ideological	  posturing	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  create	  a	  common	  platform.	  Yet,	  there	  has	  
been	   consensual	   knowledge	   in	   UNCTAD	   on	   some	   issues	   (cf.	   6.1.2	   Practical	   and	   sensitive	  
issues).	  	  
Several	   other	   negotiation	   forums	   had	   been	   created	   since	  UNCTAD’s	   establishment.	   In	   the	  
competition	  for	  attention,	  these	  forums	  became	  prioritized,	  i.e.	  WTO	  (cf.	  6.1.1	  uncertainty	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  the	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  deprioritization).	  Thus	  interns	  and	  junior	  level	  diplomats	  
were	  sent	  to	  UNCTAD.	  	  
Regarding	   the	   tentative	   conclusions,	   both	   Righter	   and	   Rothstein	   were	   correct.	   Righter	  
managed	   to	   explain	   that	   consensual	   knowledge	  was	   not	   decisive	   in	  UNCTAD’s	   rise.	  While	  
during	  the	  fall	   it	  became	  clear	   that	   the	  reason	  one	  could	  not	  achieve	  concrete	  results	  was	  
because	  one	  lacked	  consensual	  knowledge	  supporting	  Rothstein’s	  view	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  
foundation	  of	  consensual	  knowledge.	  	  	  	  
6.2 Problem	  malignancy	  
”To	  discuss	  a	  mandate	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  concrete	  issue.	  Nevertheless,	  through	  
the	  institutional	  system	  in	  UNCTAD	  one	  manages	  to	  create	  North-­‐South	  confrontations	  over	  
nothing	  and	  this	  in	  a	  time	  where	  the	  North-­‐South	  divide	  has	  become	  anachronistic”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Expert	  Lunde)	  
Respondents	   from	   the	   North	   and	   the	   South	   were	   concerned	   with	   the	   future	   of	  
multilateralism.	  One	  observer	   states,	   “I	   think	  multilateralism	   is	   in	  deep	   trouble.	   	   Especially	  
multilateralism	  that	  deals	  with	  problems	  that	  are	  global	   in	  nature	  and	  where	  the	  solutions	  
require	   economic	   adjustment”	   (NGO,	   respondent	   N).	   This	   statement	   conveys	   that	   some	  
global	  problems	  are	  more	  difficult	  to	  solve	  than	  others.	  “Problem	  malignancy”	  as	  a	  variable	  
is	  used	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  challenges	  facing	  UNCTAD.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  Underdal	  
(2002)	  proposes	  the	  variable	  of	  problem	  malignancy	  to	  deal	  with	  concrete	  problems,	  like	  the	  
climate	   change	   regime.	   During	   UNCTAD’s	   rise	   one	   negotiated	   global	   problems	   relating	   to	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trade	   and	   development	   in	   UNCTAD	   (IPC	   and	   GSP)23.	   After	   UNCTAD	   lost	   its	   negotiation	  
mandate	   to	  WTO,	  UNCTAD’s	   negotiations	   have	   been	  described	   as	   “inward-­‐looking”.	   Thus,	  
problem	  malignancy	  in	  UNCTAD	  today	  relates	  mostly	  to	  UNCTAD’s	  own	  mandate.	  	  	  
Problem	  malignancy	  relates	  to	  how	  one	  can	  solve	  a	  given	  problem.	  It	  focuses	  on	  the	  political	  
aspects	  of	  collective	  action	  problems.	   In	  other	  words,	  political	  malignancy	   is	  a	  “function	  of	  
the	  configuration	  of	  actor	  interests	  and	  preferences	  that	  it	  generates”	  (Underdal	  2002:15).	  If	  
actors	   have	   the	   same,	   identical	   preferences,	   then	   it	   will	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   perfectly	  
benign	  problem	  (ibid).	  The	  more	  contrasting	  these	  preferences	  become,	  the	  more	  malign	  is	  
the	  problem	  (ibid).	  	  
In	   this	   section	   I	   will	   use	   Underdal’s	   definition	   of	   problem	   malignancy	   as	   function	   of	  
incongruity,	   asymmetry,	   and	   cumulative	   cleavages	   to	   analyze	   the	   different	   aspects	   of	   this	  
variable	  (Underdal	  2002:18).	  	  
6.2.1 Incongruity	  	  
“The	  fundamental	  dilemma	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  UNCTAD	  is	  set	  up	  to	  defend	  developing	  
countries	  interests	  and	  it	  is	  funded	  by	  the	  rich	  countries.	  That	  just	  doesn’t	  work”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(NGO,	  respondent	  N)	  
Incongruity	   refers	   to	   problems	   where	   “cost-­‐benefit	   calculus	   of	   individual	   actors	   is	  
systematically	   biased	   in	   favor	   of	   either	   the	   costs	   or	   the	   benefits	   of	   a	   particular	   course	   of	  
action”	  (Underdal	  2002:17).	  	  
During	  UNCTAD’s	   rise	   (phase	  2),	   the	  demands	  of	  NIEO	  took	  place	   in	  a	   forum	  “where	   the	  
cards	  were	  stacked	  against	  those	  effectively	  in	  charge	  of	  world	  economic	  management	  (and	  
those	   who	   paid	   98%	   of	   UN	   expenses)”	   (Bergesen	   and	   Lunde	   1999:	   54).	   	   This	   is	   a	   good	  
example	  of	  incongruity	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  rise.	  Yet,	  incongruity	  is	  still	  a	  relevant	  feature	  in	  the	  
negotiations	  witnessed	   today	   in	  UNCTAD.	   An	  UNCTAD	   employee	   states,	   “here	   in	  UNCTAD	  
those	  who	  pay	  my	  salary	  are	  not	  the	  same	  whom	  I	  am	  supposed	  to	  work	  for”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  
respondent	  L).	  It	  is	  mainly	  the	  developed	  countries	  that	  pay	  for	  services	  that	  are	  focused	  on	  
the	  developing	  countries.	  An	  expert	  noted	  that	  over	  60%	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  budget	  is	  covered	  by	  
                                                
23	  For	  more	  information	  concerning	  the	  negotiations	  of	  	  General	  System	  of	  Preference	  (1964-­‐1970)	  and	  
Integrated	  Programme	  of	  Commodities	  (1974-­‐1980),	  see	  Williams	  (1991).	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the	  UN’s	  regular	  budget.	  This	  was	  ensured	  by	  the	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  5th	  Committee	  
in	   NY,	   which	   is	   the	   Committee	   of	   the	   General	   Assembly	   with	   “responsibilities	   for	  
administration	  and	  budgetary	  matters”	   (UN	  ND).	  The	   rest	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  budget	   is	   financed	  
through	   extra-­‐budgetary	   resources	   (UNCTAD	   2012b).	   Therefore	   it	   is	   mainly	   technical	  
cooperation	  activities	  that	  are	  covered	  by	  voluntary	  contributions/	  extra	  budgetary	  funding	  
mainly	   from	   the	   North.	   Mehta	   (in	   CUTS	   2012:14)	   argues	   that	   “contributions	   are	   made	  
according	   to	   what	   they	   can	   afford	   and	   they	   [the	   North]	   do	   it	   because	   of	   their	   moral	  
responsibility”.	   He	   also	   underlined	   that	   even	   though	   the	   developing	   countries	   do	   not	  
contribute	  in	  cash,	  they	  contribute	  “in	  kind”	  (ibid).	  	  
The	   general	   topic	   that	   is	   discussed	   in	   each	   of	   the	   quadrennial	   conferences	   (especially	   in	  
phase	  3,	  4,	  and	  5)	   is	   the	  size/breadth	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  mandate	  and	  Terms	  of	  Reference.	  The	  
main	  discussion	   is	  between	  the	  developed	  countries	   that	  want	  UNCTAD	  to	  have	  a	  smaller,	  
more	  specialized	  mandate,	  while	  the	  developing	  countries	  want	  UNCTAD	  to	  do	  more,	  have	  a	  
broader	   mandate	   and	   more	   resources.	   However,	   several	   respondents	   from	   UNCTAD	  
explained	  that	  someone	  must	  pay	  for	  the	  broader	  mandate.	  One	  observer	  wants	  UNCTAD	  to	  
reduce	  budgetary	  support	  from	  the	  OECD	  countries	  to	  25%,	  which	  means	  members	  from	  the	  
G77	  must	  cover	  the	  rest.	  However,	  an	  UNCTAD	  employee	  argues,	  “in	  terms	  of	   fundraising,	  
we	  have	  tried	  to	  contact	  emerging	  countries	  in	  the	  G77	  and	  different	  foundations,	  but	  it	  has	  
not	  worked”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  respondent	  H).	  
Agenda	  sprawling	  -­‐	  A	  standard	  UN	  game	  
To	  fight	  for	  a	  broader	  mandate	  is	   ‘business	  as	  usual’	   in	  a	  UN	  context.	  One	  observer	  argues	  
that	   “All	   the	   conferences	  are	  about	   securing	  a	  mandate.	   That’s	  how	   the	  UN	  works.	   So	   the	  
bigger	  mandate	  you	  get,	   the	  more	   funding	  you	  can	  claim”	   (NGO,	  respondent	  N).	  With	  this	  
type	  of	  pragmatism	  one	  can	  easily	   fall	   into	  the	  trap	  of	  “agenda	  sprawling”	  which	   is	  a	  term	  
coined	  by	  Brunsson	  (2006)24.	  Agenda	  sprawling	  in	  UNCTAD	  increases	  the	  costs	  for	  developed	  
countries.	  This	  means	  that	  developed	  countries	  will	  be	  systematically	  in	  favor	  of	  fighting	  for	  
a	  smaller	  mandate,	  while	  the	  developing	  countries	  will	  take	  the	  opposite	  stance.	  	  
                                                
24	  An	  expert	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  UN	  lingo	  a	  similar	  term	  is	  used;	  ”mission	  creep”.	  According	  to	  Wikipedia	  (2013)	  
“Mission	  creep	  is	  the	  expansion	  of	  a	  project	  or	  mission	  beyond	  its	  original	  goals”	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Expert	  Skogmo	  pointed	  to	  a	  dilemma	  in	  the	  multilateral	  development	  system	  relating	  to	  the	  
mandate	   and	   expectations;	   should	   it	   be	   a	   promoter	   of	   global	   goals	   and	   priorities,	   as	  
determined	  by	  governing	  bodies	  at	  the	  global	  level?	  Or	  should	  it	  primarily	  be	  demand-­‐driven	  
instrument	   for	   developing	   countries	   to	   fulfill	   their	   particular	   needs	   and	   to	   fill	   gaps	   at	   the	  
country	   level?	   In	   line	  with	   the	   principle	   of	   country	   ownership,	   developing	   countries	   often	  
expect	   the	   development	   agencies	   to	   respond	   to	   their	   demands,	   even	   if	   those	   needs	  
transcend	  the	  core	  mandates	  and	  priorities	  of	  the	  agencies	  involved.	  	  The	  same	  dilemma	  is	  
present	  in	  the	  WB,	  and	  has	  come	  up,	  for	  instance,	  in	  discussions	  about	  an	  agreed	  division	  of	  
labor	   between	   the	   WB	   and	   UN	   institutions.	   Developing	   countries	   had	   argued	   that	   they	  
expected	  the	  WB	  and	  the	  UN	  system	  to	  be	  at	  their	  disposal	  at	  the	  national	  level	  to	  be	  used	  
for	   functions	   that	  are	   important	   to	   them;	   “we	  are	  after	  all	   the	   recipients”.	   The	  North	  and	  
South,	  as	  owners	  of	  the	  multilateral	  system,	  are	  pulling	  the	  multilateral	  system	  in	  different	  
directions.	  One	   LDC	   respondent	   argued	   that	   the	   best	   solution	   is	   if	   UNCTAD	   could	   tailor	   a	  
work	   programme	   that	   would	   address	   all	   the	   specific	   problems	   in	   his	   country,	   and	   then	  
create	  ‘recommendations	  for	  improvements’	  that	  the	  UNDP	  could	  implement	  at	  the	  national	  
level.	   Expert	   Skogmo	  argued	   that	   “this	   is	   a	  dilemma	   that	   the	  multilateral	   system	  probably	  
has	  to	  live	  with	  and	  to	  survive	  it	  must	  balance	  these	  opposing	  needs”.	  From	  the	  view-­‐point	  of	  
Western	   countries,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   global	   goals	   and	   sticking	   to	   agreed	   priorities	   is	  
important	  and	  will	  not	  go	  away.	  	  
6.2.2 Asymmetry	  
Whereas	  incongruity	  deals	  with	  a	  biased	  cost-­‐benefit	  calculus	  for	  a	  certain	  course	  of	  action,	  
asymmetry	   refers	   to	   the	   actors’	   values	   that	   are	   “incompatible	   or	   their	   interests	   are	  
negatively	  correlated”	  (Underdal	  2002:19).	  My	  respondents	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  conflicting	  
interests	  and	  views	  on	  “how	  development	  can	  and	  should	  happen”.	  The	  coalition	  structure	  
polarizes	  the	  opinions	  and	  interests	  between	  the	  two	  blocks.	  What	  further	  complicates	  this	  
process	  is	  the	  deep	  mistrust	  between	  the	  North	  and	  South.	  
There	  are	  some	  fundamental	  values	  that	  are	  shared	  between	  the	  developing	  and	  developed	  
countries;	  rich	  and	  resourceful	  individuals	  (or	  states)	  should	  help	  poor	  individuals	  (or	  states).	  
The	  values	  are	  based	  on	   the	   idea	  of	   charity	  and	  are	  visible	  between	  and	  within	   the	  North	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and	   South.	   However,	   UNCTAD	   and	   G77	   approached	   this	   issue	   more	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   a	  
confrontation,	   i.e.	   “the	   countries	   in	   the	   North	   and	   the	   status	   quo	   can	   be	   blamed	   for	   our	  
countries	  underdevelopment”;	  this	  changed	  the	  whole	  atmosphere.	  During	  the	  1970’s	  (phase	  
2)	   this	   was	   the	   case	   and	   an	   ideological	   divergence	   between	   developed	   and	   developing	  
countries	  could	  be	  witnessed.	  G77	  wanted	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  system	  
where	   one	  would	   replace	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   system	  which	   had	   benefited	   the	   developed	  
countries	   that	   had	   created	   the	   system.	   NIEO	   functioned	   as	   a	   set	   of	   shared	   values	   and	  
demands	   among	   the	  developing	   countries,	   but	  must	   be	  understood	   as	   an	   idea	  on	   several	  
levels	   (Cox	   1979:258).	   NIEO	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   the	   “specific	   demands	   and	  
consideration	  embodied	  in	  an	  impressive	  range	  and	  number	  of	  official	  documents	  adopted	  
by	   international	   conferences”	   (ibid).	  At	  a	   second	   level,	  NIEO	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  negotiation	  
process	   involving	   the	   North	   and	   South.	   The	   third	   level	   concerns	   the	   debate	   triggered	   by	  
NIEO	  about	  the	  “real	  and	  desirable	  structure	  of	  world	  economic	  relations”	  (Cox	  1979:259).	  
Finally,	   the	   fourth	   level	   of	   NIEO	   is	   the	   debate	   concerning	   the	   “form	   of	   knowledge	  
appropriate	   to	   understand	   these	   issues”	   (ibid).	   In	   other	   words,	   NIEO	   challenged	   “the	  
intellectual	  hegemony	  of	  liberal	  economics	  and	  its	  claims	  to	  “rationality””	  (ibid).	  
The	  negotiations	  concerning	  the	  Integrated	  Programme	  for	  Commodities	  (IPC)	  from	  1974	  to	  
1980,	   is	  an	  example	  of	   specific	  demands	  negotiated	   in	   international	   conferences.	  Williams	  
(1991:158)	   underlined	   the	   limits	   to	  G77’s	   cooperation	   even	   in	   relation	   to	  more	   “concrete	  
negotiations”	   by	   using	   the	   IPC	   negotiations	   as	   an	   example.	   G77	   was	   meant	   to	   be	   an	  
“instrument	   negotiating	   regime	   change”	   and	   the	   institutional	   mechanism	   is	   “adept	   at	  
reconciling	   divergent	   interests	   among	   its	   member	   states”	   (Williams	   1991:158-­‐159).	  
However,	   these	   negotiations	   highlighted	   that	   in	   cases	   “where	   the	   simple	   dichotomy	  
between	   the	  North	  and	  South	   is	   replaced	  by	  producers	  and	   consumers	   the	  G77	   ceases	   to	  
have	   a	   defined	   role”	   (ibid).	   Thus,	   G77	   cannot	   perform	   this	   role	   when	   the	   “distinctions	  
between	  the	  group	  members	  and	  non-­‐members	  are	  eroded”	  (ibid).	  	  
Consequently,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   there	   are	   elements	   in	   the	   GCD	   procedure	   and	  
institutional	  mechanisms	  that	  can	  aggregate	  the	  problem	  malignancy.	  For	  example,	  Walters	  
(1972:832)	   argues	   that	   in	   the	   UNCTAD	   negotiations	   “Group	   cohesion	   Between	   LDC	   had	  
typically	   been	  maintained	  by	   the	  practice	   of	   aggregating	   interests	   at	   the	  highest	   common	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denominator	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  the	  demands	  of	  all	  the	  LDC	  […]	  the	  Western	  group	  position	  
usually	  crystallizes	  along	  the	  lowest	  common	  denominator	  at	  which	  all	  states	  agree	  to	  give	  
only	  what	  the	  most	  reluctant	  among	  them	  will	  allow”.	  How	  can	  one	  foster	  consensus	  when	  
one	  coalition	   is	  centered	  on	  the	   lowest	  common	  denominator,	  while	   the	  other	  coalition	   is	  
centered	   on	   the	   highest	   common	   denominator?	   Law	   of	   the	   least	   ambitious	   program	  
(Underdal	  1980:36)	  is	  tightly	  linked	  with	  all	  of	  the	  historical	  phases	  of	  UNCTAD.	  	  
One	  respondent	  from	  the	  South	  argues	  how	  difficult	  it	  was	  to	  negotiate	  in	  plenary	  because,	  
in	  theory,	  as	  a	  “lead	  negotiator	  you	  have	  to	  represent	  135	  countries”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  former	  
lead	  negotiator	  of	  G77,	  Respondent	  I).	  This	  makes	  it	  challenging	  to	  have	  real	  negotiations,	  as	  
there	  are	  so	  many	  interests	  to	  take	  into	  consideration.	  He	  further	  argues	  “in	  plenary	  you	  are	  
conveying	  to	  your	  constituency	  that	  you	  can	  trust	  me	   in	  doing	  a	  good	   job	  on	  your	  behalf”.	  
Therefore	  negotiations	  in	  plenary	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  succeed;	  “that’s	  why	  most	  breakthroughs	  
and	   agreements	   are	   reached	   privately	   because	   then	   you	   can	   be	   more	   constructive/more	  
candid”	  (ibid).	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  when	  resources	  are	  cut	  at	  delegation	  level,	  diplomats	  do	  
not	  have	  the	  time	  for	  informal	  talks	  outside	  the	  plenary.	  This	  is	  a	  factor	  that	  may	  decrease	  
the	  chances	  for	  reaching	  consensus	  in	  negotiations.	  	  	  	  
UNCTAD	  has	  moved	  away	  from	  NIEO.	  The	  main	  goal	  of	  UNCTAD,	  according	  to	  respondents,	  
is	  to	  enable	  developing	  countries	  to	  develop.	  There	  should	  be	  no	  disagreement	  in	  values	  or	  
interests	  between	   the	  North,	  which	   is	   financing	  projects,	   and	  South	  which	   is	   interested	   in	  
becoming	  developed.	  However,	  there	  are	  different	  opinions	  on	  how	  UNCTAD	  can	  help	  in	  this	  
process.	  The	  North	  believes	  in	  a	  specialized	  mandate	  for	  UNCTAD	  that	  does	  not	  go	  into	  the	  
areas	   of	   other	   institutions	   (like	   UNDP,	   WTO,	   and	   WIPO).	   This	   will	   avoid	   “double	   work”.	  
UNCTAD’s	  work	   should	   focus	  on	  practical	   and	   technical	   issues	   in	   the	  developing	   countries	  
and	   achieve	   results	   on	   the	   ground.	   The	   South	   however,	   believes	   one	   must	   address	   the	  
underlying	  systemic	  issues	  in	  our	  globalized	  world.	  	  
What	   complicates	   the	   negotiations	   about	   “how	   to	  make	   development	   work”	   is	   the	   deep	  
mistrust	  between	  the	  North	  and	  South.	  It	  seems	  like	  the	  coalitions	  always	  misinterpret	  the	  
other	   coalition’s	   interest	   or	   agenda.	   One	   observer	   argues,	   “the	   developing	   countries	   no	  
longer	  believe	  that	   the	  rich	  countries	  are	  keen	  to	  see	  them	  develop”	   (NGO,	  respondent	  N).	  
The	   observer	   exemplified	   how	   mistrust	   between	   the	   North	   and	   South	   functioned	   in	   the	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negotiations:	  ”when	  the	  US	  proposes	  something	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  wicked	  attempt	  
to	  undermine	  development,	  and	  when	  the	  developing	  countries	  propose	  something	  it	  is	  taken	  
as	   a	   clever	   game	   to	   try	   and	   maneuver	   and	   blackmail	   everybody	   into	   giving	   them	   more	  
money”	   (ibid).	  He	  argued	  that	   there	  was	  no	  trust	   left	   in	   the	  UN-­‐system	  and	  compared	  the	  
North	  and	  South	  to	  a	  married	  couple	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  divorce	  “there	  is	   just	  nothing	  you	  can	  
say	  or	  do	  to	  change	  their	  minds”.	  	  
6.2.3 Cumulative	  cleavages-­‐	  the	  contamination	  effect	  
Cumulative	   cleavages	   are	   defined	   as	   “the	   extent	   to	   which	   parties	   find	   themselves	   in	   the	  
same	  situation	  on	  all	  dimensions	  or	  issues,	  so	  that	  those	  who	  stand	  to	  win	  (or	  lose)	  on	  one	  
dimension	  also	  come	  out	  as	  winners	  (or	  losers)	  on	  the	  other	  dimensions	  as	  well”	  (Underdal	  
2002:20).	  When	  dealing	  with	  multidimensional	  problems,	  cumulative	  cleavages	  are	  often	  an	  
additional	  source	  of	  complication.	  	  
The	  block	  system	  and	  constellations	  of	  developed	  versus	  developing	  countries	  tend	  to	  occur	  
in	   many	   GCD	   processes	   that	   address	   problems	   with	   an	   economic	   core25.	   Thus,	   one	   has	  
multiple	   games	  on	  different	   issues	   (multiple	   arenas,	   i.e.,	   negotiations),	   but	  with	   the	   same	  
players	  (developed	  vs.	  developing).	  Concepts,	  policy	  goals	  and	  knowledge	  in	  one	  game	  can	  
be	   transferred	   to	   another	   game.	   UNCTAD	   is	   interesting	   as	   a	   case,	   because	   it	   serves	   as	   a	  
forum	  where	  one	  can	  question	  the	  status	  quo,	  it	  lacks	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  and	  where	  
there	   are	   few	   active	   participants.	   During	   UNCTAD’s	   rise,	   NIEO	   and	   the	   block	   structure	   of	  
UNCTAD	  were	  examples	  of	  this.	  
Ideas	   and	   institutional	   mechanisms	   discussed	   and	   agreed	   upon	   in	   UNCTAD	   can	   be	  
transferred	  to	  other	  forums	  where	  they	  can	  do	  “more	  harm”.	  For	  example,	   if	  something	   is	  
agreed	   upon	   in	   UNCTAD	   and	   becomes	   published	   as	   an	   “Official	   UN	   agreed	   text”	   this	   can	  
easily	  be	  transferred	  to	  another	  UN	  arena	  under	  the	  flag	  “coherence”.	  This	  is	  a	  strategy	  used	  
both	  by	   the	  North	  and	  South.	  Kellow	   (2012:340)	  viewed	   this	   strategy	   in	  a	  positive	   light	  as	  
entrepreneurial	  actors	  can	  use	  multiple	  arenas	  to	  promote	  policy	  goals	  and	  consensus,	  thus	  
                                                
25	  Interestingly	  enough,	  in	  GCD	  relating	  to	  Women’s	  rights	  (i.e.	  topic	  with	  a	  normative	  core)	  one	  has	  witnessed	  
crosscutting	  alliances	  between	  the	  blocks	  of	  the	  North	  and	  the	  South.	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creating	   a	   type	   of	   “coherence”	   in	   the	  messiness	   that	   prevails	   in	   different	   areas	   of	   global	  
governance	  (Kellow	  2012:340).	   In	   the	  case	  of	  UNCTAD,	  however,	   the	  cumulative	  cleavages	  
and	  multiple	  games	  serve	  to	  make	  the	  negotiations	  even	  more	  rigid.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  mistrust	  
and	  fear	  of	  contamination	  to	  other	  forums.	  	  
An	  example	  of	   an	  attempt	  at	   “contamination”	  was	   the	   concept	  of	   “emerging	  economies”.	  
Respondents	   from	   the	   South	   referred	   to	   Doha	   XIII	   where	   Brazil	   and	   China	   became	   very	  
active	   on	   this	   issue	   in	   UNCTAD.	   The	   BRICS	   countries	   are	   not	   afraid	   of	   being	   labeled	  
“emerging	   countries”	   in	   UNCTAD,	   but	   they	   are	   afraid	   that	   this	   term	  will	   spread	   to	   other	  
negotiations	   like	  the	  UNFCCC	  and	  WTO.	  If	  the	  concept	  was	  spread,	   it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  
they	  had	  to	  contribute	  more	  financially.	  One	  observer	  argues	  “Being	  a	  developing	  country	  or	  
a	   member	   of	   G77	   has	   a	   political	   importance	   in	   UNCTAD.	   In	   WTO	   it	   has	   an	   economic	  
importance	   -­‐	   it	   is	  better	   to	  be	  a	  developing	  country	  because	  you	  will	  get	  better	   treatment,	  
therefore	   countries	   will	   have	   economic	   incentives	   to	   be	   termed	   as	   ’developing’”	   (UNCTAD	  
staff,	   respondent	   H).	   Another	   respondent	   echoed	   this	   sentiment	   “China	   and	   Brazil	   are	  
playing	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  street.	  They	  are	  rich	  countries	  when	  they	  want	  to	  be,	  and	  poor	  
countries	  when	  they	  want	  to.	  They	  have	  an	  interest	  of	  staying	  in	  the	  G77”	  (NGO,	  Respondent	  
N).	  
Another	  respondent	  referred	  to	  the	  widespread	  perception	  that	  some	  of	  the	  BRICS	  countries	  
are	  often	  «hiding»	  behind	  the	  G77	  in	  situations	  where	  they	  could	  have	  assumed	  leadership	  
for	  more	  constructive	  solutions.	  The	  defensive	  position	  witnessed	  in	  UNCTAD	  XIII	  is	  another	  
way	  of	  saying	  “we	  will	  not	  take	  responsibility”	  and	  “we	  are	  not	  ready	  to	  take	  responsibility”	  
(Norwegian	   MFA,	   respondent	   A).	   This	   was	   considered	   to	   be	   a	   major	   challenge	   in	   the	  
multilateral	  arena.	  	  
6.2.4 Problem	  malignancy–	  Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  
The	  tentative	  conclusion	  based	  on	  secondary	  literature	  (in	  3.3.2)	  corresponds	  well	  with	  the	  
empirical	   accounts. Problem	   malignancy	   has	   changed	   character	   since	   UNCTAD’s	  
establishment.	   During	   UNCTAD’s	   rise	   there	   were	   negotiations	   dealing	   with	   concrete	  
problems;	  these	  negotiations	  exhibited	  the	  different	  components	  of	  malign	  problem.	  When	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the	  attempt	   to	  negotiate	   the	   regime	  of	  NIEO	   failed,	   the	  whole	   forum	  of	  UNCTAD	  changed	  
character.	  	  
Today	  UNCTAD’s	  negotiations	  deal	  with	  another	  problem,	  namely	  UNCTAD's	  own	  mandate.	  
Still,	   all	   the	   features	   of	   a	   malign	   problem	   are	   relevant.	   The	   main	   issue	   that	   makes	   the	  
problem	  malignant	  whittles	  down	  to	  who	  is	  responsible	  and	  who	  should	  pay	  for	  services	  and	  
projects	  targeting	  developing	  countries	  (cf.	  incongruity-­‐	  Agenda	  sprawling).	  The	  GCD	  process	  
in	   itself	   influences	   the	  malignancy	  by	   affecting	   the	  Asymmetry	   (through	   the	   group	   system	  
structure)	  and	  cumulative	  cleavages	  (thought	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  contamination	  scare).	  	  
6.3 Institutional	  capacity	  	  
“The	  group	  system	  is	  more	  conducive	  to	  confrontation	  than	  it	  is	  to	  serious	  negotiation,	  and	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  cohesion	  within	  groups	  often	  appears	  to	  take	  priority	  over	  the	  securing	  of	  concrete	  
results	  from	  negotiations	  between	  groups”	  (Walters	  1972:832)	  
“The	  UNCTAD	  formula”	  accepted	  the	  existence	  of	  coalition	  “blocs”	   in	  negotiations	  (Righter	  
1995:103).	  However,	   the	   formal	  division	  proposed	  by	  UNCTAD	  was	   four	   groups	   that	  were	  
divided	   in	   accordance	   with	   geographical	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   criteria.	   G77	   consisted	  
therefore	  of	  members	  from	  group	  A	  (African	  and	  Asian	  states	  and	  Yugoslavia)	  and	  C	  (Latin	  
American	   and	  Caribbean	   countries).	   The	  OECD	  membership	   coincided	  with	   the	   division	  of	  
the	   B	   group	   (the	   developed	   market-­‐economy	   countries),	   thus	   the	   B	   group	   answered	   the	  
demands	   from	   G77	   in	   a	   “collective	   fashion”	   (UNCTAD	   2006:9).	   Group	   D	   (the	   socialist	  
countries	  of	  Eastern	  Europe)	  would	  support	  the	  G77	  against	  the	  B	  group	  (ibid).	  The	  process	  
of	  block	  negotiations	  served	  to	  reinforce	  the	  members	  of	  each	  group	  of	  their	  own	  “common	  
understanding	  and	  diplomatic	  stance	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  groups”	  (ibid).	  
The	  G77	  block	  had	  a	  strong	  connection	  to	  the	  secretariat	  of	  UNCTAD.	  According	  to	  Walters	  
(1972:821)	  “the	  clearest	  manifestation	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  role	  as	  an	  interest	  articulator	  on	  behalf	  
of	   the	  LDC	  was	  the	  abandonment	  of	   the	  traditional	  concept	  of	  a	  neutral	  secretariat	   for	  an	  
international	   organization”.	   The	   biased	   secretariat	   was	   a	   rather	   unique	   organizational	  
feature	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  establishment,	  and	  a	  western	  diplomat	  uttered	  during	  an	  UNCTAD	  
negotiation	  that,	  “this	  is	  not	  a	  secretariat-­‐	  it’s	  a	  sectariat!”	  (ibid).	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With	  a	  biased	  secretariat	  and	  polarized	  positions	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  reach	  agreement	  between	  
the	  blocks,	  which	  is	  necessary	  when	  attempting	  to	  get	  concrete	  results.	  Phase	  3	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  
development,	   the	  1980’s,	  was	   characterized	   as	   the	   “lost	   decade	   for	   development”	   from	  a	  
UN	   perspective	   (UNCTAD	   2006:18).	   It	   was	   “arguably	   the	   lowest	   point	   in	   multilateral	  
economic	  diplomacy”	  (UNCTAD	  2006:19).	  Global	  conference	  diplomacy	  between	  the	  North	  
and	  South	  had	  reached	  a	  diplomatic	  deadlock	  and	  the	  UNCTAD	  secretariat	  admitted	  that:	  
	  "A	   perceptible	   loss	   of	   confidence	   occurred	   in	   UNCTAD's	   role	   as	   a	   facilitator	   of	  
consensus	   and	   conciliator	   of	   diverse	   views.	   Multilateral	   methods	   of	   dealing	   with	  
international	  trade	  and	  development	  problems	  were	  eroded	  and	  several	  countries	  began	  to	  
prefer	  a	  bilateral	  approach	  (UNCTAD	  1994)".	  	  
It	  was	  also	  in	  this	  phase	  that	  the	  decision	  rule	  in	  UNCTAD	  changed.	  The	  decision	  rule	  is	  the	  
most	   important	   determinant	   of	   institutional	   capacity	   to	   aggregate	   actor	   preferences	   into	  
collective	   decisions	   (Underdal	   2002:25).	   The	   function	   of	   a	   decision	   rule	   is	   to	   “stipulate	  
conditions	  that	  must	  be	  met	  in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  valid	  collective	  decisions	  or	  social	  choices	  
relating	   to	   issues	   falling	   within	   the	   competence	   of	   specific	   institutional	   arrangements”	  
(Breitmeier	  et	  al	  2006:114).	  The	  decision	  rule	  has	  changed	  from	  Most	  Favored	  Nation	  (MFN)	  
(pre-­‐UNCTAD),	   majority	   voting	   (militant	   phase	   of	   UNCTAD)	   to	   consensus	   (reformed	  
UNCTAD).	   One	   respondent	   from	   the	   South	   argues	   “the	   change	   in	   UNCTAD	   from	   being	   a	  
negotiation	   forum	   to	   becoming	   a	   consensus	   building	   forum	   corresponds	   very	   clearly	   and	  
cleanly	  with	  what	  was	   happening	   globally.	   That’s	   because	   you	   can’t	   ever	   detach	   anything	  
from	  its	  environment”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  Respondent	  I).	  	  	  
The	  decision	  procedure	  is	  very	  much	  linked	  to	  power.	  For	  example	  in	  UNFCCC	  one	  uses	  GCD	  
and	  consensus;	  “most	  developing	  and	  many	  small	  industrialized	  countries	  continue	  to	  prefer	  
consensus-­‐based	  global	  diplomacy.	  For	  major	  players,	  however,	  club-­‐like	  institutions	  such	  as	  
the	   G-­‐8	   and	   the	   G-­‐20	   are	   becoming	   increasingly	   important”	   (Underdal	   2012:6).	   Thus,	   the	  
support	  of	  the	  current	  GCD	  mechanisms	  for	  aggregating	  and	  integrating	  preferences	  “seems	  
to	  be	  strongest	  among	  its	  least	  powerful	  members”.	  This	  has	  also	  been	  the	  case	  within	  trade	  
and	  development	  diplomacy.	  WTO,	   IMF,	  WB,	  G-­‐20	   and	  G-­‐8	   are	   therefore	   institutions	   that	  
the	  powerful	  actors	  are	  most	  favorable	  to.	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According	   to	   UNCTAD’s	   mandate	   today	   one	   can	   still	   vote,	   but	   consensus	   is	   followed	   in	  
practice.	   Several	   respondents	   from	   the	   North	   told	   me	   that	   when	   there	   is	   a	   diplomatic	  
gridlock,	  the	  G77	  always	  starts	  discussing	  voting.	  According	  to	  a	  respondent	  from	  the	  South,	  
one	   discussed	   using	   a	  majority	   vote	   in	   UNCTAD	   XIII.	   The	   gridlock	   was	   due	   to	   the	   text	   to	  
“Reaffirm	  the	  Accra	  record”26.	  	  
	  Using	   voting	   would	   indirectly	   defeat	   UNCTAD’s	   purpose	   of	   being	   a	   consensus-­‐building	  
forum.	   One	   observer	   argues	   “There	   is	   no	   point	   of	   voting	   in	   UNCTAD,	   do	   you	   have	   votes	  
among	  the	  prisoners	   in	  a	  prison	  about	  how	  the	  prison	  should	  be	  managed?	  The	  developing	  
countries	  can	  vote	  all	  they	  like,	  they	  are	  not	  going	  to	  have	  a	  say.	  So	  there	  is	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  
developing	   countries	   in	   UNCTAD	   and	   they	   vote	   by	  majority	   that	   the	   US	   should	   contribute	  
twice	   as	   much	   as	   they	   are	   contributing?	   Voting	   doesn’t	   work	   in	   this	   setting!”	   (NGO,	  
respondent	   N).	   In	   other	   words,	   in	   a	   setting	   where	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   negative	   correlation	  
between	   power	   in	   the	   basic	   game	   power	   and	   power	   in	   the	   decision	   game,	   one	  may	   get	  
declarations	  and	  “results	  on	  paper”,	  but	  little	  will	  lead	  to	  substantive	  changes	  in	  practice	  and	  
behavior.	  	  
In	   connection	  with	  problem	  malignancy,	  Underdal	   (2002:28)	  postulates:	   “the	  more	  malign	  
the	  substantive	  issues	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  a	  particular	  institution,	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  will	  be	  
to	   reach	   agreement	   about	   the	   shape	   of	   that	   institution	   and	   the	   weaker	   and	   more	  
constrained	  it	  is	  likely	  to	  be”.	  This	  sums	  up	  what	  has	  happened	  in	  UNCTAD	  over	  the	  years.	  	  
There	   was	   one	   observer	   who	   criticized	   the	   role	   of	   UNCTAD	   as	   an	   actor	   and	   UNCTAD´s	  
institutional	   design.	   “It	  would	   have	   been	  much	   easier	   to	   find	   a	   consensus	   if	   the	   coalitions	  
weren’t	  so	  damned	  polarized,	  and	  they	  are	  polarized	  in	  part	  because	  UNCTAD	  doesn’t	  do	  its	  
job	   in	   finding	   the	  middle	   ground.	   UNCTAD	   still	   sees	   its	   role	   as	   the	   spokesperson	   of	   G77”.	  
(NGO,	  respondent	  N).	  However,	  others	  argue	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  conferences	  cannot	  be	  
blamed	   on	   the	   secretariat;	   it	   is	   the	   member	   states	   that	   are	   responsible	   (Briggs	   in	   CUTS	  
                                                
26	  The	  respondent	  argued	  “the	  developing	  countries	  wanted	  to	  reconfirm	  the	  Accra	  record,	  because	  it	  is	  a	  
broader	  mandate,	  while	  the	  B-­‐group	  wanted	  a	  mention	  of	  the	  Joint	  Inspection	  Unit	  (JIU)	  report.	  So	  instead	  of	  a	  
majority	  vote,	  we	  ended	  up	  with	  a	  tradeoff;	  we	  mentioned	  the	  JIU	  report	  and	  we	  reconfirmed	  Accra”	  (MIC,	  
respondent	  O).	  	  JIU	  conducted	  an	  evaluation	  where	  it	  reviewed	  the	  management	  and	  administration	  in	  
UNCTAD	  in	  2012.	  It	  was	  very	  critical	  and	  became	  a	  salient	  topic	  in	  UNCTAD	  XIII.	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2012:16-­‐17).	   “The	   Secretariat	   will	   behave	   as	   the	   way	   the	   Masters	   would	   want	   them	   to”	  
(Bhaumik	  in	  Cuts	  2012:33).	  	  	  
Another	  critique	  was	  voiced	  by	  an	  expert	  who	  believed	  that	  UNCTAD	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  find	  
topics	  where	   there	  was	   enough	   ‘common	   ground’	   before	   the	   initiation	   of	   the	   conference	  
began.	  Thus,	  when	  the	  “specific	  function	  of	  the	  forum”	  was	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  North,	   it	  
became	   more	   difficult	   to	   agree	   upon	   the	   institutional	   rules	   of	   the	   game.	   Expert	   Lunde	  
argues,	  “A	  lesson	  learnt	  from	  the	  UNCTAD	  experience	  is	  that	  one	  needs	  a	  broader	  consensus	  
concerning	  the	  main	  philosophy	  of	  the	  conference	  and	  established	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  on	  how	  
one	  can	  reach	  agreement.	  This	  was	  lacking	  in	  the	  NIEO	  campaign	  in	  UNCTAD’s	  rise”.	  	  
6.3.1 Institutional capacity–	  Summary	  and	  Conclusions 
The	   tentative	   conclusion	   based	   on	   secondary	   literature	   (in	   3.3.3)	   corresponds	   to	   the	  
respondents’	  statements.	  Yet,	  the	  empirical	  accounts	  serve	  to	  nuance	  this	  conclusion.	  During	  
its	   rise,	  UNCTAD	  had	  a	  strong	  biased	  secretariat	  coupled	  with	  a	  strong	  decision	  procedure	  
with	  majority	  voting.	  A	  cohesive	  South	  coalition	  situated	  in	  a	  historical	  context	  of	  ideological	  
unity	   profited	   from	   this	   institutional	   setting,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   decision	   game.	   UNCTAD	   had	  
several	  declaratory	  resolutions.	  This	  served	  to	  boost	  UNCTAD	  during	  the	  rise.	  However,	  this	  
did	  not	  last.	  When	  there	  was	  an	  absence	  of	  concrete	  results	  and	  lack	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  basic	  
game,	  the	  secretariat	  of	  UNCTAD	  was	  pushed	  from	  being	  an	  aggregator	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  G77	  
to	   become	   a	   facilitator	   for	   consensus-­‐building.	   This	   conveys	   how	   the	   decision	   procedures	  
and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  secretariat	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  international	  political	  climate	  and	  by	  the	  
power	  distribution	  among	  the	  players	  (i.e.	  correlation	  between	  institutional	  capacity	  (X₃)	  and	  
Power	   (X₄)).	  The	  most	  powerful	  actors	  will	  always	   try	   to	  alter	   the	  decision-­‐making	   rules	   in	  
the	  decision	  game	  so	  they	  can	  enhance	  their	  influence.	  	  
It	   also	   becomes	   clear	   that	   GCD	   approach	   and	   coalitions	   structure	   have	   some	   inherent	  
weaknesses;	  negotiations	  in	  plenary	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  succeed	  because	  the	  lead	  negotiator	  of	  
G77	  must	  attempt	   to	   represent	  and	  satisfy	  all	  his	  constituents.	  The	  possibility	   for	  a	  break-­‐
through	  outside	   the	  plenary	  becomes	  difficult	  when	   fewer	  diplomats	  are	   sent.	   It	  does	  not	  
help	  when	  the	   few	  diplomats	  who	  are	   left	  are	  attending	  various	  side-­‐events,	  which	   leaves	  
less	  room	  for	  private	  and	  informal	  talk	  among	  diplomats.	  One	  respondent	  argued	  “this	  trend	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will	   ruin	   multilateralism	   and	   widen	   the	   North-­‐	   South	   gap	   […]	   they	   don’t	   realize	   that	  
negotiations	  go	  beyond	  the	  negotiation	  room”.	  	  
6.4 Power	  	  
Power	   is	   included	   in	   this	   thesis	  since	   it	   is	   such	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  negotiating	  and	  a	  good	  
explanatory	   factor	   in	   describing	   the	   different	   outcomes	   of	   negotiations.	   This	   thesis	   uses	  
different	  perceptions	  of	  power	  to	  be	  able	  to	  capture	  the	  broader	  image.	  This	  section	  will	  be	  
divided	  into	  (1)	  basic	  game	  power	  versus	  power	  in	  the	  decision	  game	  (2)	  productive	  power	  
and	  (3)	  intra	  block	  power.	  
6.4.1 Power	  in	  the	  Basic	  game	  versus	  Power	  in	  the	  Decision	  game	  
One	  salient	  feature	  is	  that	  there	  is	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  power	  distribution	  in	  the	  negotiations	  
in	  UNCTAD	  (the	  decision	  game),	  coupled	  with	  asymmetric	  power	  distribution	  in	  the	  world	  as	  
such	   (basic	   game).	   When	   the	   two	   games	   are	   incongruent	   it	   complicates	   the	   negotiation	  
process	   and	   “is	   likely	   to	   be	   a	   good	   indicator	   for	   trouble”	   (Underdal	   2002:31).	   This	   was	  
confirmed	  by	  respondents	  from	  the	  South	  and	  North.	  
This	  distinctive	  feature	  of	  UNCTAD	  has	  also	  been	  captured	  by	  theoreticians	  like	  Gosovic	  who	  
wrote	  that	  “the	  peculiarity	  of	  decision	  making	  in	  UNCTAD,	  compared	  to	  other	  international	  
organizations,	  derives	  from	  the	  polarization	  between	  developed	  and	  developing	  states,	  and	  
the	  disparity	  in	  economic	  and	  bargaining	  power	  between	  the	  two	  sides”	  (Gosovic	  1972:269).	  
This	  was	  an	  interesting	  feature	  of	  the	  early	  period	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  history	  that	  even	  UNCTAD’s	  
own	  SG	  Ricupero	  noted	  in	  an	  official	  UNCTAD	  paper	  (UNCTAD	  2004:xii).	  The	  North	  had	  the	  
most	   basic	   game	   power;	   however	   they	   accepted	   that	   the	   international	   organizations	  
distributed	   the	   voting	   power	   equally	   among	   all	   members	   (Krasner	   1981:140).	   This	   is	   a	  
fundamental	  rule	  of	  conduct	  between	  states	  which	  the	  UN	  is	  built	  upon.	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  
UN	  is	  the	  global	  legitimacy	  that	  follows	  the	  rule	  that	  small	  and	  big	  countries	  have	  the	  same	  
rights.	  According	   to	  Krasner	   (ibid)	   the	  North	  did	  not	  clearly	  see	  at	   the	   time	  that	  “an	  equal	  
division	  of	  votes	  opened	  the	  opportunity	   for	  weaker	  states	  to	  enhance	  their	   influence	  and	  
control	   within	   these	   institutions”	   (ibid).	   Hence,	   weak	   states	   could	   never	   have	   had	   an	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influence	  on	  international	  behavior	  “solely	  through	  their	  utilization	  of	  their	  national	  power	  
capabilities”.	  When	   treated	   as	   equals	  within	   the	  UN-­‐system	   ‘restructuring	   the	   current	   the	  
international	  order’	  became	  an	  attractive	  foreign	  policy	  strategy	  for	  weak	  countries	  (ibid).	  In	  
other	   words,	   the	   third	   world	   countries	   attempted	   to	   turn	   the	   institutions	   against	   their	  
creators	  (Krasner	  1981:120-­‐121).	  By	  using	  majority	  voting	  in	  UNGA,	  the	  developing	  countries	  
managed	  to	  create	  UNCTAD	  against	  the	  developed	  countries’	  will.	  	  
There	  were	  external	  events	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  rise	  where	  players	  within	  the	  G77	  managed	  to	  
influence	  the	  basic	  game	  and	  which	  encouraged	  G77’s	  quest	  of	  NIEO.	  	  The	  Oil	  shock	  in	  1973	  
was	   a	   power	   demonstration	   that	   fuelled	   the	   belief	   in	   commodity	   power,	   which	   further	  
fuelled	   the	   belief	   in	   UNCTAD	   as	   an	   instrument	   to	   change	   the	   economic	   structures	   (see	  
section	  5.1.5).	  
“The	  North	  has	  a	  few	  tricks	  up	  its	  sleeve”	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  North	  is	  not	  powerless.	  Powerful	  members	  can	  obtain	  the	  results	  to	  their	  
liking	   by	   controlling	   the	   negotiation	   process.	   For	   example,	   the	   developed	   countries	   have	  
resources	   and	   can	   therefore	   influence	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   strong	   or	   weak	   leader	   of	   an	  
organization.	   This	   is	   done	   by	   negotiating	   “package	   deals”.	   One	   observer	   claims,	   “The	   rich	  
countries	  want	  UNCTAD	   to	   have	  a	  weak	   leader	   so	   that	  UNCTAD	  doesn’t	   bother	   them;	   the	  
developing	   countries	   are	   into	   the	   game	   relating	   it	   to	   other	   UN	   leadership	   positions.	   They	  
don’t	   care	   if	   the	   leader	   is	   deaf,	  mute	   or	   retarded	   as	   long	   as	   it	   is	   the	   right	   person	   from	   a	  
political	   point	   of	   view”	   (NGO,	  Respondent	  N).	   Some	   respondents	   argue	   that	   this	   has	   even	  
been	  a	  political	  strategy	  used	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  post	  of	  the	  UN	  Secretary	  General.	  
The	  respondents	  also	  mentioned	  underfunding	  as	  a	  strategy	  used	  by	  the	  North	  to	  reduce	  the	  
organization’s	   capacity	   to	   enter	   sensitive	   and	   political	   areas	   or	   begin	   ambitious	   projects.	  
Kellow	  (2012:336)	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  diplomatic	  strategy	  of	  using	  of	  “voluntary	  budgetary	  
contributions	  to	  shape	  agendas”	  has	  received	   little	  attention	   in	  scholarly	   literature.	  As	  one	  
observer	   stressed	   “The	  EU	  and	   JUSCANZ	  both	  play	   their	  games	  with	   these	  organizations.	   I	  
think	  the	  US	  would	  rather	  see	  UNCTAD	  go	  away,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  going	  to	  go	  away,	  so	  they	  keep	  
it	  as	  weak	  and	  underfunded	  as	  possible,	  and	  prevent	   it	   from	  going	   into	  any	  areas	   that	  are	  
sensitive”	   (NGO,	   Respondent	   N).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   is	   broad	   agreement	   among	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member	  countries	  in	  the	  North	  who	  believe	  that	  UNCTAD	  has	  a	  very	  big	  budget	  compared	  to	  
its	  task	  and	  compared	  to	  other	  organizations.	  	  
These	  examples	  convey	  “votes	  count,	  but	  resources	  decide”	  (Rokkan	  1975).	  This	  underlines	  
how	   diplomatic	   games	   do	   confirm	   the	   power	   balance.	   Another	   perspective	   within	   the	  
negotiation	   literature	   is	  that	  “the	  very	  act	  of	  negotiating	  has	  the	  real	  effect	  of	   leveling	  the	  
playing	   field,	   producing	   at	   least	   rough	   symmetry”	   (Zartman	   and	   Rubin	   2002:4).	   One	  
respondent	  argues,	  “Negotiations	  are	  about	  reaching	  equilibrium.	  You	  have	  core	  objectives	  
and	   then	   you	   have	   objectives	   that	   you	   can	   afford	   to	   trade	   off,	   internally	   and	   externally”	  
(UNCTAD	  staff,	  former	  lead	  negotiator	  of	  G77,	  Respondent	  I).	  The	  most	  important	  thing	  is	  to	  
remember	  that	  “diplomacy	  is	  about	  people”	  he	  said	  (ibid).	  Therefore	  power	  is	  important,	  but	  
when	  negotiating	  there	  is	  still	  just	  ‘people	  sitting	  in	  a	  room’	  bargaining	  and	  doing	  trade-­‐offs.	  
This	  was	  also	  echoed	  by	  a	  respondent	  from	  the	  North	  who	  stated	  that	  “There	  is	  no	  power	  in	  
the	  negotiations,	  as	  they	  are	  being	  dominated	  by	  big	  blocks”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent	  
S).	  
Basic	  game	  power	  has	  changed-­‐	  yet	  the	  decision	  game	  power	  is	  the	  same	  
In	  relation	  to	  basic	  game	  power	  one	  observer	  noted	  how	  the	  current	   international	  climate	  
has	   changed:	   “Before,	   the	   negotiations	   in	   UNCTAD	   were	   between	   the	   rich	   (western	   ship-­‐
owners)	  and	  the	  poor	  (commodity	  producers	  and	  exporters	  in	  the	  South).	  Now	  there	  are	  no	  
longer	  the	  same	  gaps	  between	  who	  is	  rich	  and	  poor	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  you	  have	  no	  defined	  
groups	  anymore”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  respondent	  L).	  The	  observer	  further	  argues	  that	  change	  in	  
the	   basic	   game	  must	   be	   reflected	   in	   the	   negotiation	   arena.	   “In	   the	  WTO	  Doha	   round	   the	  
countries	  had	  a	  certain	  picture	  in	  mind	  of	  what	  the	  world	  is	  like,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  
reality.	  Today	  trade	  goes	  across	  the	  board”	  he	  says	  (ibid)27.	  
Righter	   (1995:95)	   argues	   the	  negotiations	   and	   coalitions	   today	   still	   reflect	  what	   the	  world	  
looked	   like	   in	   the	   1960’s	   and	   this	   is	   because	   there	   was	   something	   more	   than	   material	  
interests	   that	   held	   the	  developing	   countries	   together,	   a	   type	  of	   solidarity.	   The	  developing	  
                                                
27	  HDR	  (2013b:2)	  notes	  ”between	  1980	  and	  2010,	  Developing	  countries	  increased	  their	  share	  of	  world	  
merchandise	  trade	  from	  25%	  to	  47%	  and	  their	  share	  of	  world	  output	  from	  33%	  to	  45%.	  Developing	  regions	  
have	  also	  been	  strengthening	  links	  with	  each	  other:	  between	  1980	  and	  2011,	  South–South	  trade	  increased	  
from	  less	  than	  8%	  of	  world	  merchandise	  trade	  to	  more	  than	  26%”.	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countries	   common	   position	   had	   roots	   in	   the	   ideological	   atmosphere	   of	   UNCTAD	   in	   the	  
1960’s	  and	  1970’s,	  namely	  the	  NIEO	  ideology	  and	  the	  anticolonial	  symbolism.	  The	  common	  
positions	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  “were	  not	  bargaining	  positions	   in	  the	  western	  sense;	  
they	   were	   not	   “tradables”.	   They	   were	   articles	   of	   faith”	   (Righter	   1995:95).	   Righter	   (ibid)	  
argues	   that	   the	   ideological	   coalition	   served	   to	  politicize	  UN	  negotiations	  because	   “success	  
was	  not	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  agreements	  reached	  or	  missed,	  because	  agreement	  was	  not	  in	  
the	  end	   the	  name	  of	   the	  game”.	   In	  other	  words,	   “the	  posture	  of	   confrontation	  was	  more	  
important	  than	  any	  concrete	  gains	  that	  might	  accrue	  from	  compromise”	  (ibid).	  How	  can	  one	  
capture	   and	   explain	   this	   type	   of	   ideological	   bond?	   This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   “productive	  
power”	  is	  a	  necessary	  theoretical	  tool	  to	  explain	  this.	  
6.4.2 Productive	  power	  
The	  concept	  of	  productive	  power	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  socially	  diffuse	  production	  of	  subjectivity	  
in	   systems	   of	   meaning	   and	   significance”	   (Barnett	   and	   Duvall	   2005:43).	   In	   other	   words,	  
productive	  power	  is	  attentive	  to	  how	  social	  processes	  affect	  an	  actor’s	  system	  of	  knowledge	  
and	  beliefs.	  Through	  social	  processes	  actors’	   “self-­‐	  understanding	  and	  perceived	   interests”	  
are	   shaped	   (Barnett	   and	   Duvall	   2005:55).	   An	   example	   can	   be	   the	   concepts	   that	   my	  
respondents	   from	   the	   South	   used	   to	   describe	   the	   B-­‐group;	   “the	  West”,	   “the	  North”,	   “the	  
industrialized	  economies”,	  “the	  rich	  countries”	  and	  “the	  developed”.	  All	  these	  categories	  of	  
classification	   represent	   productive	   power	   “as	   they	   generate	   asymmetries	   of	   social	  
capacities”	  (Barnett	  and	  Duvall	  2005:56).	  This	  basic	  categorization	  indirectly	  says	  something	  
about	   “the	   other”,	   namely	   that	   the	   other	   countries	   are	   therefore:	   “the	   South”,	   “the	   non-­‐
industrialized	  economies”,	  “the	  poor	  countries”	  and	  “the	  developing	  countries”.	  	  
Barnett	   and	   Duvall	   (2005:39)	   argue	   that	   disciplinary	   discussions	   in	   international	   relations	  
tend	  to	  privilege	  and	  focus	  on	  a	  realist	  perception	  of	  power:	  “An	  actor	  controlling	  another	  to	  
do	  what	  the	  other	  wouldn’t	  otherwise	  do”	  (ibid).	  This	  perception	  of	  power	  does	  not	  capture	  
a	  type	  of	  power	  which	  produces,	  through	  social	  relations,	  “effects	  that	  shape	  the	  capacities	  
of	  actors	  to	  determine	  their	  circumstance	  and	  fate”	  (ibid).	  	  
The	  G77	  was	  created	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  decolonization	  and	  liberation	  movements.	  Many	  of	  the	  
third	   world	   countries	   were	   strongly	   inspired	   by	   the	   communist	   state-­‐model	   with	   central	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management	  and	  political	  control	  over	  the	  economy.	  It	  was	  these	  types	  of	  movements	  and	  
ideological	   ideas	  that	   influenced	  the	  coalition.	  The	  cohesion	  of	  the	  grand	  coalition	  of	  77	   in	  
UNCTAD	   I	   was	   “seen	   by	   all	   western	   delegates	   as	   perhaps	   the	   most	   significant	   political	  
phenomenon	  of	  the	   last	  20	  years”	  (The	  Observer	  1964	  cited	   in	  Walters	  1971:824).	  Krasner	  
(1985)	   argued	   that	   the	   cohesiveness	   and	   unity	   of	   developing	   countries	  was	   a	   “product	   of	  
their	  objective	  situation	  and	  subjective	  self-­‐understanding”	  (cited	  in	  Keohane	  and	  Underdal	  
2011:55).	  This	  political	  energy	  and	  cohesiveness	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  generated	  by	  a	  “rare	  
combination	  of	  dissatisfaction	  and	  self-­‐confidence”	  (Keohane	  and	  Underdal	  2011:55).	  	  
This	  cohesion	  is	  still	  relevant	  today.	  When	  I	  asked	  a	  LDC	  respondent	  why	  they	  stayed	  in	  G77	  
when	  they	  knew	  they	  would	  get	  more	  resources	  and	  support	  from	  the	  B-­‐group	  outside	  the	  
broad	  coalition	  he	  argued,	  “The	  reason	  why	  the	  LDC	  is	  a	  part	  of	  G77,	  is	  based	  on	  ideological	  
solidarity	  and	  commitment	  that	  was	  established	  in	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s”	  (LDC,	  Respondent	  P).	  
This	   statement	   conveys	   that	   interests	   are	   not	   the	   only	   decisive	   factor	   in	  maintaining	   the	  
unity,	  because	  there	  is	  something	  ‘more’	  that	  characterizes	  this	  coalition.	  	  
Productive	  power	  underlines	   that	  actions	  are	  not	  only	   shaped	  by	   interests	  and	   intentions.	  
No	  one	  could	  predict	  and	  foresee	  what	  would	  happen	  and	  how	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  G77	  would	  
develop	  over	   time.	   Both	  UNCTAD	  and	   the	  G77	  have	   gone	   through	   an	   evolution	   and	  been	  
influenced	  by	  various	  actors	  and	   ideologies.	  This	  has	  also	  shaped,	  and	  been	   influenced	  by,	  
the	  connection	  to	  the	  B-­‐group.	  Righter	  (1995:96)	  argues	  that	  the	  West	  did	  not	  understand	  
the	   nature	   of	   the	   third	   world	   challenge.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   B-­‐group	   did	   not	   have	   an	  
overview	  or	  proper	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  G77	  and	  UNCTAD	  would	  
do	  to	  the	  multilateral	  system.	  What	  I	  am	  attempting	  to	  argue	  through	  the	  use	  of	  productive	  
power	  is	  that	  neither	  did	  the	  members	  of	  the	  G77	  coalition	  or	  UNCTAD.	  The	  North-­‐South	  rift	  
has	  grown	  strong	  over	  time	  without	  anyone	  having	  an	  overview	  beforehand	  of	  its	  becoming,	  
its	  expansion	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  multilateral	  negotiations	  (Jensen	  2010:200).	  The	  intention	  
and	  overview	  of	  this	  evolution	  can	  at	  best	  be	  described	  as	  “chaotic,	  or	  most	   likely	  absent”	  
(ibid).	  Some	  processes	  are	  so	  complicated	  and	  fragmented	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  
mere	   intentions	  and	   interests;	  there	   is	  an	  element	  of	  unpredictability.	  This	  unpredictability	  
has	   influenced	   and	   made	   possible	   the	   rise	   and	   fall	   of	   UNCTAD	   (plausible	   scenarios	   for	  




Productive	   power	   captures	   the	   “developed”	   and	   “developing”	   countries’	   subjective	   self-­‐
understanding	  and	  explains	  how	  the	  developing	  countries	  managed	   to	  become	  a	  cohesive	  
alignment.	  There	  are	  other	  academics	  who	  have	  attempted	  to	  explain	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  South.	  
Stephen	   Krasner	   is	   one	   of	   them	   and	   he	   has	   a	   neo-­‐realist	   approach.	   In	   his	   essay	  
“Transforming	   International	  Regimes:	  What	   the	  Third	  World	  Wants	  and	  Why”	  he	   specifies	  
that	  the	  unity	  was	  caused	  by	  a	  “widespread	  acceptance	  of	  a	  belief	  system	  embodying	  some	  
of	  the	  precepts	  of	  dependency	  perspectives”	  (Krasner	  1981:119).	  
When	   UNCTAD	   was	   established,	   a	   certain	   belief	   system	   was	   prominent.	   Namely,	   that	  
underdevelopment	   in	   developing	   countries	   could	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   ‘workings	   of	   the	  
international	   economic	   system	   rather	   than	   the	   indigenous	   characteristics	   of	   their	   own	  
societies’	   (Krasner	   1981:143).	   This	   belief	   system,	   according	   to	   Krasner,	   was	   “explicitly	  
accepted	   arguments”	   amongst	   most	   developing	   countries.	   The	   belief	   system	   was	   also	  
endorsed	  by	  “international	  organizations	  close	  to	  the	  Third	  World,	  such	  as	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  
UNDP,	   as	   well	   as	   by	   important	   groups	   with	   claims	   to	   speak	   for	   the	   North	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
South”	  (ibid).	  Even	  though	  individual	  states	  rejected	  ‘radical’	  dependency	  theories,	  they	  still	  
lacked	   “a	  belief	   system	   to	  offer	   in	   its	   stead”	   (ibid).	  One	   can	  argue	   that	   through	   the	  belief	  
systems	  one	  managed	  to	  assign	  guilt,	  which	  affected	  the	  concept	  of	  burden	  sharing	   in	   the	  
multilateral	   system.	   At	   the	   global	   or	   international	   level,	   the	   Dependencia	   belief	   set	  
“provided	  a	  unifying	   rationale	   for	  disparate	  Southern	  demands”	   (ibid).	  NIEO	  also	   triggered	  
the	  debate	  about	  the	  “real	  and	  desirable	  structure	  of	  world	  economic	  relations”	  as	  well	  as	  
challenging	  “the	   intellectual	  hegemony	  of	   liberal	  economics	  and	   its	  claims	  to	  “rationality””	  
(Cox	  1979:259).	  	  
One	  expert	  claimed	  that	  the	  G77	  and	  UNCTAD	  managed	  to	  influence	  the	  belief	  systems,	  but	  
that	  the	  developed	  countries	  were	  not	  ‘overthrown’.	  The	  developed	  countries	  let	  it	  happen:	  
“It	  was	  easy	  to	  play	  along	  as	  there	  was	  a	  wave	  of	  colonial	  guilt	  in	  a	  time	  where	  developing	  
countries	  were	   repairing	   from	   the	  damages.	   Therefore	   the	  western	   countries	   accepted	   the	  
premises	  for	  UNCTAD;	  however	  they	  viewed	  the	  NIEO	  agenda	  as	  rather	  harmless.	  They	  knew	  
the	   US	   would	   never	   agree	   to	   a	   global	   plan-­‐economic-­‐	   arrangement”	   (Expert	   Lunde).	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However,	   the	   “third	   World’s	   great	   upheavals”	   altered	   the	   political	   map	   and	   had	   great	  
consequences	  for	  the	  UN	  system	  (Righter	  1995:96).	  	  
Altering	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  
GCD	  “calls	  for	  special	  and	  differential	  treatment”	  for	  developing	  countries.	  This	  was	  justified	  
by	  the	  “contention	  that	  the	  South	  has	  been	  treated	  unjustly	  in	  the	  past”	  (Krasner	  1981:143).	  
The	   ‘Dependencia’	   theories	   and	   a	   coherent	   intellectual	   orientation	   were	   “particularly	  
important	   because	   of	   the	   strategy	   of	   using	   international	   organizations	   to	   promote	  meta-­‐
political	  goals”	  (ibid).	  Krasner’s	  concept	  of	  meta-­‐political	  goals	  is	  the	  ability	  “to	  structure	  the	  
environment	   within	   which	   decisions	   are	   made”	   (Krasner	   1981:122).	   This	   can	   be	   done	   by	  
defining	   issues	   and	   controlling	   the	   agenda,	   something	   the	   G77	  managed	   to	   do	   in	   several	  
multilateral	  forums.	  For	  example,	  the	  G77	  managed	  to	  (1)	  build	  an	  institution	  like	  UNCTAD,	  
(2)	  pick	  a	  strong	  and	  radical	  leader,	  Prebisch,	  (3)	  design	  “rules,	  principles,	  and	  norms”	  which	  
coincided	  with	  their	  own	  interests.	  These	  are	  all	  good	  examples	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  “alter	  the	  
rules	   of	   the	   game”	   (ibid).	   These	   strategies	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   diplomatic	   strategies	   many	  
respondents	   claimed	   that	   the	   North	   uses	   today	   in	   UNCTAD	   (see	   section	   6.4.1).	   Krasner	  
would	  therefore	  argue	  that	  the	  creation	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  UNCTAD	  was	  driven	  by	  interest	  and	  
therefore	  a	  part	  of	  the	  “Third	  World	  efforts	  to	  enhance	  power	  through	  the	  transformation	  
and	  construction	  of	  international	  regimes”	  (Krasner	  1981:122).	  
	  	   Many	   of	   my	   respondents	   echoed	   the	   ‘belief	   system’	   that	   was	   preeminent	   when	  
UNCTAD	  was	   established.	   One	   respondent	   from	   the	   South	   argues	   that	   “conditions	   of	   the	  
past	  are	  still	  relevant	  today,	  and	  though	  some	  things	  may	  have	  changed	  there	  are	  underlying	  
conditions	  that	  still	  are	  the	  same”	  (Think	  tank,	  respondent	  D).	  One	  observer,	  however,	  was	  
aware	   of	   the	   different	   ‘belief	   systems’.	   The	   observer	   argues	   that	   there	   are	   two	   ways	   to	  
relate	   to	   the	   colonial	   history:	   “(1)	  Underdevelopment	   is	   all	   the	   fault	   of	   the	   colonizers	   and	  
now	  they	  should	  pay	  for	  everything	  they	  did	  to	  us”.	  “This	  has	  a	  rationale,	  but	  you	  may	  not	  
live	  on	  this	  belief	  forever”.	  The	  second	  perspective	  was	  “We	  have	  to	   let	  go	  of	  the	  past	  and	  
start	  acting	  for	  ourselves	  and	  not	  just	  wait	  for	  help”	  (UNCTAD	  staff,	  respondent	  H).	  This	  last	  
perspective	  does	  not	  defy	  the	  belief	  that	  “underdevelopment	   is	  caused	  by	  the	  workings	  of	  
the	  international	  economic	  structure”,	  but	  it	  changes	  the	  way	  one	  should	  relate	  to	  the	  past.	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6.4.3 Intra	  block	  Power	  in	  the	  negotiations	  
My	  respondents	  remarked	  on	  how	  intra	  block	  power	  within	  the	  G77	  had	  changed	  over	  time.	  
One	  respondent	  from	  the	  North	  argued	  that	  the	  Middle-­‐Income	  countries	  traditionally	  have	  
had	  a	  fairly	  dominating	  influence	  in	  UNCTAD,	  through	  countries	  like	  Sri	  Lanka,	  India,	  Pakistan	  
and	  many	  Latin-­‐American	  countries:	  “It	  was	  a	  striking	  feature	  in	  my	  time,	  and	  the	  LDC	  were	  
generally	   dissatisfied	  with	   the	   priorities	   given	   by	   UNCTAD	   to	   their	   special	   concerns.	   If	   the	  
emerging	  economies	  	  -­‐	  with	  their	  rapidly	  rising	  influence	  in	  the	  world	  economy	  -­‐	  are	  willing	  to	  
give	   real	   priority	   to	   UNCTAD	   in	   the	   years	   to	   come,	   this	   could	   possibly	   give	   new	   life	   and	  
meaning	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  organization”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent	  A).	  
However,	  the	  BRICS	  countries	  have	  not	  taken	  any	  formal	  or	  informal	  leadership	  in	  UNCTAD	  
or	  the	  coalition	  of	  G77.	  Keohane	  and	  Underdal	  (2011:55)	  argue	  that	  “informal	  leadership”	  is	  
necessary	  in	  a	  broad	  alignment.	  However,	  G77	  was	  characterized	  in	  1972	  by	  “the	  absence	  of	  
leadership	   by	   a	   big	   power”	   (Gosovic	   1972:271).	   The	   literature	   has	   not	   focused	   on	   which	  
countries	   that	   take	   a	   leading	   role	   within	   the	   coalitions.	   However,	   from	   my	   fieldwork	   it	  
became	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  actors	  within	  the	  G77	  and	  the	  B-­‐group	  that	  have	  an	  agenda	  for	  
being	  active	  and	  vocal,	  or	  to	  tactically	  keep	  a	  low	  profile.	  	  
Extreme	  actors	  exploiting	  the	  coalition	  structure	  
One	   respondent	   from	   the	  North	  who	  has	  been	   involved	   in	  UNCTAD	   for	   the	   last	   few	  years	  
states	  that	  “the	  G77	  and	  China	  have	  extreme	  actors	  as	  spokesmen.	  Among	  the	  most	  active	  
countries	   you	   find	   Zimbabwe,	   Cuba,	   Iran	   and	   China.	   These	   states	   are	   the	   political	   driving	  
force	   behind	  much	   of	   the	   discussion.	   The	   rest	   of	   the	  G77	   does	   not	   say	  much”	   (Norwegian	  
MFA,	  respondent	  S).	  	  
The	   respondent	   argues	   that	   this	   is	   not	   only	   restricted	   to	   the	   forum	  of	  UNCTAD,	   but	   is	   “a	  
general	  phenomenon	  that	  we	  see	  throughout	  the	  UN	  system	  when	  we	  engage	  the	  South	  in	  
discussions”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  respondent	  S).	  This	  was	  echoed	  by	  another	  respondent	  from	  
the	  North	  who	  stressed	  “there	  are	  many	  examples	  within	  UNCTAD	  where	  the	  formal	  position	  
of	  developing	  countries	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  the	  more	  radical	  forces	  and	  that	  UN	  bodies	  
have	  been	  used	  as	  an	  arena	   for	  posturing	  and	  profiling	  of	   extreme	  positions	  and	  of	  group	  
interests”	   (Norwegian	  MFA,	   respondent	   A).	   He	   argued,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   that	   in	   recent	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years	   there	   are	   more	   examples	   of	   diversification	   of	   interests	   between	   the	   developing	  
countries,	  and	  that	  other	  groups	  –	   including	  regional	  groups	  –	  seek	  closer	  cooperation.	  He	  
hoped	   this	   “could	  make	   it	   easier	   to	   establish	   alliances	   across	   the	   different	   groups	   to	   find	  
concrete	  solutions”	  (ibid).	  	  
A	  respondent	  from	  the	  South	  underlines	  a	  different	  perspective	  that	  he	  acquired	  after	  the	  
UNCTAD	  XIII	   conference.	   “The	  main	   lesson	   I	   can	  extract	   from	   this	   process	   is	   that	   you	  only	  
have	  a	  few	  active	  participants.	   It	  doesn’t	  matter	  if	  you	  are	  a	  big	  country	  or	  have	  a	  stake	  in	  
the	  issue	  discussed,	  what	  matters	  is	  that	  you	  have	  the	  time	  and	  ability	  to	  push	  for	  your	  idea.	  
Then	   it	   is	   very	   likely	   that	   you	  will	  manage	   to	   achieve	   some	   of	   your	   objectives	   in	   the	   end”	  
(MIC,	   respondent	   O).	   This	   statement	   supports	   the	   argument	   in	   the	   literature	   that	  
negotiations	  “level	  the	  playing	  field”.	  	  
The	  power	  vacuum	  within	  UNCTAD	  is	  most	  likely	  caused	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  little	  significance	  is	  
attached	   to	   UNCTAD	   as	   a	   forum.	   This,	   however,	   makes	   the	   forum	   very	   vulnerable	   to	  
‘extreme	  actors’.	  For	  example,	   Iran	  has	  been	  an	  active	  and	  vocal	  participant	   in	  UNCTAD.	  A	  
Respondent	  from	  the	  South	  told	  me	  about	  Iran’s	  involvement;	  he	  argues,	  “I	  think	  that	  they	  
take	   advantage	   of	   their	   participation	   in	   UNCTAD	   to	   push	   the	   developed	   countries	   in	   the	  
negotiations	  for	  other	  reasons	  than	  trade	  and	  development.	  They	  don’t	  say	  it	  explicitly,	  but	  I	  
can	  feel	  it”	  (MIC,	  respondent	  O).	  He	  emphasizes	  that	  coordination	  within	  the	  G77	  becomes	  
difficult	  since	  Iran	  sometimes	  is	  strongly	  opposing	  certain	  issues,	  which	  are	  not	  important	  for	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  group.	  He	  explains:	  “If	  one	  member	  is	  active	  and	  pushing	  for	  a	  certain	  position	  
on	  an	   issue,	   then	   the	  whole	  G77	  has	   to	  push	   for	   this	   in	   the	  meetings	  of	  UNCTAD”.	  “This	   is	  
difficult,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  going	  to	  appear	  ‘Iran	  argues	  this’	  in	  the	  text,	  but	  what	  will	  appear	  
is	  ‘G77	  argues	  this’	  ”.	  He	  believes	  that	  the	  motivation	  for	  extreme	  actors	  to	  “push	  for	  things	  
that	   they	   know	   will	   be	   difficult	   for	   developed	   countries	   to	   accept”	   is	   to	   balance	   a	  
dysfunctional	   “bilateral	   relationship	   on	   the	   multilateral	   arena”	   (ibid).	   In	   summary,	   it	   is	   a	  
“way	  of	  confrontation	  saying	  ‘that	  if	  you	  pick	  on	  us	  and	  do	  not	  leave	  us	  alone	  bilaterally,	  we	  
are	   going	   to	   pick	   on	   you	   and	   not	   leave	   you	   alone	  multilaterally”.	   A	   respondent	   from	   the	  
North	   underlines	   that	   “The	   G77	   has	   been	   important	   in	   promoting	   the	   key	   role	   of	  
development	  issues	  in	  international	  affairs,	  it	  has,	  however,	  often	  had	  a	  polarizing	  effect	  on	  
UN	  negotiations,	  making	  them	  time-­‐consuming,	  cumbersome	  and	  sometimes	  unproductive.	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In	  the	  process,	  this	  has	  had	  negative	  effects	  on	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  UN	  development	  system,	  
creating	   perceptions	   of	   bureaucracy	   and	   inefficiency.	  As	   a	   consequence,	   the	  major	   powers	  
have	  sought	  alternative	  channels	  to	  pursue	  the	  same	  goals”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  Respondent).	  
An	   example	   is	   the	   consolidation	   of	   the	  G-­‐20	   outside	   the	  UN	   to	   address	   challenges	   in	   the	  
global	  economy.	  
Radicalization	   has	   gradually	   damaged	   the	   international	   cooperation	   structure	   and	  
undermined	  the	  structure’s	  legitimacy	  because	  radical	  countries	  are	  prioritizing	  their	  short-­‐
term	   interests	   (based	   on	   citations	   from	   Expert	   Lunde).	   Lunde	   exemplifies	   with	   examples	  
from	  UNCTAD	  and	  in	  the	  HRC	  where:	  “Iran,	  Venezuela,	  Algeria	  and	  before	  Libya	  made	  noise	  
and	  contributed	  to	  an	  irrational	  and	  useless	  North-­‐South	  confrontation	  that	  blurs	  and	  ruins	  
for	   the	   developing	   countries	   actual	   interests.	   It	   can	   be	   compared	   to	   a	   hostage	   situation	  
where	  radical	  developing	  countries	  manage	  to	  coup	  the	  G77	  agenda”.	  
As	   we	   have	   seen	   within	   the	   G77	   there	   are	   only	   a	   few	   countries	   that	   are	   active.	   The	  
respondent	  from	  the	  South	  believes	  this	  is	  a	  signal	  that	  the	  delegates	  lack	  time	  to	  follow	  up	  
UNCTAD.	  Only	   the	   large	  countries	  with	  big	  delegations	  have	  assigned	  one	  person	   to	  cover	  
UNCTAD.	   Brazil	   and	   China	   are	   in	   this	   position.	   However,	   this	   creates	   a	   problem	   for	   the	  
coalition	  of	  G77	  since	  “this	  type	  of	  participation	  permits	  the	  most	  active	  countries	  to	  have	  a	  
larger	  say”	  (MIC,	  respondent	  O).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  coordination	  meetings	  “the	  position	  of	  G77	  
reflects	  just	  the	  few	  countries	  that	  can	  afford	  to	  send	  delegates”	  (ibid).	  	  
6.4.4 Power–	  Summary	  and	  Conclusions	  
The	   tentative	   conclusion	   based	   on	   secondary	   literature	   (in	   3.3.4)	   corresponds	   to	   the	  
respondents’	   statements.	   The	   situation	   of	   UNCTAD	   today	   can	   be	   explained	   with	   a	   realist	  
perception	  of	  power.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  without	  referring	  to	  productive	  power	  one	  could	  
not	  have	  captured	  the	  concept	  of	  “othering”,	  the	  ideological	  unity	  that	  existed	  and	  still	  exists	  
between	  developing	  countries	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  unpredictability	  of	  the	  outcome.	  The	  unity	  is	  
more	  than	  mere	  national	  interests.	  It	  was	  this	  unity	  and	  the	  historical	  context	  which	  fuelled	  
the	   belief	   that	   one	   could	   change	   the	   basic	   game	   through	   the	   decision	   game	   in	  UNCTAD’s	  
rise.	   What	   will	   happen	   in	   the	   future	   relating	   to	   the	   unity	   and	   identity	   of	   the	   different	  
fractions	   within	   the	   G77	  will	   be	   interesting	   to	   follow.	   At	   the	  moment	   the	   African	   groups	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(mainly	  LDC	  countries)	  are	  attempting	  to	   increase	  cooperation	  and	  solidarity.	  How	  this	  will	  
affect	  the	  wider	  G77	  (and	  especially	  China)	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  
The	   tentative	   conclusion	   misses	   an	   important	   aspect,	   i.e.,	   that	   within	   the	   G77	   there	   are	  
power	  differences	  between	  the	  MIC,	  BRICS	  and	  LDC.	  Radicalization	  of	  the	  G77	  is	  an	  element	  
that	  was	  absent	  from	  the	  secondary	  literature	  (except	  when	  it	  referred	  to	  polarization	  in	  the	  
group	  structure).	  	  
6.5 Summary	  of	  findings	  
This	   chapter	   has	   focused	   on	   independent	   variables	   that	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   drivers	  
behind	  the	  GCD	  process	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  UNCTAD.	  The	  different	  drivers	  have	  
been	   examined	   one	   at	   a	   time	   with	   reference	   to	   secondary	   literature	   and	   empirical	  
information	  obtained	  for	  this	  thesis.	  This	  exercise	  served	  to	  alter	  and	  nuance	  the	  tentative	  
conclusions	  presented	  in	  chapter	  3.	  	  	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  UNCTAD	  conveys	  how	  a	  combination	  of	  lack	  of	  consensual	  knowledge	  (X₁),	  a	  
highly	  malignant	  problem	  (X₂),	  first	  biased	  then	  weak	  institutional	  capacity	  (X₃)	  and	  a	  highly	  
asymmetrical	   power	   relationship	   in	   the	   basic	   and	   decision	   game	   (X₄)	   is	   a	   damaging	  
combination	  where	   the	  prospects	  of	  GCD	   look	  bleak,	  as	   the	   tool	  becomes	   inadequate	  and	  
consequently	   leads	   to	   gridlocks.	  However,	   the	  appearance	  of	  one	  of	   these	   features	   in	   the	  
GCD	  process	   (i.e.	  problem	  malignancy	   in	  UNFCCC)	  does	  not	  necessarily	   lead	   to	   failure	  and	  
gridlock.	  It	  makes	  the	  GCD	  process	  harder,	  but	  future	  progress	  and	  possible	  success	  are	  still	  
achievable.	  	  
This	   thesis	   argues	   that	   the	   following	   highlighted	   observations	   were	   some	   of	   the	   main	  
components	   in	  explaining	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  UNCTAD.	  The	  main	  components	  capture	  how	  
the	  drivers	   correlate	  and	   reinforce	  each	  other,	  which	  either	   serves	   to	   strengthen	   the	  GCD	  
process	  (leading	  to	  success)	  or	  weaken	  the	  process	  (increasing	  the	  chance	  of	  failure).	  This	  is	  
why	  UNCTAD	  could,	  with	  the	  same	  type	  of	  drivers,	  experience	  a	  rise	  and	  a	  fall.	  It	  was	  caused	  
by	  the	  unique	  historical	  context	  during	  the	  time	  of	  its	  establishment.	  The	  main	  components	  
will	  be	  further	  examined	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  generalization	  in	  chapter	  7.	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(1)	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  leader	  and	  the	  secretariat	   in	  creating	  consensual	  knowledge	   (Interplay	  
between	  the	  variables	  of	  consensual	  knowledge	  and	  institutional	  capacity)	  
This	   analysis	   conveys	   the	   interplay	   between	   the	   variables	   of	   consensual	   knowledge	   and	  
institutional	   capacity	   in	   GCD,	   in	   other	   words,	   how	   the	   organization’s	   leader	   and	   the	  
secretariat	  are	  the	  main	  tools	  in	  promoting	  consensual	  knowledge	  on	  the	  topics	  discussed	  in	  
the	  forum.	  	  
In	   relation	  to	  UNCTAD’s	   rise	  one	  saw	  how	  SG	  Prebisch	  played	  a	  crucial	   role	   in	  shaping	  the	  
organization	   and	   the	   ideology	   behind	   the	   G77.	   Joseph	   Nye	   ended	   his	   study	   by	   asking	  
whether	  Prebisch’s	  strategy	  (of	  using	  UNCTAD	  as	  a	  pressure	  group)	  will	  pay	  off	   in	  the	   long	  
run.	  After	  extensive	   fieldwork	  and	  reading	  secondary	   literature	   I	  would	  have	  to	  argue	  that	  
this	  strategy	  did	  pay	  off	  in	  the	  short	  run	  (creating	  the	  rise),	  but	  that	  it	  has	  not	  paid	  off	  in	  the	  
long	   run.	   SG	   Prebisch	   shaped	   an	   organization	   that	   was	   not	   inclusive	   of	   the	   North	   and	   a	  
secretariat	   that	   openly	   favored	   one	   coalition.	   This	   point	   is	   illustrated	   by	   Heinz	   Arndt	  
(1987:141)	  who	  argued	  that	  UNCTAD	  functioned	  as	  a	  “trade	  union	  of	  LDCs,	  with	  a	  program	  
of	   demands	   to	   the	   developed	   countries	   ready-­‐made	   by	   Raul	   Prebisch”.	   Even	   though	  
consensual	  knowledge	  is	  often	  not	  present	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  GCD	  processes,	  there	  should	  
at	  least	  be	  some	  common	  agreement	  about	  the	  basic	  philosophy	  and	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  (i.e.	  
decision	  procedure).	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  biased	  secretariat	  that	  Prebisch	  promoted	  and	  was	  a	  part	  
of	  has	  been	  UNCTAD’s	  Achilles	  heel,	  boosting	  the	  rise	  and	  in	  increasing	  the	  fall.	  
Several	  respondents	  from	  UNCTAD	  argued	  that	  a	  strong	  and	  visionary	  leader	  is	  missing	  today	  
in	  UNCTAD.	   The	   choice	   of	   strong	   leaders	   is	   an	   important	   aspect	   in	   all	   GCD	  processes	   and	  
organizations.	  However,	  it	  must	  be	  underlined	  that	  the	  leaders	  must	  be	  neutral	  and	  should	  
be	  respected	  by	  both	  the	  North	  and	  South.	  Prebisch	  was	  a	  strong	  and	  respected	  leader,	  but	  
he	   was	   not	   neutral.	   After	   my	   interviews	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   the	   choice	   of	   leaders	   is	  
vulnerable	  to	  diplomatic	  games	  and	  power	  play.	  
(2)	  The	  amplifying	  effect	  of	   level	  of	  participation	   in	  a	  competitive	   institutional	   landscape	  
(institutional	  capacity	  and	  features	  of	  the	  GCD	  process)	  
Geneva	  has	  become	  a	   fragmented	   institutional	   environment	  with	   an	   increased	  number	  of	  
multilateral	   actors	   competing	   for	   attention	   from	   the	   member	   states.	   As	   the	   institutional	  
landscape	   has	   expanded	   and	   become	   diversified,	   the	   delegations	   have	   less	   resources	   and	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personnel	   to	   follow	  up.	   In	  this	  setting	  the	   level	  of	   representation	  becomes	  an	   indicator	   for	  
prioritization.	  	  
During	  UNCTAD’s	   rise	   there	  were	   fewer	   organizations	   and	   conferences.	   Ambassadors	   and	  
well-­‐known	  experts	  would	  attend	  the	  UNCTAD	  negotiations	  and	  conferences,	  which	  boosted	  
the	   importance	  and	  belief	   in	  the	  GCD	  process.	  This	  can	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  positive	  circle	  of	  
momentum.	  When	  Western	  countries	  began	  to	  send	  their	  experts	  and	  ambassadors	  to	  the	  
WTO	   and	   other	   forums	   and	   their	   junior	   diplomats	   and	   generalists	   to	   the	   UNCTAD	  
negotiations	   this	   changed.	   The	   term	   Forum	   shopping	   becomes	   relevant	   in	   this	   context	   as	  
Western	   countries	  were	   “seeking	   to	   realize	   their	   policy	   objectives	  within	   preferred	   policy	  
arenas	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  arena’s	  particular	  governing	  characteristics”	  (Murphy	  and	  Kellow	  
forthcoming).	   In	   other	   words,	   they	   selected	   “the	   forum	   that	   best	   suited	   their	   interests”	  
(Kellow	  2012:333).	  For	  UNCTAD	  this	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  vicious	  circle	  of	  deprioritization.	  
This	   process	   of	   giving	   less	   priority	   to	   UNCTAD	   became	   even	   more	   evident	   when	   young,	  
inexperienced	  interns	  were	  sent	  to	  attend	  the	  meetings.	  Interns	  are	  meant	  to	  passively	  write	  
minutes	   and	   quietly	   sit	   behind	   the	   country	   flag.	   Thus,	   the	   quality	   of	   negotiations	   and	  
meetings	  drops.	  It	  also	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  more	  radical	  countries	  to	  influence	  the	  content	  of	  
the	  outcome	  documents	  and	  the	  agenda.	  Sending	  interns	  has	  an	  amplifying	  effect,	  a	  type	  of	  
race	  to	  the	  bottom,	  as	  other	  member	  countries	  will	  also	  adjust	  their	  level	  of	  representation,	  
leading	  to	  passive	  negotiations	  with	  few	  decision	  makers.	  	  
Hypothetically,	   if	   UNCTAD	  was	   located	   in	   a	   different	   institutional	   landscape	   than	   Geneva	  
would	   the	   same	   development	   have	   happened?	  Most	   likely	   it	   would.	   UNCTAD	   would	   still	  
experience	   a	   deprioritization	  over	   time.	  One	   could	   argue	   that	   the	  amplifying	   effect	   of	   the	  
level	  of	  representation	  and	  a	  competitive	   institutional	   landscape	   intensified	  the	  trends	  that	  
were	  already	  there;	  therefore,	  sending	  interns	  in	  itself	  is	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  UNCTAD’s	  fall.	  In	  
this	   case,	   observed	   change	   does	   not	   capture	   the	   underlying	   variable	   that	   affects	   my	  
dependent	   variable.	   This	   is	   a	   good	   example	   of	   a	   spurious	   correlation28.	   The	   question	  
becomes	  what	  the	  underlying	  variable	  is.	  An	  expert	  argued	  that	  ‘internization’	  and	  the	  lack	  
of	   resources	   at	   delegation	   level	   covering	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   meetings	   is	   a	   symptom	   of	   an	  
                                                
28	  Hellevik	  (2002:60)	  defines	  a	  spurious	  correlation	  as	  an	  apparent	  causal	  relationship	  between	  X	  and	  Y	  that	  is	  
due	  to	  an	  underlying	  or	  confounding	  variable	  Z	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underlying	   problem	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   deprioritization	   of	   UN	   forums.	   UN	   forums	   have	  
become	   the	   means	   or	   arenas	   of	   meeting	   other	   countries	   and	   initiating	   closer	   bilateral	  
dialogue,	  but	  the	  UN	  forum	  in	  itself	  is	  therefore	  less	  focused.	  	  
There	  are	  problematic	  effects	  of	  reduced	  personnel	  at	  the	  UN-­‐delegations	  who	  handle	  day-­‐
to-­‐day	  meetings	  and	  the	  negotiations	   leading	  up	  to	  the	  conferences.	  Some	  experts	  argued	  
that	  this	  is	  especially	  prevalent	  in	  the	  Northern	  delegations	  that	  are	  put	  in	  a	  position	  where	  
they	  must	  respond	  rather	  than	  to	  initiate.	  This	   is	  something	  that	  corresponds	  strongly	  with	  
my	  own	  experience	  of	  being	  an	  intern	  for	  the	  Norwegian	  Mission	  in	  Geneva.	  	  Another	  effect	  
is	   that	   less	   resources	  and	  personnel	   results	   in	   less	   time	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  have	   informal	  
contact	   with	   delegates	   from	   other	   coalitions.	   One	   respondent	   argued	   that	   a	   prominent	  
feature	  of	  the	  North-­‐	  South	  dialogue	  is	  that	  most	  breakthroughs	  happen	  outside	  the	  plenary.	  
However,	   one	   may	   distinguish	   between	   “inclusive	   Informal	   talk”	   among	   the	   members	   of	  
each	   coalition,	   where	   one	   ‘talks	   to	   as	   many	   as	   possible’	   in	   the	   meetings	   leading	   up	   to	  
conferences,	  and	  at	  the	  conference	  itself.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  achieve	  ‘broad	  consensus’,	  maintain	  
constructive	  dialogue	  and	  keep	  the	  lines	  of	  communication	  open.	  “Green	  room	  diplomacy”	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	   is	  more	  exclusive	  and	   it	   is	  mainly	  the	  “big	  hitters”	   (i.e.	   the	  powerful	  or	  
influential	   players)	   that	   have	   an	   informal	   group	   discussion;	   then	   they	   go	   off	   and	   build	   a	  
bigger	  consensus	  and	  eventually	  everything	   is	  brought	  back	  to	  the	  plenary	  (cf.	  green	  room	  
practice	   in	   COP	   15)29.	   Many	   NGOs	   express	   concern	   over	   this	   practice	   as	   it	   excludes	   the	  
interests	   of	   the	   smaller	   developing	   countries	   (RORG	   2005).	   In	   any	   case,	   personnel	   are	  
needed	   in	   the	   negotiations	   and	   in	   the	   informal	   talk	   outside	   the	   plenary	   in	   order	   to	   reach	  
consensus.	  	  	  
Then	  again,	  at	   the	  high	   level	   conferences	   there	   is	  a	  horde	  of	  diplomats	  and	  politicians	   (cf.	  
Gahr	  Støre’s	  concept	  of	  summit	  mania).	  Andresen	  and	  Underdal	  (2012)	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  
diminishing	  returns	  of	  the	  human	  and	  financial	  resources	  spent	  on	  high-­‐level	  conferences	  (in	  
this	  case	  the	  Rio+20	  GCD	  process).	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  inherent	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  
of	  the	  GCD	  process;	  “GCD	  is	  an	  effective	  tool	  for	  setting	  agendas,	  learning	  and	  establishing	  
                                                
29	  One	  respondent	  noted	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  green	  room	  practice	  did	  not	  work	  in	  COP15	  in	  
Denmark	  was	  because	  one	  brought	  a	  Geneva	  modality	  to	  an	  NY	  atmosphere.	  In	  NY	  all	  participants	  wants	  to	  “be	  
in	  the	  room”.	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an	   institutional	   setting	   for	   further	   negotiations”	   (ibid).	   This	   has	   been	   done	   in	   relation	   to	  
climate,	  but	  now	  one	  needs	  implementation	  and	  action,	  which	  proves	  to	  be	  difficult	  through	  
GCD	  (further	  discussed	  in	  7.2).	  	  
(3)	   Power	   and	   players	   in	   the	   decision	   game	   and	   basic	   game	   (Power	   correlating	   with	  
institutional	  capacity	  and	  problem	  malignancy)	  
In	   all	   UN	   organizations	   with	   universal	   representation	   there	   will	   always	   be	   a	   difference	   in	  
basic	  game	  power	  versus	  decision	  game	  power.	   In	  UNCTAD	  there	   is	  asymmetry	  within	   the	  
basic	  game,	  and	  asymmetry	  within	  the	  decision	  game.	  A	  further	  complication	  is	  that	  there	  is	  
incongruence	  between	  the	  two	  games.	  	  
The	  more	  asymmetrical	  the	  power	  distribution	  in	  the	  decision	  game	  versus	  the	  basic	  game	  
becomes,	   the	  more	  difficult	   it	  becomes	   to	  create	  consensual	   knowledge	  among	   the	  major	  
players.	   This	   was	   the	   case	   in	   UNCTAD	   where	   G77	   were	   rich	   in	   numbers,	   but	   poor	   in	  
resources,	  while	  the	  B-­‐group	  was	  the	  minority	  but	  had	  the	  most	  control	  over	  trade.	  	  
The	  block	  structure	  created	  in	  the	  time	  of	  establishment	  of	  UNCTAD	  served	  to	  aid	  and	  boost	  
the	  G77’s	  decision	  power	  and	  momentum	  in	  the	  negotiations.	  The	  block	  structure	  can	  still	  
be	  witnessed	  in	  several	  forums	  today.	  However,	  during	  UNCTAD’s	  fall	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  
this	  coalition	  structure	  was	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  law	  of	  the	  least	  ambitious	  program,	  as	  well	  as	  
‘radicalization’	   (asymmetry).	   This	   was	   especially	   apparent	   in	   the	   broad	   coalition	   of	   G77.	  
Another	  effect	  of	  having	   the	   same	  coalition	   structure	  and	  power	   constellation	   in	  different	  
forums	  is	  that	   it	   increases	  the	  chance	  of	  “the	  contamination	  scare”	  (cumulative	  cleavages).	  
This	   is	   especially	   relevant	   regarding	   questions,	   concepts	   and	   perspectives	   that	   deal	   with	  
burden	   sharing	   (incongruity).	   Agenda	   sprawling	   is	   visible	   in	   UNCTAD.	   Concepts	   like	  
“emerging	  economies”	  may	  have	  a	  price	  tag	  in	  another	  forum	  and	  this	  makes	  countries	  cling	  
to	  their	  North-­‐South	  narratives.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  an	  asymmetric	  power	  
relation	  aggravates	  the	  problem	  malignancy.	  
Players	  who	  have	   the	  most	  power	   in	   the	  basic	  game	  can	  play	  diplomatic	  power	  games.	   In	  
other	   words,	   powerful	   players	   may	   influence	   and	   alter	   the	   institutional	   capacity	   of	   an	  
organization	   (i.e.	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   leader	   and	   secretariat	   and	   the	   decision	   rules).	   This	  
conveys	  the	  interplay	  between	  power	  and	  institutional	  capacity.	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7 Reflections	  concerning	  the	  prospects	  of	  Global	  
	   Conference	  Diplomacy	  
“An	  ambassador	  told	  me	  that	  ‘All	  negotiations	  are	  different,	  but	  they	  have	  
similarities.	  The	  trick	  is	  to	  zoom	  into	  the	  similarities	  and	  use	  that	  as	  the	  point	  of	  departure”	  
(UNCTAD	  staff,	  former	  lead	  negotiator	  of	  G77,	  Respondent	  I)	  
This	  section	  addresses	  the	  secondary	  research	  question;	  “What	  does	  the	  analysis	  of	  UNCTAD	  
tell	  us	  about	  the	  prospects	  of	  success	  and	  failure	  in	  Global	  Conference	  Diplomacy	  in	  other	  UN	  
organizations”.	   It	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis	   to	   generalize	   the	   findings	   related	   to	  
UNCTAD	  and	  GCD	  as	  a	  method	  to	  other	  UN-­‐organizations	  in	  a	  justifiable	  manner.	  However,	  
this	  chapter	  will	  reflect	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  generalization	  and	  relevance	  of	  my	  three	  main	  
observations.	  First	   I	  will	  briefly	  present	  some	  general	   lessons	   learnt	   from	  UNCTAD	  (section	  
7.1).	  A	  system	  of	  generalization	  will	  be	   included	  to	  be	  able	  to	  convey	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  
thesis’	   findings	  to	  other	  UN-­‐organizations	  that	  share	  similar	  characteristics	   (in	  section	  7.2).	  
Section	   7.3	  will	   outline	   two	   plausible	   scenarios	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   Underdal’s	   article	   on	  GCD	  
strengths	  and	  weaknesses.	  A	  best-­‐case	  scenario	  and	  a	  worst-­‐case	  scenario	  will	  be	  presented,	  
each	  referring	  to	  UNCTAD.	  	  
7.1 What can we learn from UNCTAD? 
The	   analysis	   of	   UNCTAD	   in	   chapter	   5	   and	   6	   tells	   us	   that	   the	   historical	   context	   and	   the	  
international	  political	  climate	  that	  the	  GCD	  process	  is	  situated	  in	  has	  a	  strong	  impact	  on	  the	  
prospects	  of	  GCD	  as	  a	  diplomatic	  method.	  	  
The	  case	  of	  UNCTAD	  displays	  that	  the	  unique	  institutional	  feature	  of	  a	  biased	  secretariat	  that	  
does	   not	   represent	   the	   members	   will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   reap	   rewards	   and	   access	   all	   the	  
strengths	  of	  GCD	  as	  a	   tool.	  This	  conveys	   the	   importance	  of	  a	   representative	  and	  a	  neutral	  
secretariat	  in	  multilateral	  institutions.	  In	  UNCTAD’s	  case	  it	  was	  the	  North	  that	  felt	  excluded,	  
but	  in	  most	  of	  the	  Western	  based	  institutions	  it	  is	  actually	  the	  South	  that	  the	  secretariat	  fails	  
to	  represent.	  
The	   analysis	   also	   conveys	   that	   North-­‐South	   coalition	   structures	   have	   become	   more	  
important	  than	  UNCTAD	  itself.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Weiss,	  “participants	  sacrifice	  agreement	  with	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the	   opposite	   groups	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   unity"	   (Weiss	   in	   Williams	   1991:68).	   One	   could	  
argue	  that	  the	  prospects	  of	  GCD	  would	  look	  much	  better	  if	  one	  could	  move	  away	  from	  the	  
‘outdated’	  North-­‐South	  rift	  from	  the	  1960’s	  and	  create	  crosscutting	  strategic	  partnerships	  in	  
different	  topic	  areas.	  
The	  next	  section	  will	  explore	  the	  potential	  of	  generalization	  of	  the	  three	  main	  observations	  
from	  my	   analysis.	   The	   observations	   are	   (1)	   The	   Role	   of	   the	   leader	   and	   the	   secretariat	   in	  
creating	   consensual	   knowledge,	   (2)	   The	   amplifying	   effect	   of	   level	   of	   participation	   in	   a	  
competitive	  institutional	  landscape	  and	  (3)	  Power	  and	  players	  in	  the	  decision	  game	  and	  basic	  
game.	  
7.2 Potential	  for	  Generalization	  from	  UNCTAD	  
“UNCTAD	  is	  characteristic	  of	  what	  you	  are	  seeing	  elsewhere	  in	  UN	  system.	  The	  momentum	  in	  the	  
world	  has	  drifted	  away	  from	  intergovernmental	  diplomacy”	  (NGO,	  Respondent	  N).	  	  
According	   to	  many	  of	  my	   respondents,	  UNCTAD	   is	  one	  of	   the	  most	  politicized	   forums	   in	  
the	  UN.	  Some	  respondents	  argued	  that	  by	  studying	  UNCTAD	  one	  can	  shed	  light	  on	  some	  of	  
the	   dynamics	   and	   unfortunate	   trends	   in	   the	  North-­‐South	   dialogue30.	   However,	   it	  must	   be	  
noted	   that	   each	   international	   forum	   has	   its	   own	   characteristics:	   “They	   have	   different	  
histories	   and	   cultures,	   memberships,	   voting	   rules,	   funding	   mechanisms,	   provisions	   for	  
reservations	   to	   be	   entered,	   provisions	   for	   withdrawal	   and	   so	   on.	   Each	   makes	   different	  
arrangements	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  technical	  or	  scientific	  advice	  and	  different	  provisions	  for	  
participation	   by	   civil	   society”	   (Kellow	   2012:337).	   Thus,	   if	   one	   were	   to	   generalize	   findings	  
from	   UNCTAD	   to	   a	   broader	   universe	   of	   cases,	   must	   first	   identify	   the	   analytical	   scope	   of	  
generalization.	  Since	  UNCTAD	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  UN-­‐family,	  one	  may	  therefore	  distinguish	  
between	  members	  of	  the	  UN-­‐family	  and	  the	  ‘exterior	  crowd’	  of	  organizations.	  In	  relation	  to	  
each	  of	  these	  groupings	  some	  characteristics	  will	  be	  presented.	  Based	  on	  Williams	  (1991:86)	  
one	  may	  generalize	  the	  findings	  in	  UNCTAD	  to	  other	  UN	  forums,	  these	  are:	  	  
(a)	  Close	  UN-­‐	  family:	  FAO,	  UNIDO,	  UNGA,	  ECOSOC,	  UNESCO,	  UNEP,	  the	  sustainable	  
development	  conferences	  in	  New	  York,	  UNFCCC,	  WIPO,	  WHO,	  conference	  on	  
                                                
30	  Some	  examples	  are	  “agenda	  sprawling”,	  “the	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  deprioritization”,	  ”radicalization	  of	  the	  UN	  




(b)	  Broader	  UN-­‐family:	  WTO,	  IMF	  and	  WB,	  UN	  regional	  economic	  missions.	  
(c)	  External	  multilateral	  family:	  Regional	  organizations	  (OECD,	  ASEAN),	  regional	  banks,	  
Groupings	  with	  limited	  memberships	  (G-­‐20,	  BRICS).	  
7.2.1 The	  Role	  of	  the	  leader	  and	  the	  secretariat	  in	  creating	  consensual	  
	   	   knowledge	  
Based	   on	  my	   findings,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   UNCTAD	   did	   not	   create	   a	   common	   platform	  
where	  one	  agreed	  on	  the	  main	  philosophy	  of	  the	  conference	  and	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  in	  stage	  1	  
of	   the	   conference	   (Initiation	   stage).	   This	   is	   not	   uncommon	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   GCD	  
process,	   yet	   it	   is	   the	   role	   of	   the	   secretariat	   to	   create	   a	   common	  platform	  over	   time.	   This	  
finding	   can	   be	   argued	   to	   be	   relevant	   for	   the	   (a)	   close	   UN	   family.	   The	   close	   UN	   family	   is	  
characterized	   by	   universal	  membership,	   one	   country-­‐one	   vote,	   similar	   decision	   procedures	  
i.e.	  consensus.	  Some	  respondents	  argued	  that	  UNFCCC	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  example.	  UNFCCC	  
had	   an	   institutional	  mechanism	   that	  managed	   to	   create	   consensual	   knowledge	   over	   time	  
(Skodvin	   2000).	   The	   secretariat	   included	   experts	   from	   different	   regions	   to	   become	   more	  
representative	   of	   its	  members.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   SG	   of	  UNCTAD	   and	   the	   secretariat	  were	  
biased	  served	  to	  complicate	  the	   function	  of	  achieving	  consensual	  knowledge,	  even	  around	  
basic	  principles.	  The	  importance	  of	  a	  representative	  SG	  and	  secretariat	  is	  also	  relevant	  to	  (b)	  
the	  broader	  UN	  family.	  One	  can	  argue	  that	  the	  organizations	  mentioned	  in	  the	  broader	  UN-­‐
family	   are	   attempting	   to	   find	   solutions	   to	   complex	   collective	   good	   problems	   that	   has	   an	  
economic	   core	  and	  has	  a	   similar	   intergovernmental	  group	   structure	  where	   the	   cleavage	   is	  
between	   North	   and	   South.	   (c)	   The	   external	   multilateral	   family	   is	   part	   of	   the	   multilateral	  
landscape	   and	   often	   becomes	   the	   preferred	   forum	   for	   powerful	   players	   (cf.	   Underdal	  
2012:6).	   However,	   the	   HDR	   (2013b:109)	   argues	   a	   representative	   secretariat	   and	   that	   the	  
member	  countries	   feels	  “included”	   is	   relevant	  even	  for	   the	   (c)	  external	  multilateral	   family;	  
“The	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions,	  the	  regional	  development	  banks	  and	  even	  the	  UN	  system	  
all	   risk	   diminishing	   relevance	   if	   they	   fail	   to	   represent	   all	  member	   states	   and	   their	   people	  
adequately”.	  HDR	  (2013)	  referred	  here	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  South.	  Ironically,	  in	  UNCTAD	  it	  
was	  the	  opposite	  that	  was	  the	  case.	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7.2.2 The	  amplifying	  effect	  of	  level	  of	  participation	  in	  a	  competitive	  	  
	   	   institutional	  landscape	  
“The	  medium	  is	  the	  message”	  (McLuhan	  1964)	  	  
Respondents	  argued	  that	  the	  institutional	  competition	  for	  attention	  is	  relevant	  for	  members	  
in	  the	  (a)	  close	  and	  (b)	  broader	  UN	  family,	  where	  the	  outputs	  are	  mostly	  advisory	  and	  not	  
mandatory31.	  Therefore,	  the	  appearance	  of	  young	  and	  inexperienced	  interns,	  especially	  over	  
a	  longer	  time	  period,	  has	  become	  a	  sign	  of	  deprioritization.	  Whether	  member	  countries	  are	  
aware	   of	  what	   type	   of	   signals	   they	   are	   sending	   by	   using	   interns	   is	   an	   open	   question.	   For	  
example,	  Norway	   is	   attaching	   very	  much	   importance	   to	   the	  UN	   system	   and	   is	   investing	   a	  
substantial	  amount	  of	  money	  and	  resources	  in	  the	  different	  UN-­‐	  organizations.	  At	  the	  same	  
time	  Norway	  is	  dependent	  on	  sending	  interns	  to	  meetings	  to	  cover	  the	  demand.	  For	  many	  
organizations	   and	   other	   member	   countries	   this	   seems	   like	   a	   contradiction.	   Or	   it	   can	   be	  
interpreted	   as	   an	   example	   of	   Norway	   ”throwing	   money	   around,	   without	   having	   the	  
personnel	  to	  follow	  up”.	  	  
The	  organizations	  in	  (c)	  the	  external	  multilateral	  family	  have	  a	  club-­‐like	  character.	  This	  
exclusiveness	  increases	  the	  level	  of	  representation	  and	  the	  importance	  attached	  to	  these	  
forums.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  club-­‐like	  organizations	  experience	  less	  competition	  for	  attention	  
from	  the	  universal	  membership	  bodies.	  
7.2.3 The	  relationship	  between	  Power	  and	  Players 
The	  findings	   in	  UNCTAD	  related	  to	  asymmetry	  of	  power	  in	  the	  basic	  game	  and	  decision	  
game	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  are	  transferable	  to	  organizations	  within	  the	  (a)	  close	  
UN-­‐family.	   This	   is	   especially	   the	   case	   with	   organizations	   that	   attempt	   to	   solve	   malign	  
problems	   with	   an	   economic	   core	   that	   deals	   with	   a	   skewed	   cost/benefit	   calculus	   and	  
asymmetry	  of	  values.	  In	  this	  setting	  the	  North-­‐South	  divide	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  “natural	  divide”.	  
Expert	   Lunde	  argued	   that	   it	  was	   rational	  and	  understandable	   that	  a	  North/South	  cleavage	  
appeared,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  beneficial	  to	  the	  dynamic	  of	  the	  negotiations,	  he	  maintained.	  	  
                                                
31	  Rollo	  (in	  CUTS	  2012:19)	  argued	  that	  since	  UNCTAD’s	  advisory	  outputs	  are	  not	  mandatory	  it	  is	  competing	  
with	  other	  providers	  like	  ”the	  WTO,	  the	  IMF,	  World	  Bank	  and	  regional	  development	  banks,	  UNIDO,	  UNDP,	  UN	  
Regional	  Economic	  Commissions,	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  research	  organizations,	  NGOs,	  some	  of	  which	  carry	  
either	  big	  sticks	  (the	  IMF)	  or	  big	  carrots	  (the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  regional	  banks)”.	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However,	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  (b)	  broader	  UN	  family	  the	  power	  distribution	  in	  the	  basic	  
game	   and	   decision	   game	   change.	   IMF	   and	   the	   WB	   have	   an	   institutional	   system	   and	  
capacity,	   which	   to	   a	   greater	   degree	   reflects	   the	   power	   distribution	   in	   the	   world	  
(Bergesen	  and	  Lunde	  199932).	  The	  “one	  dollar,	  one	  vote”	  system	  is	  meant	  to	  balance	  the	  
decision	   game	   power	   and	   the	   basic	   game	   power.	  One	   observer	   notes	   that	   the	   reason	  
why	  the	  momentum	  has	  moved	  away	  from	  global	  conference	  diplomacy	  “is	  also	  part	  of	  
the	  ‘one	  country-­‐one	  vote	  system’,	  which	  leads	  the	  countries	  to	  shift	  their	  money,	  effort	  
and	   time	   to	   organizations	   that	   don’t	   work	   that	   way,	   like	   the	   WB	   and	   IMF”	   (NGO,	  
respondent	  N).	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   newly	   published	  HDR	   (2013b:109)	   argued	   that	  
the	   Bretton	   Woods	   institutions	   greatly	   underrepresent	   the	   South,	   “despite	   changing	  
global	   economic	   realities”.	   The	   basic	   game	   is	   not	   reflected	   in	   the	   decision	   game	   as	  
voting	  quotas	  in	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions	  are	  “weighted	  towards	  countries	  in	  the	  
North”.	  The	  decision	  procedures	   in	  global	   institutions	  “appear	  unable	  to	  accommodate	  
changing	   power	   relations”	   (ibid).	   An	   example	   conveying	   this	   is	   “China,	   which	   is	   the	  
world’s	  second	  largest	  economy	  and	  holds	  more	  than	  $3	  trillion	  in	  foreign	  reserves,	  has	  
had	  a	  smaller	  voting	  share	  in	  the	  World	  Bank	  than	  both	  France	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom”	  
(ibid).	   Still,	   in	   a	   system	  with	   “one	   dollar,	   one	   vote”	   countries	  must	   pay	   a	   subscription	  
which	  determines	  the	  voting	  power	  in	  the	  fund	  (WB	  2013).	  Thus,	  the	  rising	  South	  must	  
also	   “assume	   more	   responsibility	   on	   the	   global	   stage,	   in	   line	   with	   its	   increasing	  
economic	   power	   and	   political	   clout,	   including	   by	   contributing	   more	   resources	   to	  
multilateral	  organizations”	   (HDR	  2013b:109).	  China	  for,	  example,	   is	  mostly	  bilateral	   in	   its	  
development	  cooperation.	  The	  big	  question	  within	  the	  UN	  is	  how	  to	  get	  China	  “into	  a	  more	  
multilateral	  way	  of	  thinking	  and	  a	  multilateral	  way	  of	  acting”	  (Norwegian	  MFA,	  respondent	  
A).	  	  
However,	   today	   it	   seems	   like	   the	   BRICS	   countries	   are	   creating	   their	   own	   institutions	  
where	  they	  can	  advance	  their	  expanding	  political	  and	  economic	  goals;	  they	  are	  planning	  
to	  create	  their	  own	  BRICS	  bank.	  The	  BRICS	  bank	  is	  supposed	  to	  challenge	  the	  dominance	  
of	  the	  IMF	  and	  WB	  (Cohen	  and	  Arkhipov	  2013).	  Even	  though	  it	  was	  concluded	  after	  the	  
                                                
32	  Their	  book	  is	  titled	  “Dinosaurs	  or	  Dynamos-­‐	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  The	  World	  Bank	  at	  the	  Turn	  of	  the	  
Century”	  where	  the	  dinosaur	  described	  the	  UN-­‐system	  whilst	  the	  system	  of	  WB	  was	  termed	  a	  Dynamo.	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negotiations	   in	   March	   2013	   that	   “more	   talks	   are	   needed	   to	   complete	   a	   plan”,	   it	   still	  
conveys	   that	   the	   larger	  developing	  countries	  are	  attempting	  to	  gain	  more	   influence	  on	  
the	  world	  stage,	  but	  outside	  the	  Western	  based	  institutions	  (Al-­‐Jazeera	  2013).	  	  
Creating	  your	  own	  institutions	  and	   joining	  exclusive	  club-­‐like	  forums	  may	  be	  a	  strategy	  
for	   the	   larger	   developed	   countries.	   However,	   smaller	   countries	   from	   the	   South	  
expressed	   concern	   as	   the	   UN	   is	   in	   increased	   competition	  with	   other	   club-­‐like	   forums:	  
“We	   fought	   very	   hard	   to	   be	   a	   part	   of	   the	   multilateral	   space;	   if	   the	   multilateral	   system	  
continues	   to	  weaken	   then	  we	  may	   end	   up	   losing	   the	   only	   space	  where	  we	   are	   allowed	   to	  
express	  our	  point	  of	  views”	  (MIC,	  respondent	  O).	  The	  respondent	  believed,	  in	  line	  with	  Victor	  
(2011)	  that	  “the	  reason	  why	  this	  is	  happening	  is	  because	  stronger	  countries	  want	  to	  facilitate	  
negotiations	  with	   fewer	  partners”.	  The	  respondent	  argued	  that	   this	  was	  negative,	  because	  
”this	  will	  make	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  strongest	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  to	  impose	  their	  decisions.	  It	  is	  
a	   way	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   the	   discussion,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   the	   way	   to	   find	   the	   solution”	   (MIC,	  
respondent	  O).	  
7.3 Different	  scenarios	  
From	  the	  previous	  section	  one	  could	  detect	  that	  some	  of	  the	  main	  findings	  from	  the	  analysis	  
in	  chapter	  6	  seem	  relevant	  for	  other	  UN-­‐organizations	  sharing	  similar	  characteristics	  (based	  
on	   interviews	   and	   secondary	  material).	   The	   question	   becomes	   how	  much	   influence	   these	  
characteristics	  and	  drivers	  can	  have	  on	  the	  development	  of	  an	  organization?	  For	  example	  did	  
UNCTAD,	   shaped	   by	   all	   its	   characteristics,	   have	   to	   experience	   a	   rise	   and	   fall?	   This	   thesis	  
argues	  that	  the	  development	  of	  UNCTAD	  and	  the	  sequence	  of	  events	  that	  led	  to	  the	  rise	  and	  
fall	   was	   not	   something	   that	   was	   given	   or	   predetermined.	   Much	   was	   based	   on	   the	   cards	  
UNCTAD	   was	   dealt	   and	   the	   cards	   it	   dealt	   to	   itself.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   development	   of	  
UNCTAD	   could	   have	   elapsed	   differently.	   Thus,	   this	   section	   will	   operate	   with	   a	   broader	  
specter	  of	  possible	  outcomes	  for	  UNCTAD.	  The	  best	  case-­‐scenario	  represents	  UNCTAD	  at	  its	  
best,	   the	  worst	   case	   represents	  UNCTAD	   its	  worst.	   These	  are	  not	   theoretical	   abstractions,	  
but	  plausible	  scenarios	  that	  take	  into	  account	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  GCD.	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Underdal	   argues	   that	   GCD	   as	   a	  method	   has	   strengths	   related	   to	   specific	   functions.	   GCD’s	  
strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  will	  be	  underlined	  in	  each	  scenario.	  This	  is	  done	  because	  it	  would	  
be	  unfair	  to	  judge	  UNCTAD	  on	  functions	  that	  GCD	  in	  general	  cannot	  do.	  	  
7.3.1 Best	  case	  scenario	  for	  GCD	  
Underdal	  (2012:6)	  argues	  that	  GCD	  is	  effective	  in	  “(a)	  setting	  political	  agendas	  and	  focusing	  
governments	   and	   stakeholders’	   attention	   worldwide,	   b)	   providing	   an	   institutional	  
framework	   for	   building	   consensual	   scientific-­‐based	   knowledge,	   (c)	   providing	   arenas	   for	  
learning	  about	  effective	  policies	  and	  good	  practices,	   and	   (d)	   generating	   for	  many	   involved	  
people	  positive	  stakes	  in	  its	  own	  success”.	  	  
In	  relation	  to	  UNFCCC	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  that	  the	  GCD	  function	  of	  “(a)	  setting	  agendas	  and	  (b)	  
providing	   a	   framework	   for	   consensual	   learning”	   has	   been	   successful.	   These	   are	   functions	  
often	  related	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  GCD	  process.	  Another	  aspect	  that	  supports	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
GCD	  is	  that	  “there	  is	  common	  agreement	  that	  one	  should	  solve	  old	  and	  new	  global	  problems	  
through	  the	  established	  institutional	  structures”	  (Expert	  Lunde).	  	  Another	  expert	  argued	  the	  
main	  function	  of	  GCD	  is	  to	  create	  normative	  principles.	  A	  high	  level	  conference	  with	  heads	  of	  
states	  and	  universal	  participation	   increases	   legitimacy	  and	   increases	   the	  normative	   impact	  
compared	   to	   regular	  multilateral	  meetings.	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   the	  member	   countries	   that	  
have	   the	   responsibility	   to	   implement	   these	   normative	   principles	   at	   national	   level.	   This	  
proves	  to	  be	  difficult	  to	  do	  through	  mere	  GCD	  (cf.	  Andresen	  and	  Underdal	  2012).	  There	  are	  
few	   conferences	   that	   have	   managed	   to	   fulfill	   (stage	   4)	   to	   implement	   the	   conference	  
outcome(s)	  (including	  review	  and	  appraisal).	  One	  of	  the	  conferences	  that	  has	  managed	  this	  
is	  the	  Mercury	  conference,	  which	  was	  of	  a	  technical	  character	  that	  to	  some	  extent	  shielded	  
it	  from	  politicization	  (NGO,	  respondent	  N).	  UN	  Convention	  on	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  (UNCLOS)	  was	  
also	  considered	  a	  success	  in	  relation	  to	  stage	  4.	  Some	  argued	  this	  was	  due	  to	  cross	  cutting	  






UNCTAD	  at	  its	  best	  -­‐	  Can	  UNCTAD	  as	  a	  forum	  do	  this?	  
From	  the	  analysis	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  UNCTAD	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  (a)	  setting	  the	  political	  
agenda	  during	  its	  rise.	  It	  later	  lost	  its	  agenda	  setting	  power.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   (b)	   provide	   an	   institutional	   framework	   for	   building	   consensual	  
scientific-­‐based	  knowledge	   and	   to	  be	  an	   (c)	  arena	   for	   learning	  about	  effective	  policies	  and	  
good	  practices	  one	  would	  need	  an	  independent,	  neutral	  organization	  with	  highly	  skilled	  staff	  
that	   both	   the	  North	   and	   South	   respected	   and	  wanted	   to	  work	  with.	   These	   experts	  would	  
provide	  accurate	  and	  reliable	  information	  on	  “what	  the	  world	  looks	  like	  today”.	  The	  member	  
countries	   would	   base	   their	   perceptions	   on	   this	   information,	   as	   well	   as	   incorporate	   this	  
information-­‐based	   knowledge	   in	   their	   positions.	   The	   independent	   experts	   from	   the	  
organization	   would	   in	   the	   preparatory	   stage	   create	   different	   roadmaps	   in	   line	   with	  
Rothstein’s	  advice.	  Even	  though	  UNCTAD	  is	  on	  paper	  “a	  neutral	  organization”	  it	  is	  tainted	  by	  
its	   past.	   Thus,	   UNCTAD	   experts’	   perceptions	   of	   how	   the	   world	   looks,	   will	   most	   likely	   be	  
ignored	   by	   delegates	   from	   the	   North.	   UNCTAD	   as	   a	   forum	  would	   have	   had	   difficulties	   in	  
being	   an	   institutional	   space	   where	   the	   strengths	   of	   (b)	   and	   (c)	   are	   displayed.	   However,	  
UNCTAD	  was	  successful	  in	  achieving	  (d)	  generating	  for	  many	  involved	  people	  positive	  stakes	  
in	  its	  own	  success	  (i.e.	  the	  developing	  countries).	  
7.3.2 Worst	  case	  scenario	  for	  GCD	  
“In	  an	  ideal	  world,	  every	  country	  –	  or	  perhaps	  even	  every	  person	  –would	  sit	  around	  a	  giant	  
table	  and	  have	  its	  voice	  heard.	  That	  policy	  because	  it	  is	  guided	  by	  all	  voices,	  would	  been	  seen	  
as	  fair	  and	  representative	  and	  thus	  legitimate	  […]	  But	  that	  ideal	  world	  doesn’t	  exist	  because	  
policy	  making	  at	  the	  international	  level	  is	  peculiarly	  vulnerable	  to	  gridlock”	  (Victor	  2011:210)	  
It	  is	  with	  these	  somber	  words	  David	  Victor	  argues	  that	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  that	  thrives	  
in	   the	   UN	   stating	   that	   “the	   bigger	   talks	   lead	   to	   a	   more	   fair,	   legitimate,	   and	   effective	  
outcomes”	  is	  wrong	  (Victor	  2011:211).	  He	  is	  describing	  the	  GCD	  gridlock	  relating	  to	  climate	  
change,	  but	  it	  still	  relates	  to	  the	  same	  dynamics	  one	  is	  witnessing	  in	  UNCTAD	  and	  other	  UN-­‐
organization	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  solve	  malignant	  global	  problems	  with	  an	  economic	  core.	  	  
Underdal	   (2012:6-­‐7)	  also	  outlines	  some	  of	  vulnerabilities	   that	  GCD	  faces:	  “(a)	  deadlock	  
over	  basic	  principles	  (pertaining,	  for	  example,	  to	  responsibilities	  and	  duties);	  (b)	  internal	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coalition	   dynamics	   that	   enhance	   polarization;	   (c)	   obstinate	   veto	   players,	   taking	  
advantage	  of	  the	  consensus	  requirement	  to	  thereby	  exert	  greater	   influence;	  (d)	  strains	  
of	   global	   competition	   over	  wealth	   and	  power,	   enhancing	   actors’	   concern	  with	   relative	  
gains	  and	  losses;	  and	  (e)	  the	  burden	  of	  overwhelming	  complexity”.	  
These	   are	   some	  of	   the	   reasons	   that	  made	  one	  observer	   argue	   that	   in	   order	   to	  meet	   new	  
global	  challenges	  one	  must	  step	  away	  from	  GCD:”The	  UN	  and	  conference	  diplomacy	  serve	  as	  
road	   blocks”.	   He	   used	   climate	   change	   as	   an	   example	   “I’m	   interested	   in	   action	   on	   climate	  
change	   so	   I	   don’t	   care	   how	   it	   happens,	   ideally	   around	   a	   table	   with	   194	   countries	   with	  
consensus.	  But	  if	  this	  is	  not	  going	  to	  happen	  and	  not	  happening	  now,	  we	  cannot	  afford	  to	  sit	  
around	  and	   think;	   ‘Jeez,	   I	  wish	   it	  would	   happen’“(NGO,	   respondent	  N).	   This	   is	   in	   line	  with	  
Victor	   (2011:6)	   who	   argues	   that	   in	   diplomacy	   there	   is	   a	   myth;	   when	   heroic	   mega-­‐
conferences	  “fail	  to	  produce	  consensus	  the	  diplomatic	  community	  doesn’t	  shift	  course,	  but	  
merely	   redoubles	   its	   efforts	   to	   find	  universal,	   binding	   law”.	   This	   is	   one	  of	   the	   factors	   that	  
produce	  «diplomatic	  zombies”	  that	  “hold	  endless	  meetings	  yet	  never	  succeed	  or	  die”	  (Victor	  
2011:260).	  	  	  
It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   Expert	   Lunde	   argues	   that	   the	   deadlock	   over	   principles	  
relating	  to	  responsibility	  in	  the	  climate	  change	  negotiations	  stems	  from	  the	  NIEO	  era.	  In	  
other	  words,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  some	  elements	  in	  a	  GCD	  worst	  case	  scenario	  that	  are	  of	  
a	   general	   nature	   (1)	   asymmetric	   interests	   between	   countries,	   (2)	   disagreement	  
concerning	   burden	   sharing.	   At	   all	   times	   there	   will	   be	   GCD	   processes	   that	   are	   in	   a	  
deadlock	  due	   to	   contrasting	   interests	   that	  are	  difficult	   to	  bridge.	   Yet,	   gridlocks	   in	  GCD	  
cannot	  be	  reasons	  “to	  give	  up	  the	  system”.	  	  Situations	  can	  become	  so	  urgent	  and	  critical	  
that	   one	   has	   to	   reach	   agreement,	   thus	   a	   common	   understanding	   of	   the	   crisis	  
(consensual	   knowledge)	   has	   always	   been	   the	   main	   driver	   in	   getting	   results	   in	   GCD	  







UNCTAD	  in	  relation	  to	  GCD	  weaknesses	  
One	  observer	  argued	  that	  “In	  terms	  of	  effectiveness,	  UNCTAD	  is	  not	  very	  effective	  but	  then	  
most	   global	   intergovernmental	   negotiations	   face	   the	   same	   problem.	   WTO	   is	   stuck,	   the	  
climate	  change	  negotiation	  is	  stuck,	  and	  Rio	  didn’t	  work.	  UNCTAD	  doesn’t	  work,	  but	  so	  what,	  
it	  is	  the	  same	  as	  everybody	  else”	  (NGO,	  respondent	  N).	  WTO	  is	  also	  struggling	  with	  a	  political	  
stalemate	  and	  has	  not	  completed	  the	  Doha	  round	  negotiations	  which	  began	  in	  2001.	  Yet	  the	  
diplomatic	   gridlock	   is	   of	   a	   different	   character	   than	   the	   gridlock	   in	   UNCTAD.	   In	  WTO	   it	   is	  
clearer	  why	  there	  is	  disagreement	  because	  it	  is	  due	  to	  national	  economic	  interests;	  it	  rarely	  
entails	  symbols	  or	  issues	  of	  a	  normative	  character.	  Thus,	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  UNCTAD	  it	  
became	   clear	   that	   the	   situation	   in	   UNCTAD	   is	   especially	   malignant.	   UNCTAD	   has	  
experienced	  (a)	  Deadlock	  over	  basic	  principles.	  All	   respondents	  argued	  that	   in	  UNCTAD	  
XIII	   this	  was	  the	  major	   issue	  causing	  complete	  gridlock.	  All	  problems	  with	  an	  economic	  
core,	   like	   trade	   and	   development	   and	   climate	   change,	   become	   vulnerable	   to	   the	  
question	   of	   “whose	   fault	   is	   this”	   and	   “who	   should	   pay	   for	   this”.	   The	   North-­‐South	   rift	  
with	  contending	  perceptions	  of	  the	  world	  serves	  to	  politicize	  and	  aggregate	  tensions.	  	  
(b)	  Internal	  coalition	  dynamics	  that	  enhance	  polarization	   is	  definitely	  a	  feature	  which	  is	  
present	   in	   UNCTAD,	   as	   well	   as	   all	   other	   fora	   where	   the	   North/South	   block	   structure	  
appears.	  SG	  Ricupero	  remarked	  that	   the	  North-­‐South	  divide	   in	   theory	  made	  sense,	  but	  
“in	   practice	   this	   ‘block	   system’	   proved	   to	   be	   excessively	   rigid	   and	   thus	   incapable	   of	  
capturing	   the	   individual	   nuances	  within	   each	   group”	   (UNCTAD	   2004:xii).	  What	   further	  
complicated	  the	  matter	  is	  the	  participation	  of	  extreme	  actors	  who	  are	  able	  to	  influence	  
the	   position	   papers	   in	   a	   direction	   that	   intensifies	   polarization.	   The	   dynamics	   of	   the	  
process	   itself	   seem	   to	   heighten	   the	   polarization;	   “Only	   after	   group	   positions	   are	  
hammered	  out	  do	  intergroup	  negotiations	  begin	  in	  UNCTAD;	  the	  result	   is	  rigid	  maximal	  
demands	  confront	  rigid	  minimal	  concessions”	  (Walters	  1972:832)	  	  	  
(c)	   Obstinate	   veto	   players,	   taking	   advantage	   of	   the	   consensus	   requirement	   to	   thereby	  
exert	  greater	  influence.	  Underdal’s	  concept	  of	  the	  “Law	  of	  the	  least	  ambitious	  program”	  
is	  relevant	  for	  UNCTAD.	  	  Walters	  (1972:832)	  underlined	  this	  factum	  in	  UNCTAD	  in	  1972.	  	  
(d)	  Strains	  of	  global	  competition	  over	  wealth	  and	  power,	  enhancing	  actors’	  concern	  with	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relative	  gains	  and	   losses.	   Several	   respondents	  believed	   that	  development	   issues	  are	   in	  
the	   end	   an	   economic	   issue.	   Respondents	   from	   the	   South	   argue	   that	   the	   North	   is	  
concerned	  with	  their	  relative	  power	  and	  wealth	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  BRICS.	  	  
(e)	   The	   burden	   of	   overwhelming	   complexity	   is	   also	   something	   that	   is	   described	   and	  
captured	  through	  the	  variable	  of	  consensual	  knowledge.	  	  
Even	  though	  the	  GCD	  method	  has	  inherent	  weaknesses	  one	  must	  also	  take	  into	  account	  that	  
GCD	  and	  the	  UN	  are	  something	  more	  than	  mere	  tools.	  Expert	  Skogmo	  argues	  that	   the	  UN	  
system	  evidently	  is	  an	  arena	  for	  member	  states	  to	  safeguard	  and	  to	  promote	  their	  national	  
interest.	   “But	   the	  UN	   should	   be	   something	  more	   –	   it	   also	   the	   foremost	   intergovernmental	  
system	  we	  have	  to	  determine	  and	  to	  promote	  common	  global	   interests”.	  This	  commonality	  
of	  interest	  is	  often	  hard	  to	  find	  and	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  negotiate	  and too	  often,	  the	  UN	  
becomes	   a	   scapegoat	   for	   lack	   of	   agreement	   among	   its	   owners,	   i.e.	   the	   member	   states	  
(Skogmo	   2009).	   	   Given	   the	   key	   role	   of	   the	   UN	   system,	   for	   instance	   in	   negotiating	   and	  
monitoring	   global	   norms,	   it	   becomes	   too	   reductionist	   to	   judge	   the	   UN	   only	   in	   terms	   of	  
development	  effectiveness	  (ibid).	  	  UN	  agencies,	  with	  their	  global	  membership,	  are	  very	  often	  
at	   a	   disadvantage	   when	   competing	   with	   more	   focused,	   streamlined	   and	   donor-­‐driven	  





8  Post reflections:       
 The future of UNCTAD as a forum                                 
A	  ‘dinosaur’	  that	  has	  not	  managed	  to	  adapt	  	  
The	   majority	   of	   my	   respondents	   believed	   that	   UNCTAD’s	   future	   was	   dark.	   All	  
respondents	  agreed	  that	  “something	  must	  be	  done”	  in	  order	  to	  make	  UNCTAD	  effective.	  
One	   observer	   used	   a	   software	   analogy	   to	   explain	   where	   we	   are	   today:	   “You	   have	   a	  
software	   version	  1.0	  and	  we	  are	  now	  up	   to	   version	  1.687,	   all	   you	  need	   is	   a	   version	  2.0.	  A	  
rethink,	  a	  redesign	  of	  the	  UN.	  And	  I	  think	  it	  is	  part	  of	  that	  redesign	  UNCTAD	  needs	  to	  be	  shut	  
down	   because	   it	   perpetuates	   the	   North-­‐	   South	   rift	   that	   is	   not	   very	   constructive”	   (NGO,	  
respondent	  N).	  The	  sentiment	  expressed	   is	  that	  UNCTAD	  is	   in	   itself	  a	  product	  of	  history	  as	  
the	   North-­‐South	   rift’	   and	   the	   ‘context	   of	   the	   1960’s’	   is	   deeply	   ingrained	   in	   UNCTAD’s	  
structure.	  The	  observer	  argued	  that	  the	  shutdown	  of	  UNCTAD	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  happen	  in	  the	  
foreseeable	   future;	   “UNCTAD	  will	   live	   long	  as	  a	  weak	  and	   ineffective	  organization	  without	  
any	  significant	  changes	  to	  its	  mandate”	  (NGO,	  Respondent	  N).	  	  
A	  respondent	  from	  the	  South	  told	  me	  “After	  the	  experience	  of	  Doha,	  I’m	  afraid	  UNCTAD	  as	  a	  
forum	   is	   becoming	   less	   relevant”	   (MIC,	   respondent	   O).	   He	   argues	   that	   the	   developed	  
countries	   do	   not	   find	   UNCTAD	   useful	   and	   therefore	   the	   forum	   will	   lose	   significance.	   He	  
explained	  how	  the	  discussions	  in	  UNCTAD	  are	  much	  broader	  than	  in	  the	  WTO,	  but	  that	  there	  
is	   something	   intrinsically	   good	   in	   having	   a	   broad	   discussion.	  We	   can	   “express	   our	   desire,	  
principles	  and	  position,	  but	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  end	  at	  this	  point	  and	  there	  is	  no	  practical	  
consequences	   afterwards”	   (MIC,	   respondent	   O).	   Another	   respondent	   was	   pessimistic	  
concerning	   the	   future	   of	   the	  North-­‐South	   dialogue	   in	   general;	   “We	  are	   extremely	  worried	  
now.	  We	  called	  it	  the	  crisis	  of	  multilateralism	  that	  has	  emerged	  over	  the	  last	  5	  years	  […]	  In	  a	  
way	   it	  could	  be	  termed	  as	  a	  North-­‐South	  dialogue	  which	  has	  become	  dysfunctional”	  (Think	  
tank,	   Respondent	   D).	   In	   summary,	   respondents	   from	   both	   the	   North	   and	   South	   were	  





8.1.1 A place for UNCTAD in the ‘Beyond Aid Era’? 
An	  expert	   hoped	  UNCTAD	   could	  have	  become	   the	   ‘third	  world	   countries’	  OECD’.	  UNCTAD	  
could	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	   future	   as	   a	   think	   tank.	   He	   suggested	   that	   UNCTAD’s	   Trade	   and	  
Development	  Board	  could	  play	  a	  strategic	   leading	  role	  as	  a	  governing	  body	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	   intergovernmental	   forum	   functions	   can	   be	   shut	   down.	   Respondents	   told	   me	   that	  
UNCTAD	  has	  already	  played	  a	  role	  in	  giving	  advice	  to	  the	  larger	  developing	  countries	  that	  are	  
a	  part	  of	   the	  G-­‐20.	  One	   respondent	  argued	   that	  developing	  countries	  have	   little	  access	   to	  
think	   tanks	   that	   can	   help	   them	  within	   the	   trade	   area	   and	   that	   they	   can	   trust,	   except	   the	  
South	   Centre.	   The	   developing	   countries	   know	   that	   UNCTAD	   has	   supported	   them	   since	   its	  
establishment.	  UNCTAD’s	  history	  can	  be	  a	  positive	  feature	  and	  an	  advantage	  in	  becoming	  a	  
think	  tank	  for	  the	  G77.	  It	  can	  support	  and	  give	  differentiated	  advice	  to	  the	  various	  fractions	  
within	   the	  G77-­‐	   coalition	   (BRICS,	  MIC	   and	   LDC).	   Another	   reason	  why	  UNCTAD	   could	   have	  
been	  a	  think	  tank	  is	  because	  many	  respondents	  argue	  that	  UNCTAD’s	  mandate	  still	  remains	  
relevant.	  UNCTAD	  has	  a	  broader	  view	  of	  the	  development,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  aid.	  In	  the	  HDR	  2013	  
it	  was	  written	  that	  one	  of	  key	  drivers	  of	  development	  in	  the	  South	  was	  “a	  strong,	  proactive	  
and	  responsible	  state”	  (HDR	  2013b:4).	  This	  echoes	  what	  UNCTAD	  has	  been	  stating	  since	  its	  
establishment.	  	  
	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Expert	   argued	   that	   if	   UNCTAD	   is	   to	   be	   reformed	   and	   become	  
relevant	   it	   seems	   important	   that	   the	  emerging	  economies	  become	  more	  active	  drivers	   for	  
change.	  The	  countries	   in	   the	  North	  have	  other	   forums	  and	  no	   strong	   incentives	   to	   reform	  
UNCTAD.	  The	  emerging	  economies	  are	  writing	   in	   their	   communiqués	  and	  speeches	  all	   the	  
“right	   things”	   concerning	   the	   strengthening	   of	   UNCTAD,	   yet	   what	   do	   they	   do	   to	   support	  
UNCTAD	   in	   practice?	   They	   are	   creating	   other	   arenas,	   like	   the	   BRICS	   bank.	   Through	   the	  
concept	  of	  “forum	  shopping”	  one	  can	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  that	  ‘big	  hitters’	  (like	  China,	  
India	  and	  Brazil)	  will	  perceive	  UNCTAD	  as	  the	  organization	  that	  can	  best	  provide	  them	  with	  
advice	  and	  relevant	  expertise.	  The	  emerging	  economies	  situation	  is	  very	  different	  compared	  
to	   the	   LDC	   group	   in	   the	   basic	   game.	   On	   the	   multilateral	   arena	   emerging	   economies	   can	  
easier	  forum	  shop	  and	  even	  create	  their	  own	  institutions	  tailored	  to	  their	  needs.	  Therefore	  it	  
is	  more	   likely	   that	   the	  MIC	  and	   LDC	   countries	  will	   have	   stronger	   incentives	   to	   reform	  and	  
change	   UNCTAD	   as	   the	   organization’s	   mandate	   and	   function	   is	   more	   “suited	   to	   their	  
108 
 
interests”.	   Whether	   the	  MIC	   and	   LDC	   countries	   are	   strong	   enough,	   have	   the	   capacity	   or	  
interest	  to	  change	  and	  reform	  UNCTAD	  remains	  an	  open	  question.	  	  	  
A	   comprehensive	  approach	   to	  development	  has	  become	   the	  new	   trend	   in	   the	  new	  
era	   ‘Beyond	  Aid’.	   In	  a	  changing	  world	  where	  one	   is	  gaining	  a	  “more	  balanced	  view”	  of	  the	  
world	   economy	   and	   where	   one	   sees	   a	   role	   for	   the	   state,	   there	   is	   room	   for	   multilateral	  
institutions	   that	   have	   alternative	   views	   compared	   to	   IMF,	  WB	   and	  WTO.	   If	   UNCTAD	   had	  
managed	  to	  reform	  and	  adapt	  to	  the	  changing	  realities,	  there	  could	  potentially	  be	  a	  place	  for	  
a	  reformed	  UNCTAD	  in	  this	  new	  era.	  If	  UNCTAD	  continues	  to	  cling	  to	  the	  past,	  it	  will	  sink	  into	  
oblivion	   and	   become	   a	   ‘diplomatic	   zombie’	   reminding	   us	   of	   the	   failure	   of	   GCD	   and	   how	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Appendix	  A:	  List	  of	  Respondents	  	  
Interviews	  conducted	  in	  2011	  
July	  2011	   Geir	  Myrstad,	  Head	  of	  operations	  International	  Programme	  on	  the	  elimination	  
of	  child	  labour-­‐	  IPEC,	  ILO.	  
July	  2011	   Geir	  Myrstad	  and	  an	  UNCTAD	  employee.	  
July	  2011	   Miguel	  Bautista,	  Chief	  Liason	  officer	  in	  UNCTAD.	  Has	  previously	  been	  a	  
delegate	  from	  the	  Philippines	  covering	  UNCTAD	  in	  NY	  and	  was	  lead	  negotiator	  
for	  G77.	  
Interviews	  conducted	  in	  2012	  
December	  
2012	  
Bjørn	  Skogmo,	  UN	  Ambassador	  for	  the	  Permanent	  Mission	  of	  Norway	  to	  the	  
United	  Nations	  in	  Geneva,	  Wrote	  the	  background	  report	  to	  St.meld.nr.	  33	  
December	  
2012	  
Fredrik	  Arthur,	  Ambassador	  of	  Gender	  equality	  at	  the	  Norwegian	  Ministry	  of	  
Foreign	  Affairs.	  Covered	  UNCTAD	  as	  Embassy	  counsellor	  the	  Permanent	  Mission	  
of	  Norway	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  Geneva	  from	  2004-­‐	  2008.	  
December	  
2012	  
Kåre	  Stormark,	  Deputy	  Director-­‐General	  of	  the	  Departement	  for	  UN,	  Peace	  and	  
Humanitarian	  Affairs	  in	  the	  Norwegian	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  Covered	  
UNCTAD	  when	  he	  was	  a	  Minister	  Counsellor	  at	  the	  Permanent	  Mission	  of	  
Norway	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  Geneva	  from	  2010-­‐2012.	  
Interviews	  conducted	  in	  2013	  
March	  2013	   Bjørn	  Skogmo	  	  
January	  
2013	  
Didrik	  Tønseth,	  Minister	  Counsellor	  at	  the	  Permanent	  Mission	  of	  Norway	  to	  the	  
UN	  in	  Geneva.	  
January	  
2013	  
Jan	  Hoffman,	  Chief	  of	  trade	  facilitation	  section,	  UNCTAD.	  
January	  
2013	  
Juan	  C.	  Sanchez	  Troya,	  Head	  of	  G77	  from	  the	  Permanent	  Mission	  of	  Ecuador.	  
March	  2013	   Leiv	  Lunde,	  Director	  of	  Fridtjof	  Nansen	  Institute,	  has	  covered	  UNCTAD	  both	  as	  




Luisa	  A.	  R	  Ortega,	  Economic	  Affairs	  Officer	  in	  UNCTAD,	  previously	  diplomat	  
covering	  WTO	  negotiations	  at	  the	  WTO	  mission	  of	  Venezuela.	  Has	  also	  worked	  
with	  the	  South	  Centre.	  














2013	   Development	  (IISD),	  Europe.	  
January	  
2013	  
Masoumeh	  Sahami	  UNCTAD,	  Chief,	  Intergovernmental	  Support	  Service	  and	  
Secretary	  of	  the	  Trade	  and	  Development	  Board.	  
January	  
2013	  
Miguel	  Bautista	  	  	  
January	  
2013	  




Mongi	  Hamdi,	  Head	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  UNCTAD.	  
January	  
2013	  
Moshe	  Kao	  Minister	  Counsellor	  at	  the	  Embassy	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Lesotho,	  
former	  head	  of	  G77	  in	  2011.	  
January	  
2013	  




Vicente	  Paolo	  Yu,	  Head	  of	  Administration	  and	  Programme	  Coordinator	  of	  
Global	  Governance	  for	  Development	  at	  the	  South	  Centre.	  
January	  
2013	  
Vlasta	  Macku,	  Chief,	  UNCTAD	  Virtual	  Institute.	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Appendix B: Timeline provided in elite interviews (2012 and 2013) 
 
Appendix C: Definition of criteria provided in elite interviews (2012 and 2013) 
To what extent has UNCTAD achieved to: 
1. Set the agenda  
 
Agenda setting can be defined as “a process by which demands by various actors at different levels are 
translated into items vying for the attention of policymaking organs” (Bergesen and Lunde 1999:4). 
 
2. Promote a common understanding 
 
IGOs are supposed to organize and facilitate discussions where the nature and scope of a certain 
problem needs to be ‘solved’. Another aspect is that there needs to be agreement of the cause and effect 
relationships in the problems addressed. 
 
3. Give Policy advice 
 
The IGO can “translate the normative principles into action at the nation level” (Bergesen and Lunde 
1999:8). In order to propose recommendations for government policy the IGO needs to possess 
expertise and have sufficient legitimacy (Bergesen and Lunde 1999:8).    
 
